

U.S.I. JOURNAL

INDIA'S OLDEST JOURNAL ON DEFENCE AFFAIRS

(Established : 1870)



PRINCIPAL CONTENTS

- Living with Nuclear Neighbours — *Col R Rama Rao (Retd)*
Unity in Diversity or Diversity in Unity — *Lt Col Y S Panwar*
Unity, Integrity and Harmony — *Maj Gen Y A Mande*
Tomorrow's Automated Battlefields — *Maj Gen V K Madhok*
Integrated Training-Mechanised Forces — *Brig Gurdial Singh*
The CR—to Show It, or Not to Show It — *Brig N B Grant (Retd)*
The Past French 'Connection' — *Lt Gen SL Menezes*
Khan Bahadur Sher Jang — *JAF Dalal*

JANUARY—MARCH 1987

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED © Rs. 10.00 PUBLISHED QUARTERLY
NEW RATES Rs. 15.00

JOIN USI Correspondence Courses And **JAWAB** for Your Career

Courses run by the USI

<i>Course</i>	<i>Date of Commencement of the course</i>
—DSSC Entrance Examination, held in Apr every year.	01 Aug
—Technical Staff College Course (TSC) Entrance Examination, held in Nov every year.	01 Apr
—Part 'D' Promotion Examination, to be held in Sep every year	01 Mar
—Part 'B' Promotion Examination, to be held in Feb every year	01 Aug
—DSSC Air Force Entrance Examination, held in July every year	01 Mar

Tuition Fee

Tuition fee in respect of each course is as follows :

<i>Course</i>	<i>For all Subjects</i>	<i>For each Subject</i>
DSSC [Army] [six subjects]	Rs. 500/-	Rs. 100/-
TSC [Army] [one subject]		Rs. 100/-
Part 'D' [Army] [five subjects]	Rs. 350/-	Rs. 80/-
Part 'B' [Army] [four subjects]	Rs. 250/-	Rs. 75/-
DSSC Air Force [three subjects]	Rs. 250/-	Rs. 90/-

For further details please write to the Director of Studies :

UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA
Kashmir House, Rajaji Marg, NEW DELHI-110011.

The
Journal
of the
United Service Institution
of
India

Published by Authority of the Council



(Established : 1870)

Postal Address :

KASHMIR HOUSE, RAJAJI MARG, NEW DELHI-110011
Telephone No 3015828

Vol. CXVI

JANUARY—MARCH 1987

No. 487

USI Journal is published Quarterly in April, July, October and January. Subscription : Rs. 40 per annum, Single Copy : Rs. 10. Foreign (Sea Mail) \$4.00 or £1.25. Subscription should be sent to the Secretary. It is supplied free to members of the Institution. Articles, Correspondence and Books for Review should be sent to the Editor. Advertisement enquiries concerning space should be sent to the Secretary.

**UNITED
SERVICE
INSTITUTION
OF INDIA**

for

*the furtherance of
interest and know-
ledge in the art,
science and litera-
ture of the Defence
Services*

Patron

The President of India

Vice-Patron

Governor of Andhra Pradesh
Governor of Assam, Meghalaya
Governor of Bihar
Governor of Gujarat
Governor of Haryana
Governor of Himachal Pradesh
Governor of Jammu & Kashmir
Governor of Karnataka
Governor of Kerala
Governor of Madhya Pradesh
Governor of Nagaland, Manipur and Tripura
Governor of Orissa
Governor of Punjab
Governor of Rajasthan
Governor of Sikkim
Governor of Tamil Nadu
Governor of Uttar Pradesh
Governor of West Bengal
Lt Governor of Arunachal Pradesh
Lt Governor of Delhi
Lt Governor of Goa, Daman and Diu
Lt Governor of Mizoram
Lt Governor of Pondicherry

Minister of Defence

Gen K Sundarji, PVSM, AVSM, Chief of the Army Staff
Admiral RH Tahiliani, PVSM, AVSM, ADC, Chief of the Naval Staff
Air Chief Marshal DA La Fontaine PVSM, AVSM, VM, ADC,
Chief of the Air Staff

President

Lt Gen KK Hazari PVSM, AVSM, Vice Chief of the Army Staff

Vice-Presidents

Vice Admiral JG Nadkarni, PVSM, AVSM, NM, Vice Chief of the
Naval Staff
Air Marshal S Raghavendran, PVSM, AVSM, Vice Chief of
the Air Staff

Elected Members of the Council

Lt Gen ZC Bakshi, PVSM, MVC, VrC (Retd)
Lt Gen (Dr) ML Chibber, PVSM, AVSM, PhD (Retd)
Brig NB Grant, AVSM (Retd)
Lt Gen JFR Jacob, PVSM (Retd)
Lt Gen SP Malhotra, Padma Bhushan, PVSM (Retd)
Vice Admiral S Mookerji, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)
Vice Admiral KK Nayyar, PVSM, ADC (Retd)
Lt Gen SF Rodrigues, VSM
Lt Gen AM Sethna, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)
Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh, VrC (Retd)
Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, AVSM, VrC, AM
Lt Gen RK Jasbir Singh, PVSM (Retd)
Lt Gen ML Thapan, PVSM (Retd)
Lt Gen M Thomas, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)

Representative Members

Lt Gen FT Dias, AVSM, VrC, Director General Military Training
Commodore HL Sachar IN, Director of Naval Training
Air Vice-Marshal S Chand, VM, Director of Trng. Air HQ

Ex-Officio Members

Shri SK Bhatnagar Secretary, Ministry of Defence
Air Marshal PK Puri, VSM Commandant, National
Defence College
Lt Gen FM Bilimoria, PVSM, Commandant, Defence
Services Staff College

Shri VS Jafa, Financial Adviser, Ministry of Defence

Executive Committee

Lt Gen KS Gill, PVSM, Director General Military Training
Shri SK Misra, JS (G), Ministry of Defence
Air Vice Marshal S Chand, VM Director of Training, Air HQ
Commodore HL Sachar, IN, Director of Naval Training
Shri CV Avadhani, Fin-Def (AG)
Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, AVSM, VrC, VM

Director and Editor
Col Pyara Lal, AVSM

CONTENTS

January—March 1987

Living with Nuclear Neighbours	—Col R Rama Rao (Retd)	1
Unity in Diversity or Diversity in Unity	—Lt Col Y S Panwar	22
Unity, Integrity and Harmony	—Maj Gen Y A Mande	41
Tomorrow's Automated Battlefields	—Maj Gen VK Madhok	53
Integrated Training-Mechanised Forces	—Brig Gurdial Singh	58
The CR—to Show It, or Not to Show It	—Brig N B Grant (Retd)	65
The Past French 'Connection'	—Lt Gen SL Menezes	73
Khan Bahadur Sher Jang	—JAF Dalal	78
A Further Analysis of I.O.M. and I.D.S.M. Awards from Secondary Sources	—C J Parrett	81

Book Reviews	96
--------------	----

India's Problems of National Security in the Seventies—*Gen J N Chaudhuri*; India's Defence Policy and Organisation Since Independence—*P V R Rao, ICS (Retd)*; Some Problems of Defence—*Air Chief Marshal P C Lal, DFC (Retd)*; Defence and Development—*H C Sarin, ICS (Retd)*; The Indian Ocean and India's Maritime Security—*Admiral S N Kohli, PVSM*; Nuclear Battlefields—Global Links in the Arms Race—*William M Arkin and Richard W Fieldhouse*; Nuclear Weapons? Policy Options for India—*Bhabani Sen Gupta and Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi*; Nuclear Proliferation and International Security—*K Subrahmanyam*; Fundamentals of Tactical Command and Control—A Soviet View—*Ivanov, Savel'yev, and Shemanskiv*; Air Power in Modern Warfare—*Air Cmde Jasjit Singh, AVSM, VrC, VM*; British Air Strategy Between the Wars—*Malcolm Smith*; No Fire No Thunder: The Threat of Chemical and Biological Weapons—*Sean Murphy, Alastair Hay, Stelen Rose*; Gulf Security into the 1980s: Perceptual and Strategic Dimension—*Robert G. Darius, John W, Amos and Ralph H. Magnus*; The PLO and Palestine—*Abdallah Frangi*.

Letters to the Editor	131
-----------------------	-----

NOTE

The views expressed in this Journal are in no sense official and the opinions of contributors in their published articles are not necessarily those of the Council of Institution

USI PUBLICATIONS

USI NATIONAL SECURITY PAPERS

- Para Military Forces
by Lt Gen ML Chibber, PVSM, AVSM Price : Rs. 10.00
- Defence Budgeting in India
by Shri DS Nakra (Retd) Price : Rs. 10.00
- Possible Counter Measures against Satellite
Reconnaissance
by Air Marshal IW Sabhaney, AVSM Price : Rs. 10.00
- Higher Defence Organisation
by Lt Gen SK Sinha, PVSM (Retd) Price : Rs. 10.00
- Leadership in the Indian Army During
Eighties and Nineties
Lt Gen ML Chibber, PVSM, AVSM Price : Rs. 10.00
- China's Strategic Posture in the 1980's (Revised)
by Lt Gen AM Vohra, PVSM Price : Rs. 15.00

USI SEMINARS

- Report on Armoured Personnel Carriers
Chairman Maj Gen D Som Dutt (Retd) Price : Rs. 5.00
- Report on the Imposition of a Manpower
Ceiling on the Army
Chairman Lt Gen ML Thapan, PVSM (Retd) Price : Rs. 5.00
- Retiring Age in the Armed Forces
Chairman Brig NB Grant, AVSM (Retd) Price : Rs. 7.50
- Report on Recruitment into the Officer Corps
of the Armed Forces
Chairman Maj Gen D Som Dutt (Retd) Price : Rs. 5.00
- Report on a Seminar on Cooperation in Defence
Chairman Lt Gen ML Thapan, PVSM (Retd) Price : Rs. 5.00
- Report on a Seminar on Review of the Organisation
Pattern of the Indian Army
Chairman Lt Gen ML Thapan, PVSM (Retd) Price : Rs. 10.00
- Report on the Military Threat in the Nineteen Eighties
Chairman Lt Gen AM Vohra, PVSM (Retd) Price : Rs. 15.00
- Report on Nuclear Shadow over the Sub-Continent
Chairman Maj Gen DK Palit, Vrc Price : Rs. 10.00
- Relationship of Military Law and Discipline with the
Judicial System of the Country
Chairman Lt Gen ML Thapan, PVSM (Retd) Price : Rs. 15.00

USI NATIONAL SECURITY LECTURES

- India's Problems of National Security in the Seventies
by Gen JN Chaudhuri Price : Rs. 10.00
- India's Defence Policy and Organisation Since
Independence
by Shri P.V.R. Rao, ICS (Retd) Price : Rs. 25.00
- Some Problems of India's Defence
by Air Chief Marshal PC Lal, DFC (Retd) Price : Rs. 25.00
- Defence and Development
by Shri HC Sarin, ICS (Retd) Price : Rs. 25.00
- The Indian Ocean & India's Maritime Security
by Adm SN Kohli, PVSM (Retd) Price : Rs. 25.00
- Internal Threats and National Security
by Shri Govind Narain, ICS (Retd)

USI JOURNAL CENTENARY NUMBER

- Contains informative and authoritative articles Price : Rs. 15.00

Ask for your copy from :

Secretary, United Service Institution of India
Kashmir House, Rajaji Marg, New Delhi-110011

Living with Nuclear Neighbours

COL R RAMA RAO (RETD)

“YOU CANNOT LIVE IN THE SEA AND CREATE
ENMITY WITH WHALES. YOU HAVE TO BE
FRIENDLY WITH THEM.”

General Mohammad Zia ul Haq

INDIA'S SECURITY CONCERNS

WE have been having serious security problems with some of our neighbours, almost from the time we emerged as a free nation forty years ago. Our freedom was hard won and cost us dear. Pre-partition riots organised by fanatical sections of people of the subcontinent with the support of British officials in what are now Pakistan and Bangladesh, inflicted not merely deep psychological wounds on millions of our men, women and children—but also deprived the refugees who fled for safety here, of their ancestral homes and properties. Despite the humiliations, losses and sufferings that our neighbour inflicted on our people, our leaders consistently endeavoured to foster feelings of good neighbourliness with Pakistan. However, the latter consistently maintained an anti-Indian stance at home and in international fora. Pakistani leaders over the years have invariably succeeded in attaining their ends vis-a-vis this country thanks to the support they received from powerful forces that are out to exploit Indo-Pak differences to further their own strategic and economic interests in the region.

The ruling elite in Pakistan, during the past four decades have sought to condition the minds of their people to a permanent anti-India stance chiefly for ensuring their own survival. In fact the basis of their domestic and foreign policies has been vehement anti-Indianism. This is one area of concern for India, as it gives rise to problems affecting our national economy and our external as well as

internal security. External powers have their regional interests which also directly and otherwise impinge on our own security and nation's well being.

A realistic assessment of our neighbours' attitudes to current problems and their likely reactions to events in the future is thus essential. So are periodical assessments of American and Chinese interests and activities in the region. We may therefore consider our overall security concerns in the light of Pakistan's attitudes towards us based on historical developments within Pakistan itself, the China factor, America's economic and strategic objectives in the region, events in West Asia and Afghanistan and their impact, and the spread of nuclear capabilities in the region and its fall out.

THE PAKISTAN FACTOR

Pakistan came into being because of the efforts of the elite elements of the Muslim Community in India (principally in Uttar Pradesh, Hyderabad and Bombay), to have a homeland of their own. This suited the departing colonial power which wanted to retain a foothold in their erstwhile dependency as they believed that it would help them safeguard their interests in Iranian and Iraqi oilfields and their other interests at Bahrain and in the Gulf generally.¹ This was of no concern for India which had accepted partition as having become inevitable although it deeply regretted the mass killings, looting, arson and harassment of refugees that preceded and followed the country's partition. Pakistan's founder president, Mahammad Ali Jinnah, in his earlier speeches had visualised a secular Pakistan, where all, irrespective of colour, creed or religion, would be equal citizens. Soon, however, the Kashmir issue was raised, encouraged by Britain, and the bogey of religion became an important and useful element of Pakistan's domestic and external policies. In particular, the Kashmir issue has been the immediate cause of Pakistan-India conflicts of 1948 and 1965. These two wars predictably left bitter legacies on both sides of the border. The Kashmir issue continues to provide a convenient tool in the hands of some Pakistani politicians to whip up anti-Indian feelings.

THE 1965 WAR

Pakistan's then ruler Ayub Khan initially was somewhat alarmed at China's action in invading and occupying large chunks of

Indian territory in 1962. After listening to Bhutto's analysis of events he began to think that it was a welcome development for Pakistan as India was weakened, and humiliated and that Indian leaders and army were proved to be incompetent and lacked the will to fight. However, after 1962, a reluctant India slowly began rebuilding its forces. India's armament programmes were delayed mainly because after supplying some small arms, USA delayed and eventually stopped supplies following Pakistan's protests, Britain effectively denied supplies by long delays. However, India managed to strengthen her forces and when the test came in 1965, Indian forces held their ground forcing back Pakistani attackers.

Although Indian forces had to fight with obsolescent weapons, while Pakistani forces could bring to bear on our forces superior American gifted arms, they lost the day, leaving India in occupation of sizeable areas of Pakistan's heartland in Punjab. Thanks to Soviet mediation resulting in the Tashkent accord, Pakistan got back the territory it had lost. In any case India, for its part, never wanted and does not want an inch of Pakistani or any other country's territory.

The repercussions of the 1965 war in Pakistan were many. President Ayub Khan lost his credibility since his American friends had apparently decided to teach him a lesson.² Shortly after the end of the 1965 war, or even as the American ambassador was talking to president Ayub, in not very complimentary terms, the CIA was apparently planning a coup to unseat Ayub Khan, and was trying to recruit General Azam Khan, a former Governor of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). Gen. Azam, however, proved to be loyal to President Ayub Khan and informed the latter of CIA's efforts.³

American arms twisting of Pakistan was the consequence of Pakistan's increasingly closer contracts with China and the Soviet Union. While the latter was neutral in the Pakistan-India war, China was overtly sympathetic to Pakistan. As early as November 1963, while meeting Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in Washington at President Kennedy's funeral, President Lyndon Johnson expressed displeasure at Pakistan's "flirtation with China".⁴ Pakistani leaders including the staunchly anti-communist Ayub Khan felt that given American attitudes (*i.e.* failure to support Pakistan in its adventure against India) China was their sole support.⁵ In fact when confronted by

Americans during the course of his visit to the United States in December 1965, President Ayub Khan reportedly stated⁶ that "if we break with the West, we might lose our economy. If we break with China, we might lose our country".

China in Pakistan's perception thus emerged as a power which would ensure Pakistan's security and integrity although the former might have had some reservations especially regarding East Pakistan.

AFTER EFFECTS

The effects of the 1965 war on Pakistan and the region generally were predictably far reaching. A clearer assessment of the war and its aftermath has been made in Pakistan, after the fall of Bhutto, than in this country. The war signalled the beginning of the end of Ayub Khan's regime. More importantly it gave rise to bitter feelings among Pakistanis that Americans were untrustworthy but correspondingly raised China's stock. In East Pakistan, as it then was, Bangladeshis who till then were staunch Pakistanis lost faith in central leadership and West Pakistanis generally and built up the movement for autonomy of East Pakistan⁷ (Sheik Mujib ur Rehman's Six Points demanded in February 1966). Eventually they launched the struggle for the liberation of Bangladesh.

POST 1965 ANALYSIS OF EVENTS

Pakistan's elite representing practically all shades of public opinion have been analysing the events of the Sixties and brought out the issues referred to earlier. These have lessons, as much for us as for the people of Pakistan themselves. Their postmortem of the 1965 war too has highlighted some points which ought to be of equal interest to us. Among these are :

1. The operation, referred to as 'Gibraltar' or the infiltration into Kashmir in August 1965, though conceptually good as military operations go was launched without adequate preparation;
2. "The mood of Kashmiris had not been understood, and they had not been psychologically prepared for a break with India. A sufficient number of infiltrators had not been sent in earlier to destroy India's installations in Jammu and Kashmir and to be ready to cut off road links and disrupt supplies." Extensive

preparations are necessary before guerilla operations can be undertaken in a target country;

3. Higher leadership had failed to consider possible responses from India and were taken by surprise when India reacted across Punjab's borders;
4. "The 1965 war should never have been started. It was started by Bhutto, Aziz Ahmed, then Foreign Secretary, and Nazir Ahmed, then Defence Secretary in the hope that there would be reverses for Pakistan for which the blame could be laid on Ayub Khan who would get pressed to quit and make room for younger leadership"⁸. Reportedly this was the observation of an upright and a political Pakistani officer, Nawabzada General Sher Ali and of two ex-ministers of Azad Kashmir whom Mir Abdul Aziz had met in 1970.

We may also add to these, the US factor. Pakistan, as was evident from President Johnson's displeasure at Pakistan-China friendship, could not expect any support from its then sole benefactor, supporter and arms supplier.

Regarding Mr. Bhutto's part in pushing Ayub Khan into the 1965 war, we in India may have to await further information and disclosures. He certainly forged friendship with China. But the foundations for this were laid by Mohammad Ali of Bogra, Pakistan's prime minister in the Fifties when he assured Chou en Lai at Bandung that Pakistan's alliance with USA and membership of SEATO and CENTO was purely opportunistic and was intended solely for securing that country's economic, defence and political support against India and that Pakistan bore no ill will whatsoever against China.

THE 1966-1971 INTERLUDE

This was the period of uncertainty for Pakistan's military rulers as well as the vocal sections of the people of Pakistan. Post 1965, while China-Pakistan friendship matured and deepened because of the congruence of their interests vis-a-vis India, Pakistan-Soviet Union relations too were reasonably friendly. From Pakistan's point of view the Soviet Union had behaved correctly, rescued it at Tashkent and had been providing it with weapons besides industrial

technology such as setting up a steel plant at Karachi. In contrast, USA despite over a decade long military pact, never assisted Pakistan in the latter's industrial development. At that time USA continued to be suspicious of China for several reasons. The Vietnam war was still ranging with its end not in sight. Both the Soviet Union and China were helping Vietnam to protect its independence and a measures of understanding appeared to exist between the two communist powers despite Soviet's withdrawal of technical and economic assistance to China at the end of the Fifties. China itself, in the early and mid Sixties was in turmoil because of intra-party struggles and the Cultural Revolution.

Towards the end of the decade, a sea change had occurred in Super Power relations which had their effects on events in third world countries. Richard Nixon had been elected to the White House. He studied the progress of the Vietnam war carefully, noted the waning enthusiasm of USA's European allies to their war as well as the rising costs of the war to America itself. Although initially he strove to pursue the war with vigour, Nixon soon realised that the war was unpopular with his own troops and besides, the South Vietnamese leadership had proved to be incompetent and unreliable. Hence he sought to evolve a strategy for US withdrawal from the theatre without loss of face.

In the wider context too action on these lines appeared to be prudent. After the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviets had quietly been adding to their nuclear arsenal and although US remained far ahead of its rival in nuclear weapon strength, it could no longer dictate to the latter. Furthermore it seemed to be in US interests to pursue detente with the Soviet Union. Only thus could USA recover from the debilitating and demoralising effects of the Vietnam war on the American people. Not merely this, President Nixon was quick to realise that the 1969 Ussuri border clash arising from China's unprovoked attack on Soviet troops in the areas was in fact a signal, loud and clear, to USA that Sino-Soviet relations had not only ceased to be cordial but also that China was ready to break relations with its erstwhile ally and benefactor and could consider mending fences with USA, its adversary since the Korean war.

By training and temperament, Nixon was an arch conservative, yet was a shrewd political leader and like Churchill was prepared to

trade with the devil if that furthered his country's interests as he saw them. As a conservative, Nixon inherited the attitudes and prejudices of British and American right wing groups in favour of dictatorships and right wing regimes in the Third World and suspicions regarding those regimes which try to be neutral. In the context of the subcontinent, he was clearly predisposed in favour of Pakistan and against India. This opened the way for Sino-US rapprochement which was to blossom into close understanding and eventually into strategic alliance in all but name.

American administration resumed military supplies to Pakistan, though as a 'one-time exception' and the process of getting back Pakistan into the American fold began. The prime movers here were the powerful body of pro-American Pakistan military officers most of whom had received advanced training in American military establishments and constituted a powerful lobby in their country. Pakistan's military officers, senior and junior, meanwhile were also being increasingly exposed to contacts with Chinese personnel which served to strengthen their belief that they could depend upon China to help them in settling scores with India. General Yahya Khan had visited China several times and had established good relations with China's leadership. Hence he could confidently undertake and succeed in his mission of getting Chinese and American heads of state together, which has had a profound impact on super power relations and world events generally.

Both China and USA recognised the general's role in paving the way for closer Sino-US relationships and duly rewarded Pakistan by greater military aid and support in attaining its regional goals. The stage was set for greater power for Pakistan's military establishment and its disastrous role in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) not long after.

THE 1971 CRISIS

While Gen. Yahya Khan was building up his own position as a valuable emissary for USA and in consequence, Pakistan's status in the region, the people of the Eastern Wing were becoming increasingly disenchanted with the Western wing. The armed forces and higher civil services were the latter's monopoly. Immigrants from Bihar and eastern Uttar Pradesh, known as 'Biharis', held all the middle level and technicians jobs. Both these categories of Pakistanis

were, with good reason, looked upon by the local population as selfish, unprincipled, haughty and oppressive. The psychological break between the people of the two wings, which proved to be irreversible, came about when the East Wing suffered immense flood damage and loss of life in 1970 and Pakistan's military rulers betrayed their callous disregard for the lives of the people of the East Wing. The seeds for East-West conflict, however, had been sown by Ayub Khan much earlier when he tried to impose Urdu as the national language, as a consequence, of which language riots broke out spontaneously. Shortly thereafter Ayub Khan wanted to 'get rid' of Pakistan's inconvenient Eastern appendage.⁹ A pro West Wing politician from Dacca, Abdul Rehman Chowdhury¹⁰ had also declared, after the 1965 war, when the East felt neglected, that if the West Wing could not protect the East, the latter had no need of the former. The growing disenchantment with the West Wing following the 1970 floods left Sheik Mujib ur Rehman with no option but to demand full autonomy for the East Wing.

PAKISTAN'S FREE ELECTIONS

General Yahya Khan, to his credit took two steps which could have built up a democratic Pakistan, preserved its unity and ensured its orderly progress. He scrapped Ayub Khan's One Unit Scheme which had resulted in Punjab's dominance and suppression of minority provinces and restored the Frontier Province Baluchistan and Sind to their earlier status and identities as separate provinces. He also ordered elections to the Central and Provincial legislatures which were free and fair. Probably Yahya Khan had hoped that such an election would result in people of different political hues being returned with no clear majority for any established political party or group, and so enable him to rule as before with support from one or other political group. In the event, however, Sheik Mujib's Awami League captured practically all the seats in the East Wing while Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party emerged with an impressive majority in the West Wing.

Given the East Wing's larger population and correspondingly more seats in the Central legislature, Sheik Mujib's party had a safe working Parliamentary majority. These results certainly upset Bhutto whose aim was to be Pakistan's Prime Minister. He must have reasoned that if, as was evident, the East Wing was not dis-

posed to accept him, he had better take steps to get the troublesome East Wing out of his way, just as Ayub had reasoned earlier.

Sheik Mujib's growing popularity and the tacit support he received from Baluchi and Pathan nationalists alarmed Bhutto who aligned himself with Yahya Khan. The latter had a sizeable force in the East Wing. Sheik Mujib and his followers sensing danger decided to convene the National Assembly at Dacca. This would not suit Bhutto and the stage was set for a civil war.

Sheik Mujib had sensed that Bhutto would not let the electoral verdict, which was decisively in his favour, be implemented as that would mean his remaining in opposition or at best accept an ineffective position in Mujib's government. To Yahya Khan and his close associates in the army, it seemed that a show of force would fragment the East Wing's predominant political party and soon it would be 'business as usual'. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's visit to Dacca, his confabulations with Yahya Khan and his generals on the spot and his return to the West Wing shortly before the fateful day in March 1971, suggest that Yahya Khan had Bhutto's support for the massacre of Bangladeshis that was planned by the Army. Sensing that Pakistan's military rulers may be planning to nullify people's verdict, Sheik Mujib thought that he could pre-empt them by presenting once again his six point plan for a confederal type of government.

The military were in no mood to let Mujib's Plan materialise as that could end their supremacy. Accordingly, Mujib soon followed up his demand for full autonomy, by going one step further and declaring the independence of Bangladesh, which was greeted by his people spontaneously and with enthusiasm unparalleled in history.

Meanwhile Yahya left Dacca for Karachi and once aboard his aircraft, gave his infamous order "Sort them out", to General Tikka Khan who was the local Marshal Law Administrator. Service Officers like Sahebzada Yakub Khan and Admiral Hussain who were averse to the impending military action, quietly resigned and moved out to the West Wing.

MASSACRE OF THE INNOCENTS

Pakistan's military leaders had made preparations for using brutal force in order to stifle dissent. Hence on receiving Yahya Khan's formal order Tikka Khan's troops surrounded the Dacca University Campus at night and began shooting students, teachers and staff, and burning buildings to ensure that Bengali intelligentsia who led the freedom movement were obliterated. Simultaneously, Dacca's residential colonies, where Sheik Mujib and his close supporters were staying, were encircled and Mujib and his senior supporters taken prisoner. The Sheik was sent to the West Wing to languish in prison till his followers waged and won their war of national liberation.

The Dacca massacres were repeated in other urban centres to eliminate all Bangladeshi professionals, public servants, policemen, and members of auxiliary and regular forces besides students and all others who opposed or may in the future oppose Pakistani rule. Pakistani objective, as described by foreign newsmen then in Bangladesh was to 'decapitate' Bangladesh, that is destroy the leadership potential of the local population and fill the void quickly by immigrants from the West Wing, in order to 'Pakistanise' the area.

The inhumanities, looting, burning and methodically executed genocidal operations of Pakistan's armed forces in Bangladesh in the wake of the "sort them out" campaign steeled the will of Bangladeshis to free themselves. Fortunately for them, Major Zia ur Rahman (later General and President of Bangladesh), Major Musharaf (later Brigadier and for a short period officiating head of the Army), Col. Mazumdar who subsequently died, and Mr. Siddique rallied Bangladeshi military, para military and police personnel besides students and other young men in their respective areas and made them into coherent resistance units, who as guerrillas hit Pakistani forces and their henchmen hard. Their contribution to the victory that was to come was immense.

THE EXODUS TO INDIA

Pakistani army's savagery at Dacca, which spread immediately throughout the East Wing, achieved its aim namely to terrorise the population. Pakistan's leaders had hoped that the fear stricken

people of Bangladesh would, from then onwards, remain docile and submit to Pakistani overlordship. Their spirit of independence had, however, been aroused and they chose to flee to Indian borders and enter India to prepare for active rebellion and gain their independence. Those who sought safety in India were Bengali Muslims. The Hindus were too frightened to move and hence stayed on in the early stages and were preparing for the worst. In less than a month, over ten million Bengali refugees moved into West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Tripura. Thereafter, their numbers swelled to over twelve million. Some dedicated leaders also had managed to cross over and soon organised their followers, consolidated a small area of their country adjoining West Bengal and established a Government in Exile from which they directed a resistance movement in Pakistani occupied Bangladesh with skill and perseverance.

To stop further exodus into India, as it had drawn world attention to the atrocities being committed by their troops in Bangladesh, Pakistani commanders deployed their forces close to India's borders and sealed all exit points. This, as later events proved, was a tactical blunder as its forces inside the country were thinly spread and Bangla freedom fighters (the Mukti Bahini) began to operate with courage and devastating effect on Pakistani troops and pro Pakistani elements. The Bahini's own morale and that of their suffering people rose remarkably and the end was soon in sight.

India was concerned at the vast numbers of refugees that were to be looked after and the consequent direct and indirect costs to India's economy and well being. International public opinion too was the horror struck at the genocidal mania of Pakistani troops and the indignities on women and children inflicted by them. China and the United States were the exceptions. The former was discreetly silent, as its commitment to Pakistan was limited to maintaining the integrity of the West Wing. It wanted an independent Bangladesh. This could enable it to gain control of a port in the Bay of Bengal and eventually dominate South East and South Asia. USA for its part decided that it was to its interest to see no evil, hear no evil and speak no evil regarding Pakistan's behaviour in Bangladesh, since Pakistan had served its strategic interests by opening the way to an understanding with China. If India suffered in the process, well, USA was not concerned.

Pakistanis in desperation attacked India as reprisal for sheltering Bangladeshi refugees and India in self defence had to repel the attackers. Bangladesh won its freedom and India in the larger interest of peace in the subcontinent took charge of over 90,000 Pakistani troops and repatriated them to their country.

POST 1971

Predictably the 1971 war brought the reputation of Pakistan's military, especially the army, to its nadir. People in Punjab were disillusioned and wanted a change to civilian rule. The minority provinces were relieved, as they could not forget Pakistani army's bombings of innocent Baluchi villagers and the studied discrimination against the Sindhis. It was in this setting that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then at the UN arguing against India, came back to take over as his country's civilian prime minister.

THE SIMLA AGREEMENT

Given the trauma caused by the breakaway of Bangladesh and the army's, Bhutto's part in it, Pakistanis, especially the armed forces accepted Bhutto as the best bet for Pakistan at that point of time. He set for himself several national tasks. First, to secure the return of the territory lost during the war and the repatriation of Pakistani prisoners. Second, economic recovery after the ravages of war. Third, rebuilding Pakistan's image in China, the Muslim world and USA. Overriding these tasks, was the need, as he saw it, for a Pakistani bomb, ever since India's defeat in 1962 and China's entry into the 'nuclear club'. In order to recover the territory Pakistan had lost, he entered into an agreement with Mrs. Gandhi at Simla in July 1972, recognising the 'line of actual control' in Kashmir as the international border¹¹ between India-Pakistan and to resolve all differences between the two countries bilaterally and not involve United Nations organisations or other external agencies in such talks.

Following the agreement, 'the Kashmir issue receded further into the background in the context of Pakistan's domestic politics'.¹² Mr. Bhutto's objective of defusing the Kashmir issue was achieved, although in order to contain anti Bhutto feelings among Islamic fundamentalists, and for purposes of record he used to say that the

future of Kashmir would be determined by Kashmiris themselves and that Pakistan cannot but be concerned with the Kashmir issue because of "their indissoluble bonds"¹³ with the people of Jammu and Kashmir.

PAKISTAN'S ISLAMIC BOMB

With the Kashmir obsession thus out of the way, Bhutto was free to chart out Pakistan's future and secure his own as well. He took steps to lay the foundations for Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme and forged closer alliances with Arab states and Libya to raise funds and assistance for this project. As early as the summer of 1972, Bhutto called an epoch making session of his Pakistan People's Party at Multan with the objective of providing Pakistan with a new constitution under which he would stay at the helm of affairs for a period of 15 years. His other objective was to utilise the occasion to gather Pakistan's scientists together and urge them to dedicate themselves to the task of providing Pakistan with the Islamic bomb. Abdul Qadir Khan, then working in West Europe was also present and enthusiastically agreed to do his best; others assembled too promised support. From Libya, Bhutto secured uranium from the mines in Niger besides generous funds. Saudi Arabia too underwrote the project. Thus the needed finances and vital raw material were procured by Bhutto while A.Q. Khan set about gathering technological data and sensitive equipment needed for processing raw uranium into weapon grade material. Although the enrichment route was pursued in earnest only after 1974/75 when Khan once again met Bhutto, the plutonium route was being explored almost immediately after the Multan decision.

Two other factors had their impact on Bhutto's bomb project. First, the uranium enrichment effort was entirely Khan's and few if any even in Pakistan (or Holland for the matter of that) were aware of Khan's plans and modus operandi. USA was unaware of these secret plans and hence had no reason to alert its own intelligence agencies. Second, in any case Pakistan's importance for USA had considerably diminished following the rise of Iran as an important power and US gendarme in the Gulf region, after US forces cut down the scale of their operational commitments in the Indian Ocean following detente with the Soviet Union.

But USA came hard on Pakistan when it realised that the latter was trying to secure a reprocessing plant from France. Pakistan for

its part was also negotiating with France for a 500-1000 MW nuclear power plant. Pakistan's argument for public consumption was that it would need a reprocessing plant for recovering plutonium and unburnt uranium from this reactor's spent fuel. The French, in furtherance of their commercial interests undertook to set up a fuel reprocessing plant, which after completion would have provided Pakistan with the means to produce sufficient plutonium for the series production of nuclear warheads. Since Pakistan did not have an energy producing programme justifying the construction of a reprocessing plant, American policy makers realised that once the plant was in position, Pakistan would become an impressive nuclear power. This in turn would pave the way for the entry into the exclusive nuclear club of many countries not all of whom may be USA's dependable allies or surrogates. In the case of Pakistan, it appeared to US at that time that the bomb in Pakistan's hand would in fact become the dreaded Islamic bomb and employed to threaten Israel and with that USA's interests in West Asia and perhaps beyond. Hence in the summer of 1976, when the French-Pakistan deal seemed to have been finalised and drawings for the proposed plant together with some components had already reached Karachi, USA compelled France to renege on its assurances to Pakistan. At first France offered to modify the plant and reprocessing technique so that the plutonium derived from the plant would be suitable for power reactor use and not for weapon fabrication. Since Pakistan would not bite the bait, Dr. Kissinger, at a meeting with Pakistan's then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Aziz Ahmed, warned the latter that the United States would make "a horrible example"¹⁴ of that country (Pakistan) if it persisted in building nuclear installations clandestinely. This was the beginning of the end for Bhutto. It also proved to be the beginning of more active phase of Pakistan's secret quest for getting the weapon. Bhutto manipulated election results held in 1976-77, although he had in fact secured an overwhelming majority for his party even without counting the additional votes secured by questionable methods. This proved to be extremely costly for him, since it involved him in election fraud cases.

The secession of Bangladesh and its prelude, namely the inhumanities committed by Pakistan's military rulers on those that were till then their compatriots, was to a large extent due to Bhutto. But he did lay a firm foundation for Pakistan's bomb and further strengthened the Sino-Pak axis directed against India. The irony here was that Bhutto did make his unwilling contribution to the secession

of Pakistan's then Eastern Wing. But he also contributed much to Pakistan's stability in the aftermath of the 1971 war by making honourable peace with India, and securing for Pakistan at conference table at Simla the return of Pakistan's 90,000 troops held prisoner in Bangladesh and vast areas of Pakistan's heartland, which the Pakistan army had lost in war.¹⁵ He had also endeavoured with some success to reduce the dominance of Pakistan's army in public life, which had dragged his country into an unwinnable war in 1971. The 1965 war and consequent losses for Pakistan and Ayub Khan in particular was to some extent, also of Bhutto's making. Shortly after assuming office as Prime Minister he dispersed the generals who may have had political ambitions and appointed General Tikka Khan as the army chief. Tikka had no such ambitions and has been a staunch Pakistani although he had earned the sobriquet 'butcher of Baluchistan' for his indiscriminate use of Pakistani army and air force units in bombing, shelling and setting fire to Baluchi villages in the early Sixties. He lived up to this reputation in Bangladesh as Yahya Khan's chosen instrument for carrying out the 'sort them out' operation.

Inducting Tikka Khan as Pakistan's army chief was Bhutto's opening move designed to reduce, if not eliminate the army's dominance and so minimise the chances of the revival of 'Bonapartism'¹⁶. Bhutto introduced the system of Joint Chiefs of Staff under a civilian defence minister (himself) so that individual service chiefs' powers could be effectively circumscribed. However, US policy makers suspected that he (Bhutto) was not dependable and that American interests in Pakistan would be safer if Pakistan's army was in control of that country. This eventually cost Bhutto not only his position as Pakistan's head but eventually his life as well. Most ironically the individual who secured his arrest, imprisonment and, for all practical purposes, secret execution was the person whom Bhutto had promoted out of turn and later installed as army chief, General Zia ul Haq.

The general at first was very deferential towards Bhutto. Soon Zia got his potential rivals in the armed forces out and paved the way for his benefactor's incarceration and eventual execution, which international media described as judicial murder.¹⁷ Zia assumed full powers reviving martial law although to start with, he announced that he would hand over power to a civilian government within 90 days.

From mid 1977, after Bhutto's judicial murder, to the closing months of 1979 when events in Afghanistan claimed world attention and suddenly enhanced Pakistan's utility for USA, Zia had to move with the utmost caution. Bhutto's execution and the manner in which Zia sought to perpetuate his and the army rule had aroused deep suspicions in the minds of the people especially in Sind, Baluchistan and to a lesser extent among Pathans. Nor have these been allayed even now, after a decade of Zia's rule. With characteristic adroitness he managed the domestic crisis by repeatedly declaring his intention to Islamise the country since Pakistan came into existence only because of the desire of the people to have a land of their own where Islam would be supreme. This posture not only served to moderate domestic opposition but also gain unqualified support, financial and other, from affluent Arab States. The oil boom multiplied job opportunities for Pakistanis in Gulf countries and with that remittances from expatriates including over 30,000 military personnel serving with the forces of West Asian States. This was the principal reason for sustaining Pakistan's economy despite enormous defence outlays and infructuous expenditure on paramilitary forces and the proliferating civilian/military bureaucracy.

During the uncertain two years for Zia, starting from mid 1977, he was subjected to discreet pressures from USA to abandon Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme. But he let Abdul Qadir Khan secretly proceed with his work unhindered, although for public consumption he repeatedly affirmed that Pakistan wanted nuclear technology for peaceful purposes only.

By 1978 west Asian situation had altered dramatically. The Shah of Iran abdicated and fled as he could not manage the domestic crisis, brought about by USA through its West European associates by supporting Ayatollah Khomeini then in exile in Paris and arranging his return to Iran. Developments in Afghanistan too appeared to be none too comforting for the West. Hence Pakistan became invaluable for USA. The latter wanted to monitor events in Afghanistan from close quarters and derive maximum benefit for itself while bringing about maximum losses for its adversary, USSR. China's approach was identical. Thus the Sino-US-Pak alliance became closer in the context of South Asia.

This Sino-US commitment for Pakistan enabled the latter to accelerate its nuclear efforts and even unveil it partly on occasions to secure its political ends. Thus, as early as April 1979, Zia ul Haq

had mentioned to the then US Deputy Secretary of State, Warren Christopher,¹⁸ that Pakistan intended developing the bomb since India already possessed it and the situation in Iran and Afghanistan was unstable. At about the same time Senator Zablocki had justified Pakistan's efforts to produce the weapon in order to safeguard its security.

INDIA'S SECURITY PROBLEM

India ought to have woken up to the developing nuclear threat to its security at least by 1980 when Pakistan began to step up the scale of enrichment and production of nuclear material. Because of the progress achieved in bomb material production, General Zia in 1979 could confidently reject President Carter's aid offer of \$ 400 mn as 'peanuts', knowing that USA for its own reasons would come forward sooner than later with substantial aid offers. This came about almost immediately with Reagan's election as US President and total commitment to Pakistan, giving it virtually the green signal for going ahead with its nuclear plans. Induction of powerful 'state of the art' air, sea and land equipment from USA soon followed, and now USA is stationing in Pakistan AWACs operated by US pilots which can monitor all vital installations deep in our country. Further,¹⁹ USA has undertaken to share the intelligence gathered by its agencies pertaining to India, Afghanistan, and Iran, with Pakistan.

By mid 1984, if not much earlier, Pakistan was producing enriched uranium on an 'assembly line' scale as noted by Senator Cranston²⁰ after his visit to Pakistan. Thus Pakistan is set to produce not a 'few bombs' but a sizeable arsenal rivalling Israel's. It is not merely quantity production but more importantly of bomb grade enrichment of the material, as was known in Pakistan long before and brought to the notice of friends and foes alike by the father of Pakistan bomb programme, A.Q. Khan himself,²¹ when he declared that Pakistan can enrich uranium to 90 per cent and beyond and that his country "can compare itself with Britain and West Germany in this respect" leaving India far behind. More recently Zia too has said this.²² While stressing that Pakistan's programme is for peaceful purposes, he added that Pakistan could enrich uranium to 90 per cent or higher level. More significantly he also indicated that confrontation with India cannot be ruled out. This is a blunt message to India to take due note of Pakistan's nuclear status and vastly reinforced conventional and nuclear might. It is also a

message to USA to recognise its nuclear status in view of that country's need for Pakistan in the global as well as regional context. This message is applicable to China as well. Both USA and China are aware that if such a course seems advantageous to Pakistan, it would not hesitate to improve its relations with the Soviet Union. China itself is set on the same course, although haltingly. The consequence will be that Pakistan will not have to worry about its west flank and can devote its attention to the eastern flank. Even after reducing its commitment to Afghan and other guerrillas operating in Afghanistan, Pakistan is assured of USA's help, since the latter's interest in the former 'transcend Afghanistan'. In any case USA wants to fight in Afghanistan only 'to the last Afghan' as noted by a perceptive observer, Selig Harrison. USA supports Pakistan as quid pro quo for providing bases for US rapid deployment forces and monitoring facilities. If need be US can intervene covertly in other countries of the subcontinent and the Gulf region from its firm bases in Pakistan. This alliance with USA enabled Pakistan to receive economic aid besides total diplomatic support despite its nuclear programme which has already matured, making it the Israel of South and South West Asia. In consequence USA shares with Pakistan all vital information gathered by US monitoring agencies concerning India, Afghanistan and Iran. Hence our western flank is extremely vulnerable. So is our northern flank with China having positioned in Tibet its nuclear weapons. The only targets for these missiles are India and possibly Vietnam.

Four decades ago we tried appeasement by recognising Tibet's annexation by China. Later we compromised again and again by trying to ignore its nibbling of our territory in the north and north-east only to reap the bitter harvest of 1962.

In this world of two distinct and mutually exclusive castes of the nuclear 'haves' and 'have nots', in any dispute between the two, the former will always prevail. Further USA's war doctrines are based on the premise that if need be it would preempt with a nuclear strike. This is Pakistan's approach too as declared by A.Q. Khan. The same would be China's approach vis-a-vis India, notwithstanding its proforma declarations to the effect that it will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike. Indian planners ought to recall that Chinese spokesmen were hinting in the Seventies that they may test fire their intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) then under development, from their test ranges in Tibet or Sinkiang, across continental India, into the Arabian Sea, leaving us to draw the

obvious inference that all vital targets in India are within China's reach and are highly vulnerable.

We will, however be far less vulnerable when we acquire a reasonable sized arsenal ourselves. Co-existence with nuclear neighbours will be easier, indeed will only be possible if we also wish to preserve our integrity and freedom, when we have the means to convince potential nuclear aggressors that if attacked we would respond in kind. Our nuclear neighbour who is in forcible occupation of a neighbouring country to our north and of vast areas of our own is more likely to respect our rights if we acquire effective means for defending them. A super power whose declared nuclear policy is to use nuclear weapons pre-emptively is most likely to do so against third world countries that strive to adopt independent policies and foster economic and technological cooperation amongst themselves. India is thus a possible target for this power too. The menacing threat from our western neighbour, with its own independent nuclear arsenal is too glaring to be ignored. A determined India, with an adequate nuclear arsenal would, however, be better able to stand up to these threats, from whichever quarter they may originate.

The President as well as the Prime Minister have recently indicated that, if threatened, India will take suitable action.²³ This has to be followed up with demonstrable action; otherwise there is the danger of potential aggressors treating our declarations of intent as routine and lacking purpose.

REFERENCES

1. Sir Olaf Caroe, Secretary, in pre-partition India's Political Department had noted in his "Wells of Power" that the 'fertile crescent' covering Iranian and Iraqi oil fields and the Gulf area generally was of great importance to Britain, since the British Admiralty owned a sizeable part of the assets of the old Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Britain through the pre-revolution Iraqi government also controlled Iraq's Mosul oilfields. Additionally she had a naval presence at Bahrain in the Gulf in order to safeguard her interests in the area.
2. The then US ambassador in Pakistan shortly after the start of the 1965 war reportedly told President Ayub Khan, "with supreme arrogance, 'The Indians have got you by the neck, Mr. President, haven't they.'"

Mushahid Hussain

"1965 : A debate in Pakistan"

'The Muslim', Islamabad; September 6, 1986.

3. Ibid. London's "Daily Telegraph" of September 13, 1965, carried this story.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid. Mushahid Hussain concludes that "China emerged as the biggest winner of 1965 by winning the hearts and minds of Pakistanis".
6. Ibid.
7. "Kashmir Factor in Pakistan's Politics". Mir Abdul Aziz in 'Muslim', November 14, 1986.
8. "Operation Gibraltar—why it failed?" Mir Abdul Aziz in 'Muslim', September 9, 1986.
9. Justice Munir, former Chief Justice of Pakistan.
10. See reference at no. 2.
See also Sangat Singh: "Pakistan's Foreign Policy", 1970, pp. 4, 5 and 15. According to Ayub Khan as recounted in "Friends, not Masters", p. 548, Pakistan with the two wings physically as well as otherwise separated by a vast distance did not have the sine qua non for forming a nation. Hence separation of the two wings was inevitable, he had said.
11. "The Simla agreement did signal Pakistan's acceptance of the ceasefire line in Kashmir even though India had gained territory in the Kargil Sector".
Mir Abdul Aziz; 'Kashmir factor in Pakistan's politics' in 'Muslim', Islamabad, November 14, 1986.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Report in 'Jung', Karachi, reproduced in 'Statesman', November 10, 1977. Maulana Kauser Niazi, a one time associate of Bhutto has now disclosed that since A.Q. Khan was confident of enriching uranium to weapon grade purity, Bhutto should not waste time and money on spent fuel reprocessing to recover plutonium. He had also said that the French equipment and technology offered was inefficient. Hence Bhutto cleverly engineered American pressure on France to renege on the proposed deal. This way, Bhutto had told his close followers, Pakistan would not only be able to come out of the inconvenient deal but also secure compensation from France for breach of contract.
Niazi in "Aur Line Kut Gai", 'Times of India', March 30, 1987.
15. 'White Paper' on Kashmir issued by Pakistan government, reproduced in 'Pakistan Times', Lahore, January 16, 1977.
16. Ibid.
17. In what is regarded as his testament "If I am assassinated" (Ed. Pran Chopra, New Delhi, 1979) written when he was languishing in jail in solitary confinement and stoically awaiting execution, Bhutto gave expression to his anguish and recalled that he had resisted pressures from the most powerful external force and not only had laid the foundations for Pakistan's nuclear weapon competence but had also

achieved substantial progress towards that end. He also records, not without justification, that the coup to get rid of him was supported by agencies.

18. Report in 'Jang', Karachi and 'Hindustan Times', April 8, 1979.
19. Report in 'Times of India', March 27, 1987.
20. Senator Alan Cranston in his speech in US Senate on June 21, 1984. See US Senate proceedings reproduced in 'Strategic Digest', Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi; August 1984, pp. 827-833.
21. An interview with A.Q. Khan by news reporters; 'Times of India', March 14, 1985.
22. Report of an interview with General Zia ul Haq; 'Time', March 30, 1987, pp. 4-6.
23. President Giani Zail Singh speaking at a seminar in New Delhi on March 29, 1987 said that India too can make a nuclear bomb if needed and the neighbouring countries trying to destabilise this country should take note of it. Report in 'Times of India', March 20, 1987.

Earlier during the month, the Prime Minister too had mentioned that if the need arises, India may have to reconsider its nuclear option.

Unity in Diversity or Diversity in Unity *

LT COL Y S PANWAR

["*Leave India to God.....*"]

—MAHATMA GANDHI

PROLOGUE

The ensuing essay was written in the circumstances prevailing in our country in the autumn of 1985. In the period since then, not only have the forces encouraging divisive tendencies that existed then consolidated but, a large number of new ones have raised their ugly heads. The threat posed by these fissiparous forces is getting increasingly menacing by the day. The assault against the symbols of nationhood viz the national anthem, the Constitution and the call for boycott of the Republic Day celebrations are, if not acts of treason, at least indicative of the degeneration that has taken place in higher values and ethics of our society. In short, the situation today, if not altogether gloomy, is far worse than what it was two years ago.

Though much of what was written in the original essay holds good today, there has been a phenomenal increase in violence in the country that make it imperative to update the essay.

INTRODUCTION

FOR a nation whose history dates back to the earliest of civilisations, 39 years is just a fleeting moment. For centuries together India was not a nation in the sense that we understand the word today. The country was divided into a number of kingdoms and principalities fighting amongst themselves. This was so during the reign of mythical Rama, the great emperors Ashoka, Chandragupta and Akbar as also the mighty British. Yet in the midst of the disunity there survived a geographical entity called Bharatvarsha.

The events since independence and in particular the last two decades however have had many amongst us ponder over our ability to remain united as a nation. Though the pressures have been

* Gold Medal Competition. Awarded Cash Prize.

building up over a period of time, it is only the recent events in Punjab, Gujrat and Assam and the assassinations of Mrs Indira Gandhi and Sant Langowal indicated that we had reached a flash point. The situation has been defused somewhat by the signing of the accords for Punjab and Assam.

In 1931, while on his way to attend the Round Table Conference, Gandhiji was asked about the nature of the Constitution he would like to have. He replied, "I shall strive for a Constitution which will release India from all thralldom and patronage, and give her if need be, the right to sin.....there shall be no high or low class of people, an India in which all communities shall live in perfect harmony"¹. On attaining independence, we gave ourselves a Constitution which enshrined the Gandhian concept of free India. It sought to secure for all citizens justice, liberty, equality and fraternity. Our founding fathers, in all their wisdom, chose for us a structure for governance that was federal though with a unitary bias. And for the first time in our history, our own chosen representatives were to govern us through a democratic form of government. Yet today, it is our statute itself that is suspected of being a major destabilizing factor.

While departing, many of our erstwhile rulers apprehended a major holocaust to engulf the country. For a couple of decades we did survive our freedom in a period of relative calm.....which if one sees today the strife ridden atmosphere all round, was may be the lull before the storm. Fissiparous tendencies can be seen erupting all over. Cries of regionalism are gathering momentum and the whole fabric of society seems ready to tear apart under the tensions of caste, creed, class, race and religion. Social and moral values have degenerated to an abysmal low. Corruption, if not directly encouraged, is surely overlooked by the government and has thus become an accepted way of life. All this is occurring even as the gulf between the haves and have nots keeps widening.

Anandpur Sahib resolution and its cynical interpretations and the rhetoric of regionalistic forces notwithstanding, one cannot discern any serious secessionist trend as yet. However, the very fact that the cry today from many a States is for 'Diversity in Unity' and not 'Unity in Diversity' as is cherished by the central leaders, portends a situation wherein we may not find it possible to survive within the framework we had laid down for ourselves viz a modified federal structure governed through a parliamentary democracy.

What ails our body politic today? Where does the fault lie—in the structure or form of governance, the general disregard for higher values of life, the resurgence of the individual's search for identity, the degradation in political life and ideologies or does it lie in our unrealistic post independence aspirations? Is it that we are the envy of some foreign powers to whom a strong and united India is an anathema? Can we apportion blame for the prevailing state of affairs onto any one individual or a group of them? And finally, is there a way out of this terrible mess that we find ourselves in? These are some crucial questions that are on the mind of every responsible citizen today. Let us then attempt to analyse the situation and look for ways to bring about greater harmony all round.

CENTRE STATE RELATIONS—CALLS FOR A REVIEW

In her history prior to 1947 the whole of India had never been governed by any single authority. A large number of empires sprang up at different times which, while exercising a central authority of sorts, invariably left the local administration undisturbed. Even the Moghuls and the Britishers had to accept the reality of over 600 princely states. The founding fathers of our Constitution were conscious of the fact that India is a multi-religious, multi-lingual nation with a wide diversity of philosophical thought, cultural patterns and social structures. Such a diversity initially prompted the idea of federalism (of the form defined by Prof Birch, i.e. "a federal system of government is one in which there is a division of powers between one general and several regional authorities, each of which, in its own sphere, is co-ordinate with the other").²

As our freedom movement gathered momentum, the form of federalism earlier visualised underwent a metamorphosis. In the Congress—Muslim League Pact of 1916, it was visualised that all subjects excluding Foreign Affairs, Defence, Customs and Currency were to be provincial or state subjects. There was to be no concurrent list. The Quit India Resolution of 1942 also maintained the same position. What then perhaps motivated the architects of our Constitution to finally opt for a strong Centre was the pain of partition, the communal riots and the aggressive moves by certain foreign powers.

Before delving into the reasons for the rising crescendo calling for a review of the Centre—State relations as laid down in our statute, it would be worth recalling the statements made by some of our founding fathers, for these give an insight into their moral strength, character and stature. In fact the Constituent Assembly debates should be

made compulsory reading, for they enable one to capture the spirit of those times and relive the atmosphere of dedication and selflessness of our leaders. To them, patriotism meant placing nation above self unlike the form of patriotism abundantly evidenced today and which Dr Johnson described as 'the last refuge of a scoundrel'.

Talking about our birth as a republic, Dr Ambedkar had declared, "on 26 January 1950, we are going into a life of contradictions" and "if hereafter things go wrong, we will have nobody to blame but ourselves". He warned the countrymen not to trust any single leader with powers that would enable him to subvert the institutions of the State. "In politics," "he warned", Bhakti or hero worship is a sure road to degradation and eventual dictatorship". We are thus not only guilty of not heeding to this sagely advice, we indeed have no one but ourselves to blame for the situation that we find ourselves in.

When the Constitution was being drafted, Dr Rajendra Prasad had opined, "If the people who are elected are capable and men of character and integrity, they would be able to make the best even of a defective Constitution. If they are lacking in these, the Constitution cannot help the Country. India needs nothing more than a set of honest men who will have the interest of the Country before them"³.

A society resistant to change is a society without hope or future. A progressive outlook requires us to constantly review the socio-politico-economic environment all around us and remodel our system to meet the constantly evolving challenges. To that extent one can appreciate modifications already made to our Constitution. Whether all the fifty four changes that have been introduced were indeed called for is however debatable. In fact those not sheltered under the political wings of those ruling at the Centre are also calling for changes in the Constitution. Let us have a brief glimpse of the nature of the objections being voiced by these States.

The demand for a review of the Centre State relations was first recognised in the establishment of the Administrative Reforms Commission in late 1960s. This body had recommended among other things, a new balance in the Centre State relationship keeping in view the experiences gained since independence and the fact that the governments at the States may not conform to the same political ideology as the one at the Centre. The Rajamannar Committee established in 1969 by the Tamil Nadu government furnishes a valuable insight into how things look at when viewed from the side of the

States. This Committee, not being constrained by a purely administrative reforms approach, recommended for reaching changes in the legislative and political provisions of the Constitution all aimed at heavily tilting the balance in favour of the States. The Rajamannar Committee Report could in fact be considered as a 'maximum' statement of case against centralism.

The 1973 Anandpur Sahib Resolution has come under scathing attack in recent times, especially by the leaders of the Congress Party. It has been interpreted variously as being totally secessionist on the one hand to being no more harmful than say the Rajamannar Committee Report. This resolution did indeed call for increased autonomy for the States and recommended that the Central authority be restricted to matters concerning Defence, Foreign Affairs, Communications, Railways and Currency departments only. In 1977, the West Bengal government too had lamented, ".....in a country like India, with such diversities in race, religion, language and culture, national integration could be achieved only through voluntary conscious efforts.....A strong and united country can only be one in which democratic aspirations and distinctiveness of the people of different States are respected and not treated with disdain. We are definitely for strong States but on no account do we want a weak Centre".

The call for a review of the Centre—State relationship received a stamp of credibility when none other than Mr N Sanjeeva Reddy, the then President of India, in a Republic Day interview, advised the restoration of Centre—State relations to the frame originally envisaged in the Constitution and called for a proper assessment of the reasons for and the effects of the growth of strong regional forces.

FAILURES OF FEDERALISM

It would be worth analysing as to why a system that had been carefully evolved by our founding fathers, and which had been apparently working satisfactorily, has suddenly become an anathema. A major factor is that the architects of the framework failed to appreciate the steep decline that would occur in the moral fibre of our national leadership. While they sincerely believed in Gandhiji's cardinal tenet that 'the ends do not justify the means', those who came to power later discarded this teaching as impractical.

Thus we have seen the spirit as well as the letter of the Constitution being violated with impunity by those in power. The Centre has assumed gangartuan proportions by steadily usurping powers that

rightly belong to the States. Article 356 has been invoked ruthlessly and with partisan ends. Governors have been used as puppets to topple legitimately elected governments. No wonder then that the States have no faith left in the impartiality of the Centre and the calls for a review of the Centre-State relations are not without reason.

THE GROWTH OF REGIONALISM

INDIVIDUAL'S SEARCH FOR IDENTITY

The ceaseless struggle for power that we are witnessing in our society today is not a new phenomenon, but characteristic of all societies all the time. In modern societies however a much larger strata of the population is drawn into this struggle. Not having the traditional family ties to fall back on, today an individual is forced to struggle to discover his identity. Aided and abetted by the thoughtless polarisation of our polity brought about by the political machinations, an individual is today forced to identify himself with one group or the other. This fragmentation of our polity on ethnic, religious, casteist, economic, social and cultural patterns is commonly in evidence today. The popular Mizo leader Mr Laldenga put the issue in the right perspective when he queried, "Why should I need a safeguard from the Indian government when I accept the Indian Constitution? and then answered it himself stating, "Because we are of different racial origins. And we would like to preserve our national identity, our own racial, tribal and other practices. And this is our aim : This is what the negotiations are all about.....And whether in Tripura, Mizoram, Nagaland or Manipur, the fundamental reason deep down in the heart of man is race".

When seen in the perspective of an individual's search for identity and the increasingly authoritative attitude of Central leadership the growth of regionalistic tendencies does not remain a surprise. To the Central leadership however, this development is a direct and unacceptable threat and it would continue to remain so till it learns to accept the realities of India's size, diversity and complexity. The philosophy of the Central leadership can be summed up in the remark made by late Mrs Indira Gandhi after the rout of Congress Party in the elections in the South. She stated that the results were a cause for worry, "because it (Congress (I)) lost on grounds of language and regional chauvinism", and that, "such factors were threatening to split up the Country". There is not much doubt however that the scale and nature of the regionalistic movements call for immediate

changes to be brought in our basic structure, which in its present form is groaning under their onslaught. Let us then analyse the nature and scope of these movements.

RESENTMENT IN KASHMIR

The problem in Kashmir can be traced back to the early days of our independence when the Hindu Maharaja chose to accede to India despite the Muslim majority prevailing in the State. The accession came about under the pressure of Pakistan Army's onslaught. The state has since been enjoying a special status in the Indian Union, with its privileges being guaranteed under Article 370 of the Constitution.

The fact remains however that a sizeable section of the population never did reconcile to this merger, and aided by foreign agencies they are ever ready to seize every opportunity to not only embarrass the Central leadership but create a situation of unrest with the aim of progressing towards their goal of securing even greater autonomy for the State, if not a complete break from the Union itself.

The Centre on the other hand has set upon the task of step by step integration of the State with the rest of the Union. Thus between 1953, when Sheikh Abdullah was arrested and 1975 when he was finally released, a systematic campaign was set afloat to achieve this aim. The State was brought under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and about two dozen labour laws and provisions were enacted to facilitate its financial integration. The Centre has unfortunately not shown much finesse in executing its hand as was demonstrated in the bungling of the affair concerning the ouster of the popular as well as legitimate Farooq government.

The average Kashmiri is very much averse to being swamped by the Indian (Hindu) culture. As Ahmed Altaf, President of the Shoeba-e-Tulba's Srinagar unit put it "Your TV, radio and films attack our Islamic culture". Under the circumstances the Centre has to be extremely wary in its handling of the Kashmiri affairs. Integration of the State with the mainstream is certainly required, but undue haste in the process will be counter productive.

CHANGED PERCEPTIONS IN THE SOUTH

The regionalistic aspirations of the people of the South are not a new phenomena. The anti Hindi agitation dates back to the 1930s when Periyar EV Ramaswamy Naicker, the thanthai of Tamil Nadu

politics and the founder of the Dravida Kazhagam (DK) launched a movement protesting against the then government's (headed by C Rajagopalachari) decision to introduce Hindi as a compulsory language for study. In the mid sixties, the decision of the Congress government of Bhaktavatsalam to introduce the three language formula in the State led to one of the most bloodiest and violent agitations in the South. The situation was aggravated by the theory expounded by Shri C N Annadurai that the people of South India were of a stock different from those in the North. The very creation of Andhra Pradesh in 1952 was the result of a fast unto death by Shri Potti Sriramalu in the cause for a Telugu speaking State.

To the Tamilian, Tamil is sacrosanct; any slur to the language causes considerable resentment. The recent agitations are a protest against what is considered to be the centre's attempt to introduce Hindi through the backdoor. "If Doordarshan Kendras are meant to impose Hindi, there is no need for such Stations in Tamil Nadu" proclaimed K Kalimuthu, the 'State Agricultural Minister recently.

The year 1983 saw the Congress being routed in the states of Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka over which it had an apparently impregnable hold ever since independence. The debacle in Andhra was explained by the victor, Shri N T Rama Rao thus, "The state had acquired the dubious distinction of being the most politically stable one with the poorest record of performance".⁵ The Andhra experience has been that a one party dominant system had a deleterious effect on the functioning of the government, and on the economic growth and development. No wonder then that Shri Rama Rao believes that diversity alone would provide the resilience and strength for a political system and regional parties in particular would contribute in a large way to the unity and development of the nation. Similar feelings were echoed by Shri K Veerani, President of Dravida Kazhagam recently when he said, "If they really want to foster national integration, there should be a separate channel (on the TV) for each of the 15 national languages".⁶

ASSAM—A CULTURE UNDER ATTACK

In its character, the agitation in Assam was not very different from other regionalistic movements in the country. The Assamese fear of being subdued culturally by persons alien to their land was the underlying cause of the violence, though the movement was fuelled by feelings of sub nationalism, linguistic emotions, frustration at the lack of economic development and a general persecution complex.

The migration question in Assam has been a sensitive issue brewing from the start of the century when the Britishers began bringing in Bengalis to work as their clerks, tribals from central India to work on the tea gardens and hardy peasants from Sylhet and Mymensingh to cultivate the vast tracts of land which the unenterprising Assamese, with their minimum needs met on richer pastures, would not touch. The genesis of the problem was first spotted by SC Mullan, who, in his 1931 census report observed, "It is sad but by no means impossible that in another thirty years, the Sibsagar district will be the only part of Assam in which the Assamese will find himself at home".⁷ The issues of language and land emerged as a direct consequence of the unchecked immigration.

The language issue arises from the fact that the illicit immigrants ('malthusian' refugees) owing to their ulterior motives have until now been returning Assamese as their mother tongue though almost all of them are actually Bengali speaking. This enabled Assamese to be enumerated as the majority language and this led to its eventual recognition as the state language for the first time in 1960. The re-opening of the ethno-linguistic divide has now revived Assamese fear that in any new census, the immigrants might register themselves as being Bengali (and Hindi) speaking, thereby threatening the status of Assamese as the state language.

The patient Assamese nature inhibited them from rising in revolt against the steady encroachment of their land until the fear of being swamped made them react. Even then, the movement, led mainly by student leaders, has been applauded for its Gandhian outlook. Five years of struggle radically changed the aim of the movement—until the weary agitation leaders seemed jubilant at the accord signed on 15 August this year, even though the accord resulted in nothing other than the dismissal of the obviously illegitimate Saikia government.

The accord pays only lip service to the economic and cultural aspects. It does promise a lot, eg the clause 6 of the memorandum reads, "Constitutional, legislative and administrative safeguards, as may be appropriate, will be provided to protect the culture, social and linguistic identity and heritage of the Assamese people". High sounding words these, but for the accord to solve any basic issue and hence arrive at any lasting solution, what is required is to work out specifics on what is appropriate, the mode of their implementation and the time frame to achieve all that the accord has promised. As the President of AASU put it, "It was a very old problem and it is

only now that both parties have agreed. But the real thing is the implementation.....”.

THE SMOULDERING NORTH EAST

The Assam accord, even if it does not come unstuck during implementation, will restore normal conditions in only one state of North East India. The task of putting out the smouldering fires in the rest of the region will remain. Most of the North East became part of India only 150 years ago, and continued to maintain its autonomy, owing to its isolation. This minimal contact with the rest of the country continued even after independence. The attitude of the Centre towards this region has been paternal at best, colonial at worst but apathetic most of the time. The ruthless economic exploitation of the region by outsiders has caused understandable resentment amongst the tribals. The nationalistic feelings are no less in these parts than was witnessed in Assam during 1980 when the popular slogan was “Tej dim, tel nido” (we will give blood but not oil).

The insurgency phase in North East began with the beginning of the fight for secession by Zapu Angami Phizo in 1956. Army entered Nagaland in 1956. Mizoram entered this phase on 02 March 1966 when paratroopers were dropped to counter Operation Jericho launched by the MNF leader Mr Laldenga. In Manipur the Army operations commenced on 09 September 1980 and in Tripura on 17 September 1982.

The underlying causes for insurgency in the North East are the tribals' difficulty of identifying with the mainland, their fierce sense of pride and honour and their resentment at being meted out a colonial treatment. As said Laldenga “...The white master left us and the brown master stepped in...”.

The region deserves a mature political outlook, on economic uplift to bring it at par with the mainland and adequate safeguards that the cultural and racial identity of the tribes will not be meddled with. The military cannot provide any lasting solution for the problems of the region. It has been there for two decades without much to show by way of results except for reducing the level of the insurgency from the high of the sixties to the relative low of the eighties. Mr Laldenga put it emphatically, “...the Army can never have a political victory over the people...However strong the Indian Army is, it cannot win the conviction of a man”⁸.

THE CASTE WAR IN GUJRAT

In a space of 10 years the State of Gujrat has twice taken the credit for the downfall of an elected government being caused by mass movements. But unlike the Nav Nirman agitation of 1974, the battle lines drawn this time were totally along casteist lines. With communal elements rapidly joining in, there was the right admixture of fuel to cause an inferno. The trouble started with the populist decision of the Solanki government to reserve 18 percent of posts in services and educational institutions for the OBCs (other backward castes) on the authority of the Rane Commission that was appointed in 1981. These were over and above the 10 percent reservations instituted by the Janta government in 1979 on the basis of the report of the Baxi Commission. With 21 percent statutory reservations already existing for the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, only 50 percent seats were available for distribution on basis of merit.

The anti-reservation stir has been launched by the upper caste combine of Banias, Brahmins and Patels who constitute 30 percent of the total population. In a socialistic society like ours, the elected government is obliged to create conditions for equality of opportunities for all sections of society. To that extent, measures aimed at the uplift of the masses are called for. The aim should be to work at the grass roots levels and not go about instituting populist measures like reservations of jobs and/or seats in institutes of higher learning. Unfortunately the latter are far more electorally rewarding.

The events in Gujrat cannot be seen in isolation since the reservations issue has nationwide implications. The violence evidenced in Gujrat should be taken as a warning to indicate the conflicts that will emerge if an attempt is made to extend reservations to a large number of castes. A long term solution, but one that is electorally unattractive, would be to rapidly improve the basic facilities available to the mass of the people. A nationwide consensus is certainly called for—not to discuss whether the reservation policy should continue but to look for long term measures to ameliorate the condition of the downtrodden, which the reservation policy has totally failed to do.

PUNJAB—THE GRIEVANCES OF A PROSPEROUS COMMUNITY

The Sikh desire for a separate homeland is older than our independence. In support of their demand the Sikhs quote the assurance given to them by Nehru during the All India Congress Committee meeting at Calcutta in July 1946, "I see nothing wrong in an area and

a set up in the North wherein the Sikhs can also experience the glow of freedom". The Akali Dal representatives at the Constituent Assembly did not sign the Constitution in protest against the States not being granted more autonomy. That the Sikhs desired and were prepared to fight for a state independent of India and Pakistan and as a buffer state between them has been revealed in the concluding volume of 'Transfer of Power 1942-47'. This document records the warning given in this context by the Akali legislator Giani Kartar Singh to Sir Evan Jenkins, the Governor of undivided Punjab⁹. A lot of water has flowed down the Ganges since then—Sikhs have occupied the forefront in all walks of life and Punjab is India's No 1 state on the basis of per capita income.

Hence for over a quarter of a century after independence the Sikhs felt quite at home as normal citizens of the country. Their latent aspirations were sparked off once again with the adoption of the Anandpur Sahib resolution. The events leading a community which is prospering at home and abroad and which has an extremely good standing in all government services and especially the defence forces, to rise in revolt with all its subsequent tragic effects are attributable to a combination of social, economic and political factors. Put across in a forthright manner the more important of these were, "the cruel ambivalence of the Akali leaders, the impardonable crimes of the Sikh extremists, the unspeakable chicanery and temper of Indira Gandhi and the machinery of terror her ghost set into motion".¹⁰ An overstatement perhaps, but clearly indicative of what actually happened.

The idea of what a 'homeland' should be is interpreted quite differently by the Sikhs themselves. For Ganga Singh Dhillon, "Now more than ever the time was ripe for Punjab to break away from India and become an independent nation.....Give us Khalistan and then leave us in peace".¹¹ This is the view of an extremist settled abroad and with no roots in India. On the other hand we have the view of Sant Longowal, who stated on 11 October 1982, just before his famous march to the Parliament, "Let me make it clear once and for all that the Sikhs have no designs to get away from India in any manner".¹² This view has the support of the majority of the Sikhs themselves and got the stamp of authenticity in the massive turnout of the Sikhs in the September elections which were a proof of the popularity of the Sant and all that he stood for. Thus the extremists stand shamelessly exposed. In the interests of peace and harmony the saner elements will do well to lend no credence to the alleged remark

of the Sant, made in the wake of the elections and perhaps only to placate Tohra and Badal, "Let us have a Khalsa raj.....if we must have Khalistan that can follow¹²".

Bereft of political rhetoric, the agitation in Punjab was over four issues only viz the transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab, the sharing of Ravi—Beas waters, the demarcation and transfer of Hindi speaking areas to Haryana and a review of the Centre—State relations. None of these problems are beyond simple solutions—given the will. However political machinations aimed at capture of power ensured that while Punjab burned, four accords were almost concluded but foiled. Non entities like Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale were "lifted out of obscurity by Giani Zail Singh with a view to destroying the Akali Party from within".¹³

The accord signed recently does not solve the basic issues. However, the accord, followed by the peaceful elections has greatly diffused the situation. This is a pre-requisite for a calm appraisal of the recent events and to enable mutual discussions for a long term solution to the problems of the Sikhs. For Khuswant Singh, the only real issue is the widening drift between the Sikhs and the Hindus and "It is this drift that is the real danger to the integrity of the Punjab and the country. There are no real issues which cannot be easily resolved".¹⁴ He is right, but there is an imperative need to eradicate the malaise in our political life that caused the drift in the first place.

Regionalism is an emerging reality that cannot be wished away; it should in fact be considered a normal phenomenon in a country of India's size, diversity and complexity. The central task of a political system is not how to eliminate or suppress it (a policy most enthusiastically followed till now) but how best to sublimate it so that what is dangerous in it is neutralised and that which is valuable utilised for strengthening the cross—structures of federalism.

POLITICS, ETHICS AND LEADERSHIP—THE CHANGING EQUATIONS

Expressing his views on the need to decentralise powers down to the villages, Mahatma Gandhi wrote in 1935, "I look upon an increase of the power of the State with the greatest fear because.....it does the greatest harm to mankind by destroying individuality which lies at the root of all progress".¹⁵ Gandhiji was a strong advocate of individual freedom. He had seen enough of the world to know that the state or constituted authority was not always the highest repository of moral wisdom, and he placed moral conscience of the individual

above all else. In his estimate, only individuals endowed with a vision of truth and with an inherent spirit of sacrifice could secure the moral foundations of society and contribute to real progress. He was a strong critic of parliamentary democracy since such a system drew its strength not from the strength of individuals but from the part played by money. Almost all serious observers of the working of our democracy have been deeply agitated by the corruption at all levels of administrative and political life that the system encourages.

However while a democratic form of government may be bad, others are perhaps worse. What we need is to identify the evils of the system and then try to improve upon it. The radical separation of politics from ethics that was foreshadowed in the writings of Machiavelli is now a common feature of almost all forms of society. Today we find a growing nexus between politicians on the one hand and smugglers, criminals and gangsters on the other. Perhaps it is because our country is not the only one to be affected by this malaise that late Mrs Indira Gandhi, when confronted by Tariq Ali with the fact that there was a gigantic difference between her party and the Congress of Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi, replied, without batting an eyelid, "But standards are going down every where, are they not?" For Aristotle, politics and ethics were interlinked. The state existed for good life and politics derived its value from ethics. In our case the State does exist for good life—of the limited few in power or those in close vicinity of them.

Over the past 39 years India has changed beyond recognition with the qualitative change (for the worse) being most evident in its political life. Over the years, the vested interests—political, social and economic—who established themselves early have further consolidated themselves and continue to monopolise growth without any thought for the have-nots. The decay that has set in is so extensive that the salvage work would require a cleansing movement of the type we have not witnessed since independence.

If at all we are to restore some sort of balance and sanity in our political life, politics and ethics will have to be brought together through the pressure of a broad based movement of public opinion. "A small body of determined spirits fired by an unquenchable faith in their mission can alter the course of history" is what Gandhi wrote in 1938.¹⁶ There is a definite need to change our course and there is an urgent need for such men to steer us today. A movement would

have to be initiated by a few exceptional individuals who are acquainted with politics but who are above it. Granted that the movement for restoration of morality in the political life of the nation has to be led by people who do not regard politics as their primary calling, the question remains as to the methods that such people should adopt. It is evident that the movement must largely rely upon methods of education coupled with constructive work. To make an impact on the ruling powers, an agitational approach, not the variety in evidence today but a satyagraha launched by the conscientious objector', would have to be adopted.

Connected with the moral decline in our political life is the aspect of the styles of leadership that are in evidence today. It is ironic that inspite of our having been governed since independence almost uninterruptedly by a single party, our polity today is totally fragmented along linguistic, ethnic, communal and casteist lines. This is so because political leadership is being acquired by the aspirants creating conditions of insecurity and then presenting themselves as the only saviours. This style of leadership, based on the British policy of divide and rule has played havoc with our polity while at the same time fetching rich electoral dividends for its architects. No wonder then that we have group after group—the religious minorities, the Dalits, the 'Sons of the Soil' in each region, the backward castes of all hues—focus more and more on the rights and privileges they can secure as members of a group, rather than ponder over the rights and privileges that should be available to every citizen—as indeed is enshrined in our Constitution, as our aim.

A starting point in the salvage operations is for our people to realise that what we are witnessing today is the direct result of the perversion of the state, of the murky politics of the last two decades, of the unhealthy link between politics and (black) money and of the communalisation of politics caused due to the new styles of leadership. All groups, especially the religious minorities must realise that their salvation lies not in wresting concessions through opportunist politicians but in strengthening the institutions of the State.

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?—SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION

THREAT POTENTIAL OF REGIONALISTIC MOVEMENTS

The common feature of the movements in Assam, Punjab, Tamil Nadu, the North East as well as Jammu and Kashmir is the fear, real or imagined, of the people of the region of being swamped by what

is commonly termed as the Hindu culture. In Gujrat there is a tremendous social dynamics at work which having originated along casteist lines rapidly acquired communal overtones. In the Delhi riots as well as in Gujrat we have seen the State itself drawn into the arena leading to it being accused of actively encouraging communalism and terrorism.

The threat of secession appeared for the first time in Tamil Nadu where it was rapidly contained. The simmering insurgency in the North East has posed problems but not of the insurmountable type. It is the rhetoric of the extremists and the ambivalence of the moderates in Punjab that did present, at least until recently, a real threat of secession. However as has been evidenced here too, an astute political handling has managed to push this threat into the background.

The real threat if any, in all the movements is owing to the communalisation of politics and the rapid decline in the standards of political leadership. The moral crisis is obviously most profound. The dangers of a deliberate and motivated fragmentation of our polity along casteist, linguistic, communal and racist lines are all too obvious to be neglected any longer.

That the states are all perturbed at the growing centralisation of powers by the Central is well known. Dubbing the Anandpur Sahib resolution as clearly secessionist in nature, the Congress comfortably won the elections to the Parliament with this as the main election issue. In a strange volte face soon thereafter, and in a surprising environment of continual appeasement of the Akalis, the Centre has now agreed to refer the issue to the Sarkaria Commission, which was set up in 1983 with much fanfare. This Commission was tasked to review in totality, all aspects of the Centre-State relations. It would be a pity however, if the Commission is allowed to go into oblivion or if its recommendations are neglected in the same manner as those of similar Commissions earlier.

THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION

The difficult situation that we find ourselves in calls for drastic remedies. What we all require is perhaps some sort of a shock therapy. The last emergency was one such remedy tried with much resentment and repentance and without anything to show by way of results. It can thus easily be ruled out as a means of salvage operation.

In the report captioned 'India Under Pressure; Prospects for Political Succession upon the Death of Mrs Gandhi' prepared before her death by Robert L Hardgrave, it is stated, "The military is the ultimate guarantor of stability in India.....its officer corps is respected, highly professional, and by tradition, non-political". One cannot but agree; but what it goes on to state perhaps has a motive, not quite sympathetic to the nation or the armed forces; "But pressure within the military, potential political instability and the inability of the civil authorities to cope up with social unrest could draw the army into a more active role in government". The author has not only underestimated the fantastic inherent resiliency of the Indian system to cope up with crisis situations, he has not visualised the greatly deleterious effect any such adventure by the army would have on its own professional competence.

The prevailing situation requires not short term remedies but a long term deep cleansing operation. A massive movement aimed at introducing the Aristotle link between politics and ethics, at revitalising the values of life, the removal of corruption now prevalent all round and eradicating the role of (black) money from our political life is what is called for.

CONCLUSION

We attained our independence after a long period of struggle. That was the time when new hopes and aspirations filled the hearts of most men. It was a time when, in the words of Nehru, ".....the soul of a nation, long suppressed, finds utterance.....". The period of calm and disciplined development which prevailed till the end of the Nehru era completely belied the prophecy of our erstwhile rulers that India would break up rather than enjoy her freedom. Never before in her history had India been ruled by a single authority, never before had she seen a democratic form of government. In 1947, we, in all seriousness took up the challenge of starting a new experiment.....

In less than a quarter of a century, the Indian experiment started receiving its first jolts. Cries of regionalism were raised by the States of Tamil Nadu and West Bengal. Serious threats of secession appeared in the fragile North Eastern States. The spirit that brought us our freedom slowly melted away, being replaced by a new set of values. Thus political expediency and selfish leadership replaced lofty ideals and leaders dedicated to the nation. Today we have a situation wherein the State itself is being openly accused of abetting

communalism as well as terrorism. While the resurgence of the individual's search for an identity is appearing in a new form of nationalism and regionalism, the leadership at the Centre which has had a vested interest in maintaining the status quo has at least till recently, refused to recognise the pluralism that is required in our society.

The de-ideologisation of politics and the increasing pre-occupation with mere survival in office has led to a situation wherein our polity is being manipulated on a communal and religious basis. The recurring violence seen today is a direct result of the lumpenisation of politics, the scant disregard for institutions of the State and a general crisis of leadership. Visualising perhaps just this sort of a situation, the father of the nation had recorded in his diary on 12 September 1947, "Let not future generations say that we lost our freedom because we could not digest it. Remember that unless we stop this (communal) madness, the name of India will be mud in the eyes of the World". Our freedom is not immediately at stake, but our integrity certainly is under great strain unless of course we usher in revivalistic movements to counter the present trend.

There is much in India's modern history that points towards containment and eventual amelioration of the present crisis. We have in the past survived such crises through a spirit of accommodation and co-operation. It is too early to judge the long term damage that has already been caused on account of the recent fissiparous tendencies on the Indian political system. But looking at the extent of the damage that has already been caused to all aspects of our life, a massive salvage operation is called for. Such an operation would naturally require initiative and leadership of the kind we have not witnessed since independence. We have today clearly over exercised the 'right to sin' which the father of the nation gave us. The moral crisis is on such a large scale that unless we make up our minds to establish certain minimum unalterable standards, with some degree of constitutional authority, we will not be able to launch upon the correction.

The nation needs to arrest the drift that has set in today. We need a new vision of the type witnessed in the 1930s and 1940s. It is perhaps our good fortune that we have at the helm of our affairs today a young leader, dubbed as 'Mr Clean' by many, and who talks of launching our ancient land into the 21st century, "with confidence and success". He has shown his mettle in rapidly diffusing the situation—the accords signed on Punjab and Assam, the restoration of peace in Gujrat and the ushering in of a democratically elected

government in Punjab demonstrate a new kind of vision and determination. Perhaps we may yet see the creation of a 'creative minority' that according to Toynbee, has always been at the back of a 'renewal of a civilization, or the birth of a new one'.

REFERENCES

1. C Subramanyam, "Need to Restore Values", Indian Express, June 18, 1983, p 6.
2. Anirudh Prasad, *Centre and State Powers under Indian Federation*, Deep and Deep Publication, New Delhi, 1981, p 23.
3. Soli Sorabjee, "Tryst with Destiny", The Illustrated Weekly of India, January 27, 1985, p 35.
4. Kalyan Mukherjee, "The Mizos Live under the Shadow of Death," The Illustrated Weekly of India, December 30, 1984, p 32.
5. N T Rama Rao, "Crisis of the System", Indian Express, June 10, 1983, p 6.
6. K P Sunil, "The Language Crisis", The Illustrated Weekly of India, June 2, 1985, p 52.
7. Nari Rustomji, "Assam : Reports of Discontent", Express Magazine, The Indian Express (Sunday Edition), February 13, 1983, p 6 (Column 2).
8. Kalyan Mukherjee, Op cit, p 31.
9. News item in Indian Express, June 4, 1983, p 9.
10. Darshan Singh Maini, "The Alien", The Illustrated Weekly of India, August 11, 1985, p 50.
11. Pranay Gupta, "Give us Khalistan and then Leave us in Peace", The Illustrated Weekly of India, July 21, 1985, p 25.
12. Janardhan Thakur, "Behind The Akali Victory", Sunday Review, The Times of India, October 13, 1985, p 1 Column 6.
13. Darshan Singh Maini, "An Indian Tragedy", The Illustrated Weekly of India, January 20, 1985, p 50.
14. Khushwant Singh, "Give Peace a Chance", The Illustrated Weekly of India, July 28, 1985, p 11.
15. M K Gandhi, The Modern Review, October, 1935.
16. M K Gandhi, Harijan, November 19, 1938.
17. A S Abraham, "The Clamour of Discontent". The Times of India, December 26, 1986.
18. Sumanta Sen, "Tripura CM caught in a dilemma", The Times of India, December 28, 1986.

Unity, Integrity and Harmony

PART III—IMPACT OF CULTURE

MAJ GEN Y A MANDE

In the last article, we had concluded by observing that people can integrate and disintegrate. Unity, integrity and harmony is the problem of the people and hence choice is upto them. One thing is certain that violence and fissiparous movements cannot last indefinitely and sooner or later people have to find solution.

We had also noted that some power-elite exploit sentiments of the people for their own end. They do not understand the significance of cultural residue. The Indian sub-continent has a culture of its own, distinct from the rest. In this article we examine the impact of culture on unity, integrity and harmony.

CULTURE

People make use of the word "culture" in diverse ways. The anthropologists use the term in a most comprehensive manner. A Goldenweiser's definition of culture includes "our attitudes, beliefs, ideas, judgement of values; our political, religious, legal and economic institutions; our codes of ethics and etiquettes; our books and machines; our sciences and philosophies and many other things, both in themselves, and in their multiform inter-relations". The anthropologists who strive to study "man" perforce must use culture as a totality of environment under which mankind has evolved right from the beginning. To us what is important is relationship between culture and personality. "Personality" said Ralph Linton, "cannot be studied without taking into account culture", a proposition to which most psychologists and sociologists agree. Such then is the impact of culture; our ideas, our values, our faiths are governed by the environment under which we are born and brought up. Recall Mill's statement— "I am a Christian because I was born in the Christian family. I would have been a Hindu, a Muslim or a Buddhist if I was born

in that family". We derive our values, judgements, codes and customs from the social group in which we are born and brought up. Majority of the people do not question these and accept them as correct, as a kind of truth. We take our culture for granted and become aware of its weaknesses and strength only when we compare it with others. None of us, to be sure, is born with a culture; it is acquired. A child's mind is like a blank paper on which environment writes complicated tales, both affirming and conflicting.

What we have said above is a generalisation and does not deny freedom and individuality of behaviour. In every social group, there are rebels who defy social customs and codes, its value and belief system, but such people are rare; the generalisation still holds good. Now this generalisation is important; the societies and cultures have an element of permanence, the individuals come and go.

Sociologists distinguish between civilisation and culture. For them civilisation includes utilitarian objects such as telephones, cars, machines, weapon systems etc which are readily borrowed by social groups from one another. Such objects are products of science and technology and are value-neutral. Culture includes religions, codes, customs, folk-lore, languages etc which is peculiar to each social group and involves value judgement. Both civilisation and culture interact on each other. The civilisational benefits have an impact on culture whereas the culture decides utilisation of civilisational benefits. The sociologists observe that civilisational changes take place at a faster pace whereas cultural changes are slow.

The distinction between culture and civilisation helps sociologists to study modern societies and arrive at the future trends. A child 2000 years from now, studying Indian Society of 20th Century, will be amused to read about our religious squabbles, caste differences, codes and customs, political institutions, methods of agriculture and means of production. It is likely that 2000 years from now mankind will reach a stage of universal culture provided that we do not destroy ourselves. The progress of culture can be reversed easily and we may go back to primitive days after nuclear holocaust as Huxley writes in "Ape and Essence".

Culture is a comprehensive term. It includes religions, races, languages, customs, beliefs etc. Within the culture of any country, there are sub-cultures of social groups living in the different parts of the country. These sub-cultures have peculiarities of their own but nonetheless share certain commonalities. We can keep on extending this process of sub-division of culture to the towns, villages and even families. On the other hand, we can enlarge confinement of culture from the countries to larger grouping; thus there is a South Asian Culture, European Culture, African Culture and so on till we arrive at a human culture. Now the point to note is, that cultural differences are human creations; their validity lasts so long as one culture is compared with the other for a specific purpose.

It would be futile to say which culture is good or bad and carry out any scientific evaluation. There are elements in culture such as religions, languages, customs, etc which are not based on sciences. These have been passed from generation to generation and surprisingly people hold them as sacrosanct despite the lack of scientific content. Here, Veblen's findings are interesting. Habits govern our beliefs and attitudes, when we get habituated to something, we consider it as good. Herodotus too, observed 2000 years ago, that every community considers its codes and customs as best. There is nothing sacred about waters of Ganga and all places of worship are made of stones, bricks and mortar. It is people who assign them values setting aside reason and scientific knowledge. Such are the irrationalities of human-beings, the so-called rational animal.

Culture changes not with time but changed situation. Modern changes have been brought out by the advent of science and technology. Introduce electricity, tractors, fertilisers, schools and hospitals in a sleepy, interior village and the whole life style of the people will shake up. They will modernise rapidly but still cling to their beliefs and values. The Indians who migrate to other parts of the country or abroad retain their culture and life style. They do not change their religion, beliefs and values. This applies not only to the Indians but all communities all over the world. This phenomenon is called as cultural residue. An individual who wants to shake off from the confines of his religion, language, customs etc will need comprehensive education which is not possible for a common man. Very few in every society are

well versed with physical and social sciences, literatures and arts and philosophy which sits at the apex of knowledge. The learning process of an average man is restricted to job-requirement, the rest he learns from environment and hence the process of cultural change is very slow. Nonetheless, ultimately changes do take place, but it takes a long long time, several centuries.

Cultures much change with situation otherwise they face the dire consequence of extinction. History is replete with civilisations lost. As a rule, people adjust but there are some who do not. This problem applies particularly to the tribal groups. On a lower scale this problem applies to developing countries. People resist change, placing forward arguments of tradition, values and religion without realising that the march of civilisation cannot be reversed. Here militancy has no meaning, a bullet will kill toughest of the tough, saint and scoundrel alike, and the effects of nuclear explosion do not distinguish between various cultures.

With this observations on certain aspects of culture, let us examine Indian Culture and its influence.

INDIAN CULTURE AND ITS INFLUENCE

Ours is an ancient culture. It has been evolved on our soil. We try to decipher past from the ruins of Harappa and Mohan-jodaro since no records are available; however the cultural continuity is clearly discernible from the Vedic period. KM Panicker writes that India at the beginning of this Century was same as it was 500 years back, not very different from the times when Buddha lived. There were invasions both from the West and East, the invaders were few and they either went back or were assimilated in the country's culture. The cultural changes in our country are taking place at a faster pace, after a long spell, and that too after independence. Here we would do well to note that it is civilisational changes which are noticeable.

Ours is a culture of stabilised society. It is a culture evolved on the fertile plains, interspersed with forests, rivers and mountain ranges. The natural barriers of Himalayas, dense forests and the seas have protected our culture from encroachment. It is a culture evolved on the land of plenty, with nature's bountiful gift of sun-shine, warmth, sweet water, rains, timber and fertile soil. Here it would be pertinent to note that the human civilisation has

passed through three successive stages i.e. nomadic/pastoral, agricultural and industrial. India was already in the agricultural stage when the rest of the world was still in pastoral stage. The earliest Western travellers to our country had observed that India in 16th and 17th Century was well ahead of the West. The agricultural society, stabilised over the centuries, living in the land of plenty, developed certain set of values which persist till to this date. The salient features of the agricultural community are — industriousness, thrift, peace, fidelity, stable families, numerous children (as many as one can, very useful as farm hands), chastity, early marriage, adherence to codes and customs etc.

Inherent in the code of agricultural community are stability and rigid adherence to customs and past practices. These are no longer virtues in the industrial culture whose characteristics are — specialisation, long years for education, late marriages, one or two children, competition, mobility, self-interest, innovation etc.

Our entry into the industrial age is recent, which calls for adjustment in the life style and value — belief system. Now, this adjustment is not possible at a fast pace and we had earlier observed that cultural changes are slow. This accounts for many of our social problems leading to conflicting situations.

Ours is a country of continental size. In a vast country it is but natural that there will be variations in languages, eating habits, dresses, codes and customs fashioned by climatic conditions and heritage. For centuries these have been passed down from one generation to the other and here we must remember that mobility in the old days was restricted, people lived and died in the same villages. Besides indigenous diversities in the development of culture, variations were also introduced by the aliens who settled down in the country. Despite these diversities there are certain common traits of culture which not only pervade India but also neighbouring countries — Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. This culture is conspicuous and different from that of Afghanistan, China and Burma. Within the Indian culture, there are numerous sub-cultures such as Punjabi, Bengali, Marathi, Naga, Mizo and so on.

Earlier we had observed that there are residual effects of culture from which the society cannot shake off easily and to add to our problems India has an ancient, stabilised and rigid agro-based

culture. We have to adjust to industrial age otherwise we face a grave danger of being left out to perpetual doom in the fenced colony of Huxley's Brave New World. At the same time, we must remember that there is no way of ushering in modernisation at a fast pace; here, over enthusiasm does not work. What happened to Shah of Iran is well known and the worst still is the movement of the clock in reverse direction.

Bound as we are from the influence of culture, it governs our thoughts and actions in every sphere of life. Let us assume that a well informed Indian knows about his cultural inheritance and proceed to discuss its influence.

In our foreign policy, we believe in international peace, cooperation and non-interference. Such a concept has been ingrained in our minds due to cultural influence of a stable society protected by natural barriers. We believe in non-alignment but non-alignment is a very expensive proposition in the world divided between the two power blocs. The ideological content of non-alignment and its desirability in the existing international situation is not questioned; but what we emphasise is that in this country there is a social acceptance which would be very difficult for others, for example European countries to accept. Non-alignment works because India is a large country and super powers do not want to disturb its neutrality. We accept non-alignment in spite of the fact that it has increased our security burden in relation to China, Pakistan and the Indian ocean. The Indian value that if you do not interfere with others, will not interfere with you has turned out to be incorrect. We have to realise that the international relations are governed by national interest and not ideological or human interest.

In our defence policy, the emphasis is on the maintenance of territorial integrity which is once again a value nurtured by the peculiarities of culture. We read and narrate the tales of Mahabharata and Ramayana to our children observing laws in the conduct of war. The enemy defeated, after surrender, has to be treated as equal and friend. The history records that on those occasions when we defeated invaders we never pushed them out of our frontiers. Never have we gone beyond the frontiers of our country and waged war. Never have we made attempts to enlarge our territory by conquest. The conduct of war was restricted to certain sections of society. The normal life in villages was never

affected by wars; to them change in king merely meant change in the tax collector. The belief-attitudes derived from such a cultural heritage have an impact. In 1948, the winning side accepted cease fire and UN Commission in J & K when there was no requirement. We handed over Tibet on historical evidence despite the fact that history tells us that the maps of countries have always changed, despite the fact that history was ignored when Pakistan was created. In 1965, we withdrew to our borders without making use of war gains. In 1971, we withdrew from Bangladesh without ensuring safety of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and our interests. We enumerate these examples to illustrate how mistakes have been committed because of belief and attitudes which are peculiar to our culture. Surely, the others would not act in the similar manner. The West believes that if you want peace, prepare for war. Compare this with the statement of Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru — if you want peace, prepare for peace.

In our home policy we believe that various regions should develop according to their culture and to that extent they must have autonomy. This policy is based on the size of the country and its diversity; it possibly cannot be otherwise. The wisdom of such a policy is not refuted, but the facts are that this policy has led to regionalism and conflicting situations between the states and the centre. The linguistic division of states has led to frequent clashes. Uniformed, petty and power-at-any-cost-leadership has made maximum use of and is thriving on this policy. The regional leaders talk in terms of "Qaum" despite the fact that the national policy accepts regional growth and autonomy. A healthy competition between "Qaums" for development is most desirable, but unfortunately "Qaumi" slogans are directed invariably against the Centre.

Our social and economic policies are governed by the cultural inheritance. We believe in secularism. Acceptance of others' view point, accommodation and tolerance are distinctive features of our culture. The caste system had laid down vocations and people find little substance in class-struggle as advocated by communists. There are many who are still fired by Upanishadic teachings, "Take as much as you need, the rest belongs to the society". By and large, people are still content despite the ingress of materialism. The spiritualism still holds its sway.

When we discuss cultural influence, an obvious question which strikes us is whether it is good or bad. Now, every virtue is a vice and every vice a virtue depending on the situation. Killing is bad but in war it is a virtue; pardon is good provided the man becomes friendly otherwise it is of no use; help to neighbours is good provided friendly relations continue otherwise it is stupid and so on. In such consideration of good or bad, the criteria must be utilitarian and result-oriented. Here, unfortunately utilitarianism does not appeal to Indian people because of cultural influence. They still cherish the ideas of good-in-itself, self-illuminated truth and other abstractions of spiritualism. What we need is pragmatism. Here we must mention that Pragmatism as a philosophy does not deny idealism.

UNITY AND INTEGRITY

There is a general belief that a common culture fosters unity and integrity. It is not necessarily so. The belief is correct in a sense that common culture provides background, and environment for people to live and work together; it is wrong in the sense that we ignore interests of the people which clash despite common traits. In any case, culture is too comprehensive a term and even its ingredients such as religion is open to the formation of sub-sects due to schism leading to conflicting situation.

The Hindu kings have fought with each other. The Muslims have more than 100 factions and are fighting with each other. The Sikhs are fighting amongst themselves for political power and control of Gurudwaras. Pakistan was created despite common culture and East Pakistan (Bangladesh) opted out barely after 24 years. Germany and Korea have been divided. If the democracies fight, the communists do not pull on together. There is little evidence to show that common culture ensures unity and integrity.

Social conflicts occur because of clash in interests and other reasons. Where is a family in which husbands and wives do not quarrel and the young do not differ with the old? Where is a thinker, a general, an administrator or a business magnet whose views have not been questioned? Every political party in power must have opposition and every religious teacher a contender. All religions are subject to schism and formation of sub-sects. Even if we have on our planet, only one form of Government, only one religion,

only one type of culture that would not mean an end to social conflicts. The anarchist's view that conflicts will vanish is the free-from-wants societies of the future and the communist view that the state will wither away is open to question. To be sure, there are vested interests in every organised act of violence and fissiparous movements.

And yet the importance of culture as a cohesive force cannot be questioned. For sure, we know that in a certain culture the family life is stable; husbands and wives do not part easily, at least for variety; parents care for their children and the young respect the old. Ours is an affiliative culture which is accommodative and accepts others view point and life style. People may belong to different religions or regions but the music is the same, the dances and folk-lore are very akin, the poetry and novels in different languages express the same ethos. Looked from cultural point of view, the fissiparous movements have no basis. The reasons for fissiparous movements lie somewhere else.

We can examine the influence of culture in yet another way. The British united and ruled India because culturally it was one country, otherwise there would have been number of independent countries in the sub continent. In the absence of affiliative culture, the Hindu majority would have driven out the Muslims after partition, the Sikhs from Pakistan would not have been welcomed and the Tibetians could have never found a refuge. The violence would have been met by greater violence and there would have been no place for concepts such as co-existence.

Our hope on unity and integrity of the country lies on culture and its residue. It is in this light that we have to see how far and how long the fissiparous movements continue. They cannot last indefinitely.

HARMONY

People can integrate or disintegrate; they can change their religion and adopt new life style; languages in any case are only means of communication, but harmony is a requirement of good living. We live in a state of equilibrium. Now, frequently this equilibrium is disturbed but the society finds an inner strength to restore the balance. There is no such thing as fight to the last or last man last round. These are military slogans with limited application.

No disputes are everlasting and people have to come to terms at some time or the other. Let us look back. Mongol hordes could not destroy Europe. The Christian crusaders could not destroy infidels, the Sikhs and Muslims have not finished each other and the Nazis could not eliminate the Jews. It is in this light that fissiparous movements cannot last indefinitely and sooner or later people have to find solution.

The concept of harmony and equilibrium does not mean that there is no violence or disruptive activity, but it certainly does not accept perpetual state of disorder, wars and utter confusion. Nor is the concept of equilibrium static. It possibly cannot be in the world which is still evolving. The stagnation is worse as it implies regress. The society throws up forces which pull it out of stagnation as well as doom. In the past, amongst other things, the religions appeared to remove stagnation and restore order.

About the ancient religions like *Veda* we cannot write much and here "*Shruti*" does not help. But we know a great deal from the times of Buddha onwards as written records are available for scrutiny. Buddha was greatly perturbed to find pain and suffering on our earth. His mission was to find who pain exists and how to overcome it. Earlier, the *Vedas* knew existence of misery but its methods to overcome pain and suffering were least satisfactory. Take for example, Chandogya Upnishad which says "not unless, the mankind learns to roll the sky like a hide will there be an end to human misery, unless "He" is known first". Buddha could never accept Yagna, rituals, worship etc for the removal of pain and human suffering. Buddha was the first rationalist; on the existence of God he was silent and he never accepted *Veda* as direct revelation which cannot be questioned. He wanted to know reasons and the priest class could never convince him that "Release" (Moksha) can be attained by performing Puja, Yagna, renunciation or leading abstemious life on the bank of Ganga. After long meditation, the "Enlightened one" came out with four causes for pain and eight-fold path to overcome misery. This was the first attempt to redeem mankind from stagnation.

Christ was born in a period of utter confusion when people were engaged in petty quarrels, feuds and internecine activities. That is the reason why Jesus preaches love. Without love, the life in his time was in perilous state. The ten commandments are like ten principles of harmonious existence.

By the time Mohammed was born a relapse had taken place and the life had once again deteriorated. The people lived at cross purpose with each other, with their idols and icons, without unity, without cohesion. Mohammed forged an order in the disorderly society, doing away with idol worship, in the name of Allah. His followers preferred austerity. It was better than disorder created by indulgence.

Nanak was a reformer. He had advantage of watching closely the follies of Hindu and Muslim practices and had known all previous religious teachings. His attempt was to lift society out of stagnation. The militancy in Sikh religion is accidental due to Muslim persecution.

From the foregoing it would be clear that the religions are part of culture expressing its ethos. Buddha and Nanak express Indian ethos improving on what had already existed. Bible and Qoran are improvements on Old Testament. Also, the religions were born for social reconstruction in times of stagnation or disorder. The religions have nothing to do with political power and its use to acquire power is misuse. Unfortunately people have always exploited religion for their personal end. Machiavelli, in his "Prince" advocates use of religion to keep population subdued. Marx was most vociferous against priests and their craft. There is a truth in his statement that kings and priests, throughout the medieval period, had combined to inflict tyranny on the proletariat. The ruins are witness; only the palaces and temples are left behind to remind us about the past civilisation.

It has taken three centuries (from 16th to 19th century) for the West to get out of the clutches of religion. The developing countries will take time. India with its affiliative and tolerant culture must take lead to treat religions in proper perspective. The religions cannot be made issue for fissiparous movements. The function of religion is to create order and not confusion, and if confusion continues we may see yet another religion or saint to restore order.

Conflicts are part of life. They are not due to cultural differences and the days of religion based wars are over. The present day conflicts are due to clash of interest. These clashes disturb the equilibrium which the society tries to restore. The violence,

terrorism and fissiparous movements are part of this overall interest based social conflict. When we talk of culture or religion as an instrument of cohesion we are speaking on idealistic or moral plane, whereas the reality of conflict is based on entirely different considerations. In order to comprehend the problem of unity, integrity and harmony in totality, we will examine the realities of social conflicts in the next article. None-the-less, we reassert that the importance of culture as a cohesive force cannot be questioned.

Tomorrow's Automated Battlefields

MAJ GEN VK MADHOK

EXTRACTS from the war diary of Brig Kandolkar, AVSM, Commander X Mountain Brigade, Jelep-La, East Sikkim, 14 Jan 2000. "As usual, the weather continued to remain extremely bad with visibility reduced to 100 meters or so. A flat patch of approximately 1000 meters separated the forward posts of my battalion and the enemy ! Satellite photographs alongwith electronic and signal intercepts of enemy commander's radio conversation had indicated, that a build up was in the offing. Therefore I had no option but to know immediately and accurately as to what was happening behind enemy positions and his rear areas ? I could have used a helicopter and flown along the ridge line, bad weather however prevented me from doing so. I then decided to launch our newly acquired all weather RPV Tata-1 (Remotely Piloted Vehicle) from the small basket ball ground next to the brigade headquarters. As this RPV flew along the ridge line, we (I and my staff) could clearly see the enemy posts on the TV screen in my bunker. The RPV was then guided deep into enemy territory along the likely approach routes. We could then see enemy vehicles, commanders deploying guns and mortars as well as stores and troops being unloaded. Comparison of figures in computers with Real-time-information confirmed, that another brigade group had indeed been inducted in total violation of the stand-still agreement. My gunner commander then alerted gun positions to be ready for instantaneous engagement of enemy targets as soon as clearance could be obtained from superior headquarter. 10-12 years ago, we would have taken weeks and perhaps months to get this information. In any case, artillery guns could not have been used to punish the newly located targets without forward observation posts !"

To accomplish their missions, military commanders need Real-time information as to what is happening on the battlefield or behind it; to have a sure weapon capability with one round hit

and kill accuracy (to avoid wastage of ammunition) and a capability to engage the located targets instantaneously: This is however not so and the shortcomings are being faced by practically all armies over the world. Though industrialised countries are trying to find answers by automating such functions and in turn, military technology seems well poised to provide a range of options. On a future battlefield it is visualised, that it would be possible to locate, track and target enemy forces almost instantaneously with data banks, computer assisted intelligence evaluation and automated fire control. And accordingly, there are no technological reasons as to why conventional battlefields of today should not get fully automated in the next 20-30 years! Industrialised countries in fact have set their sights to do so by 2010 if not earlier.

ADDITIONAL REASONS FOR AUTOMATION

Besides the above requirements, man power shortages and the increasing battlefield lethality are two additional reasons for development of automation: Lethality of weapons approaching near sure kill probability can be frightening for soldiers, who will be less willing to fight; besides, armies would no longer be in a position to afford loss of a large number of trained troops employed in operating complicated weapon systems, who cost money. These psychological and physical reasons have therefore left little option to advanced countries but to push towards automated battlefields.

ESSENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS

Of all the technologies, these with the most far reaching consequences for armed forces are surveillance, guidance of weapons and warhead designs. Surveillance is the activity to locate, identify and keep track of the enemy, his weapons, dispositions and intentions. Guidance technology ensures, that the weapons in question achieve a first round hit capability and war-head designs ensure that once hit, the target-tank, warship, aircraft or soldier is sufficiently damaged to be kept out of battle.

TRANSPARENCY REVOLUTION

Technology has and promises to give other ways of 'seeing' with radar' sonar (sea) and target detection from radio direction

finding to sensing of heat radiation. Sensor, an effective tool, which can pick up vibrations resulting from seismic or acoustic disturbances (men as well as vehicles) and transmit the same through radio relay stations to computers for evaluation and interpretation to rear echelons has already increased the degree of visibility over the battlefield. Sensors can be planted with their antenna visible just above the ground, carried in aircraft or fired by artillery on a given zone. A combination of active, passive or chemical sensors can be used as Electronic barriers on state boundaries for early warning. Once planted, periodic replacements may not be necessary. Augmenting this device are the RPVs, unmanned aircraft with side looking radar and other surveillance equipment, supported with reconnaissance satellites and conventional aircraft. RPVs were used most effectively by Israel during their 1982 war against Lebanon when Israeli operators were able to see the Lebanese vehicles in bazars or on the streets from their tennis courts. Orbiters launched in space, in addition, while making passes over a hostile country provide photographic and electronic reconnaissance. Elint (electronic intelligence) and Sigint (signal intelligence) in which information is gathered from electronic interception, compliment these innovations. The information gained is subsequently integrated, interpreted and disseminated by computers. Surveillance technology could therefore introduce a new twist in the deployment of manpower currently used by armies in the shape of observation posts, surveillance detachments, forward observers to identify and intimate arrival of hostile aircraft, patrols to report on an adversary's activities and so on. Sensitive areas where ingress is expected might perforce have to be kept free from own personnel and vehicles to obviate interference with sensors.

WEAPONS OF AUTOMATED BATTLEFIELDS

To select from a large inventory, two weapons that is the 'Smart' bomb or a 'Brilliant' missile are of special interest. During the Vietnam war, the Americans flew approximately 837 sorties against the now famous Thanh Hoa Bridge in North Vietnam and dropped 2000 tons of conventional bombs but the bridge stood. Then Laser guided 'smart' bombs were introduced and the bridge was destroyed in the first mission. The 'Smart' bomb is a conventional bomb equipped with a sensor, that responds to a laser light and stabiliser fins, the surfaces of which can be moved to guide the

bomb to its target. The 'Brilliant' Missile would be an improvement and be able to itself search for and recognise its target and attack it without instructions from any outside sources.

Missile warfare whether on land, sea or space-it is clear, will dominate the battlefields of tomorrow. With guidance technology, once located, it is difficult for a target to escape punishment as homing devices and seeker systems enable a missile to track and locate its target with precision. In the philosophy of missile warfare, tanks, aircraft, ships, helicopters, or hovercraft therefore really become launching pads or weapons platforms for firing missiles. With micro electronics, missiles have acquired all weather capability. Newer missile systems such as UK's Tercon (Terrain counter matching) under development, would enable a cruise missile to fly at subsonic speeds, 20 to 50 meters or so above the ground with pre-programmed flight path and a computer to compare the terrain below and data to reach the target. Thereby making its detection extremely difficult, thus giving insufficient time to an adversary to react. The plethora of night vision devices now available in the world market could make fighting by night as good as by day! So far as the oceans are concerned, instead of massive and easily detectable ships, fast naval patrol craft armed with missiles could become the order of the day, as missile threat is much more difficult to counter than from tardados, gun fire and slow bombers.

CONSEQUENCES OF AUTOMATED WARFARE

On an automated battlefield, weapons are used at an extremely fast rate. This would therefore put heavy premium on establishing large scale production of unmanned vehicles, smart bombs, missiles and other systems. With the acquisition of automated weapons, wars can be more violent and damaging which means more casualties. Another issue is that wars may be continuous—both by day and night and thus exerting psychological stress with no respite to troops.

A doubt can arise as to whether complex technologies would work? Experience shows that T V sets, modern cars, computers, aircraft rarely break down and therefore, new technologies need not break down. The main problem with automated weapon systems, it is stated could be organisational and not technical. Pulling together a large number of sub-systems to make them function is like a jig-saw puzzle.

As super powers race to maintain their lead in technology over their adversaries, the momentum could lead to increased automation of warfare. This includes the need for quick transmission and split second computer assisted decisions and secure communications—free from sensing and interception. Also, this leads to another logical activity in the vast field of electronics connected with ensuring that one's surveillance systems, radar, missiles, aircraft and communications etc are not interfered with by enemy's jamming devices and continue to respond effectively.

So far as the third world countries are concerned, it appears that they would also experience automation but only in gradual stages and not necessarily full fledged planned programmes. But as the technological base improves, they would also think and push towards increased automation with the momentum of technology.

Integrated Training-Mechanised Forces

BRIGADIER GURDIAL SINGH

SCENE—BATTLE OF PHILLORA—11 SEP 1965

THE Centurion tank Commander was minutely observing the battlefield through his peribinocular before advancing to the next fire position. Suddenly, he saw a Patton Tank lurking about in the Sugar-Cane field. Both the tank Commanders appeared to have sighted each other simultaneously. The Centurion Tank Commander sprung into action as if hit by high voltage electric current and shouted in the intercomn :—

‘Crew action’

‘Sabot, eight hundred, on Tank’, Simultaneously laying the gun on the Patton Tank by Commander’s over-riding control.

‘Eight hundred, on’ Responded the tank gunner.

‘Sabot-loaded’ Shouted the loader after ramming the heavy APDS round into the chamber of gun.

‘Fire’ Ordered the Tank Commander.

‘Firing Now’ Shouted the gunner in the intercomn after fine laying on the Patton Tank.

‘Add Half, Firing Now’.

‘Drop one, Firing Now’.

‘Target ! ek aur Patton ragad dia, Sahib’.

Shouted the gunner with great exuberance.

All the above actions took only a few seconds and a huge fifty ton steel monster—the Patton Tank—was emitting tall flames, smoke and fumes. The Centurion tank Commander was naturally elated and reported to his troop leader on the radio set :—

‘Hullo—Tango one alfa,’ Maine dushman ka ek aur Patton barbad kar diya. Main advance shuru kar raha huin’.

Success in a Tank versus tank battle goes to the side which has well trained and motivated tank crews forming part of a combined arms team of mechanised infantry, self propelled artillery combat

engineers and signals supported by fighter aircraft and the armed helicopter. Though there have been many advances in weapons and technology since the days of Battle of Phillora, the concept of combined arms team to win the battle, remains unchanged. The military historians and biographers have written a great deal about the genius of Erwin Rommel, Heinz Guderian, Bernard L. Montgomery and General George S. Patton but their successes on the battlefield were to a great extent due to the well trained soldiers led by high quality junior leaders.

AIR LAND BATTLE-CONCEPT

Before World War II, Maj Gen JFC Fuller and Capt Basil H. Liddle Hart wrote extensively about mobile warfare but it was generally ignored by the British General Staff. On the other hand in the German Army there were many advocates of this concept like Heinz Guderian and Eric V. Manstein. It was practiced by the Germans during attack on France in May 1940 with resounding speed and success. The key tools of this lightening war called Blitzkreig was "the Coiled First of the Panzer Corps and thunder bolt of Luftwaffe". The Blitzkreig was truly an air-land battle of the forties.

The latest doctrine in Land Warfare, called Air Land Battle in U.S. and NATO military journals is an extension of Blitzkreig using modern technology. It envisages traditional battle along the front line, the deep battle against enemy key nodes and reserves and the protection of friendly rear areas from enemy sabotage or attack from enemy airborne or heliborne forces. It is an offensive minded warfare that can stop the attacks of an agressor Army, seize the initiative and defeat the enemy force with a combination of lightening manouvre and accurate and massive combat power. It can be executed in battle only if we have well trained highly mobile ground forces supported by Air Force which would provide intelligence, reconnaissance, counter air, interdiction, close air support and aerial supply.

In a 'chip' oriented battlefield of tomorrow, the cutting edge of the armoured and mechanised divisions would be armoured regiments and mechanised infantry battalions supported by artillery. A combat group has tremendous fire power and mobility. A well trained regimental group led by high quality leaders would fulfil the requirements of Air Land battle to defeat the enemy decisively.

QUALITIES OF A JUNIOR LEADER

Good leaders are a rare commodity. They have to be identified, selected, trained and given adequate opportunity to train their

command without undue interference from the top to develop initiative while practising battle drills. A good junior leader leads by personal example. He must have an eye for the ground and an uncanny sense of direction. Armoured Corps and Mechanised Infantry are technical arms and the technology used in armoured fighting vehicles is changing rapidly. As such leaders should be the master of weapons and equipment with which their unit is equipped. The officer cadre should have those intangible qualities of head and heart, i.e. an officer should have plenty of enthusiasm, dash, initiative, élan, courage and an unimpeachable integrity. Selfish individuals cannot become combat leaders. Therefore, the senior officers at all levels must make very deliberate efforts and spend time to select true combat leaders. During Second World War, Field Marshal Montgomery spent a large percentage of his time in identifying and selecting the combat leaders.

INDIVIDUAL TRAINING

Needless to say that every individual in the tank regiments, infantry battalions, artillery regiments, combat engineers, helicopters and fighter air-craft have to achieve very high standard of combat efficiency. Tank crews must be experts in tank gunnery, capable of tactical driving of tanks in the battle field and their mechanical reliability and maintain good radio communications in spite of active enemy electronic warfare environments. Similarly the mechanised infantry should be expert in field craft and minor tactics. Subsequently both have to train together for long periods to become an effective team. After the team work between tanks and infantry have been perfected; artillery, combat engineers and attack helicopters are to be integrated with tank-infantry teams in tactical exercises depicting various battle situations. Many aspects of individuals training like gunnery, driving and communications can be easily quantified. The standard achieved by various units should be recorded and the efficiency rating awarded without any cribs from unit commanders about subjectivity.

TACTICAL TRAINING OF TANK REGIMENTS AND MECHANISED INFANTRY BATTALIONS

After the individual members of a tank crew have achieved the required proficiency in their trades, the regiment should be taken out for tactical training. The maximum emphasis must be on troop, squadron and regimental training. This aspect tends to be overlooked and partly neglected because emphasis shifts to formation manœuvres. It is difficult to quantify the standards in tactical training

into mathematical figures. However, certain manoeuvres and tactical drills can be laid down to assess the performance of a Regiment.

The troop, squadron and regimental training should be done with full complement of tanks and supporting arms. The training instruction at formation level should include instruction regarding the attachment of mechanised infantry sub units, artillery officers and engineers during squadron and regimental training. The infantry-tank cooperation should start at troop-squadron level. This would contribute a great deal to achieve armour-infantry integration which is the primary requirement in modern battlefield.

Due to meterage restrictions on tanks, it is not possible to give adequate training to the tank drivers. Therefore we should use simulators extensively during individual training cycle. Also we should not treat the meterage restrictions with too much sanctity during collective training. We must not economise on tank engines, tracks, gun barrels and ammunition if we want to keep tank crews at highest fighting efficiency. The formation commander should sanction extra meterage and main gun ammunition if there is a requirement for it. During infantry-tank co-operation, armoured corps officers invariably put up the meterage excuse to the formation commanders and thus useful integrated training with tanks is not done.

NIGHT TRAINING

With the advancement in the accuracy of defensive weapons, night operations may have to be undertaken to reduce casualties to the personnel and tanks, more as a rule rather than an exception. Night warfare is a complex undertaking. The confusion, complexity and uncertainty gets multiplied at night. It is easier for the well trained and skilled troops to achieve surprise (a cardinal principle of war) in battle at night, during poor visibility or bad weather. The commanders should plan to capitalise on the advantages which accrue to troops trained for fighting at night and in reduced visibility. Indian soldier who comes from rural areas, would fight better at night than his counter part from the city.

It requires greater skill and efficiency on the part of crews and commanders to fight effectively at night. Infact the proficiency in night fighting is an excellent indicator of the state of training of the regiment. A Commanding Officer needs lot more time for regimental training before taking it for night manoeuvre and live firing. Armour-ed Regiments and formations have evolved their own night signs, signals and drills for control. These need to be standardised and

promulgated to the whole corps. Presently our mechanised forces have achieved high proficiency in night movement. What we need to develop further is night fighting capability i.e. making a turning movement, night attack and beating back enemy's inevitable counter attack. There have been numerous instances where own troops have fired at friendly forces at night. There is a necessity of identifying the enemy at night and destroy him by accurate fire.

COMBAT GROUP TEST EXERCISE

In the 50's and early 60's, all units were invariably put through a 'regimental test exercise' every year to see their training efficiency and effectiveness. This exercise was conducted by the Brigade Commander and Divisional Commander also attended some important parts of the exercise where new concepts were being practiced. With the passage of time, this aspect of training has been relegated to some extent and formation level exercises have taken its place where the thrust of the formation commander is to show his personal efficiency to his superior officers. Though this trend has been arrested to some extent now, Combat group test exercise should be given greater weightage to see the fighting efficiency of the combat units.

The standard achieved by a regiment in tactical training can be gauged by putting it through a test manoeuvre. Prior to this test exercise, mechanised infantry company/battalion, battery commander with observation post parties and engineer task force in skeleton must be made available to the armoured regiment during regimental training. The complete combat group must train together for two to three weeks. The meterage allotted for this phase should be approximately 200 Kms including test exercise. The Commanding Officer should put the combat group through all operations of war both during day and night. The FAC with ACT and tentacle should be made available in the regimental test exercise (live firing phase). The standard of training of a regiment and fitness for war can be ascertained fairly accurately by putting it through an exercise with the following setting :—

- (a) An approach march at night by the combat group to an objective approx 20 to 30 Kms away. Using the microminaturised technology aboard airborne platforms, the enemy can easily spot an armoured regiment inspite of best camouflage and concealment. Therefore armoured regiment and mechanised infantry battalion will have to disperse over a wide area in troops before the approach march.

(b) At the end of this march, the combat group should assault across a minefield using trawls. The minefield should be covered by the enemy. The battle noises could be represented by use of gun cotton slabs, pyrotechnics and machine gun fire. The dummy mines must be laid with detonators. This would bring out the efficiency of trawling drills. Any tank that has gone over the dummy mine would be declared a casualty by the umpire.

(c) After crossing the minefield, the combat group, should go over a BLT bridge laid in tandem. The BLTs should be attached with the regiment for this purpose. After getting into the bridge head, the deployment of the combat group and reactions of the commanders at all levels should be checked when the enemy has put in a well rehearsed counter attack. Control of fire and use of illuminations, can be judged during the crucial phase of the battle.

(d) After beating back the counter attack the combat group should put in a quick attack on a feature where the enemy is occupying a defensive position. The feature selected for attack should be in the field firing range (if possible) where live firing can be carried out. Needless to say all safety precautions should be observed. The targets (made of hessian cloth) can be quickly placed. It could be a dawn attack and firing standard both during poor visibility and day light can be actually measured. Live firing is the most important part of the exercise where targets would also be given to the pilots by the FAC. After firing, the umpires would actually count the number of hits on the targets.

Such an exercise can be refined further after gaining practical experience. It would be nearest to the battle field conditions that are possible to create in peace time. If the field firing range is not available, the live firing phase of the exercise should be conducted when the regiment goes for its annual field firing, the supporting arms even though in skeleton must take part in live firing exercise.

INSPECTOR GENERAL OF MECHANISED FORCES

Training of the mechanised forces has suffered because there is no focal point, no central agency for overseeing the attempts at setting standards for crew selection, training, research and repair of Armoured Fighting Vehicles. We have been lucky in having a little continuity among tank crews but it is slowly deteriorating due to higher turnover rate. This must stop forthwith. If we have to send personnel on turnover, complete crews must be transferred.

In the past, there used to be a post of Inspector General of Cavalry. As the name implies, he not only inspected the state of horses but also checked their training efficiency in field manoeuvres. There is an absolute necessity of renewing such a post and call him as Inspector General of Mechanised Forces. He should be the senior most General of the Corps. Director General Armoured Corps can carry out this job effectively with additional staff. Laying down the standards and supervision of the training standards of units should be one of his charter of duties. He would maintain the data for predictors of performance, selections, retention and transfer as necessary from the available pool of tankers. All new ideas in equipment performance, training doctrine would be sent to this agency for further analysis and research before adoption by the troops. He would set standards for individuals and crew performance in conjunction with service schools. He would inspect and evaluate training of armoured regiments and mechanised infantry battalions throughout the Army. He would also suggest for special awards and distinction insignias to outstanding crews to raise the morale of the Corps. A central agency to oversee the training of all mechanised units has become more important now because the equipment is getting more complex day by day. The combat power of the combat group increases by geometrical proportion provided each arm and service comprising the team is thoroughly proficient in its own tasks.

CONCLUSION

Our units have not taken part in actual combat since Dec 1971. During peace time many extracurricular activities take over the front seat, thus adversely affecting the thrust on training for combat. We are in a happy position that our Unit Commanders and Formation Commanders have actual combat experience. This experience should be made use of to keep an edge over our possible adversaries.

Technology has introduced many new items of equipment but the basic approach for training the armoured regiments and mechanised infantry battalions as part of combined arms teams has remained the same. There is a famous saying in the Army, 'Nothing checked—nothing done'. Thus there is a definite necessity of having a central agency like Inspector General of mechanised forces who would lay down technical and tactical standards for the mechanised units. He would also be responsible for checking the standards achieved by all the units. This would improve combat efficiency of our mechanised forces and would ensure victory in the technologically intensive battlefield of tomorrow.

The CR—to Show It, or Not to Show It

BRIG N B GRANT (RETD)

SHAKESPEAR'S Hamlet was spared the agony of answering such a question. Performance Appraisal, or the CR, as it is commonly known in the army, has become the most hazardous encounter in modern superior—subordinate relations. No phase of an officer's work strikes as much fear in his heart as the appraisal report. Problems arise, when neither the subordinate nor the appraiser fully understands what is desired in a performance appraisal, or how these ends are to be achieved with a mutual degree of success and satisfaction.

The overall aim of any appraisal system, must be to achieve the utmost towards ensuring that, each individual officer is guided and developed in such a way, that the army obtains the maximum benefit from his abilities throughout his career, while providing for the officer the maximum in job satisfaction and reward. To elaborate, the purposes and uses of the appraisal report can be tabulated as—

- (a) effective development of the individual officer in his current job,
- (b) aid in planning for training,
- (c) improved communication between the officer and his superior,
- (d) preparation for the officer for promotion, and
- (e) training in human relation for the superior.

Uptill now, the above was sought to be achieved by the writing of a CR once a year, which was shown and discussed with the appraisee. Recently however, Army HQ has ruled that, effective Jan 85, CRs will now no longer be shown to the officers. The reason given for this is that, it will reduce the present trend in 90% of officers being graded Above/High Average, and will also ensure for fairness and objectivity. The aim of this paper, is to examine whether the new ruling will achieve the objectives of an appraisal report as mentioned above, and discuss some of the basic concepts of the present CR form.

INDUSTRIAL AND ARMY APPRAISAL CONCEPTS

As is now well known, the science of management in general, and the study of human relations in particular, was first started in the

army during World War II. It was later copied, refined and developed by industry to an extent that, today, organisational concepts, staff work, and research into interpersonal relationships in industry, excels in all respects from those prevailing in the army. Although the army was also the pioneer of the performance appraisal system, today, industry has forged far ahead in this field, leaving the army way behind. This was to be expected, however, what cannot be accepted, is the army now wanting to take a retrograde step by not showing the CRs, and thereby going back to square one of the very basic concept of the appraisal system. A recent US War College study revealed that, the number one stress factor amongst officers is not knowing fully what superiors think of their job performance.

To begin with, the main difference that exists between the appraisal system practised in industry from that prevalent in the army, is in the concept of basing appraisals on results rather than on personality traits. Pragmatically speaking, it is the difference between the terms 'effectiveness' and 'efficiency'—the two are not necessarily synonymous. In the army, more than 80% of the appraisal systems in use even today, are derivatives of what are generally known as trait-rating qualities. These place great emphasis on personality characteristics and behaviour patterns. Such factors as, initiative, enthusiasm, loyalty, cooperation, leadership, dependability and adaptability etc, although important, are difficult to define, and still more difficult to measure. It is also hard to demonstrate a direct relationship between levels of such characteristics and corresponding levels of effective performances. Effectiveness is not an aspect of personality; it is not something an officer has. Effectiveness is best seen as something an officer produces from a situation by managing it appropriately. It represents 'output' and not 'input'. It is not so much what an officer does but what he achieves. Whereas the army system bases its opinion on what the officer is capable of achieving due to his inherent personality traits, the industrial systems focusses on what he has actually performed irrespective of his personality qualities. This tantamounts to stating that, although an officer could well be 100% efficient as reflected in his personality traits, yet he could be 0% effective in his performance results. The main crux of the matter is that, neither the appraiser nor the appraisee can be aware of this, unless the report is shown to the latter and discussed with him by the former, which today the army is reluctant to do so.

The army tries to get over the above objection by stating that, current performance, as measured by the attainment of results is not

necessarily correlated with potential for promotion. It further goes on to argue that, separate evaluation of these dimensions, can reduce the officer's need to defend a composite rating that he cannot justify, and increase the likelihood of a constructive dialogue, therefore reducing the possibility of avoidance. In support of this, a rather clumsy attempt has been made in the CR form to divide it into two parts, viz, (a) Personal Qualities, and (b) Demonstrated Performance. However, a close study of the latter will reveal that, terms like, 'applies professional knowledge to assigned duties', 'has administrative ability', 'displays foresight' and 'maintains morale' etc., are guarded versions of personality traits, which are again unmeasurable, as such do not really serve the purpose for which they were devised.

The main difficulty the army finds in basing its appraisal system on performance results, is perhaps in defining the exact job description for each position, and more than that, in clearly indicating what the officer is expected to achieve in that position during the year. This would entail, for example, in a regiment—

- (a) the CO defining the objective of the regiment for that year, together with the outline of the steps required to achieve them;
- (b) each officer having to analyze his job in order to identify the important areas of it, and express these in terms of results which he has to achieve. He gets his CO to agree to this analysis, and in addition, they both agree to a plan of action with targets to achieve improvements; and,
- (c) the officer having normal contact with his CO at regular intervals. Time will have to be set aside for the officer to meet his CO formally, say once in 6 months, or even once a year as it once was, in order to report on progress. At such meetings, difficulties are discussed, new targets agreed to, and training needs identified.

All the above, however, automatically entails the CR of the officer being shown to him, which today is taboo.

SHOWING ONLY ADVERSE REMARKS

Even if the CR is primarily based on personality traits, as against performance results, its prime objective should be to motivate subordinates to change their behaviour pattern. However, for this, an open process that includes mutual participation is required. This approach takes the superior out of the role of judge and puts him into the role of helper. The objective always being to help subordinates discover their own personality leading to a particular kind of

performance, and help them take the initiative to develop a joint plan for improvement. Even here, the army appears to have hedged the issue by allowing only the adverse remarks to be communicated to the officer, but without intimating to him his corresponding good points. Very soon this practice must prove counter-productive, and will backfire. One must realise that, when an officer is experimenting with new behaviour, positive feedbacks is likely to reinforce his effective behaviour, and he is able to stabilise it as a part of his personality. However, if only criticism of negative feedbacks are given, this will merely increase the chance of an officer becoming defensive, and will invariably build some defense round his self, so that he can protect his-self from the threat. The use of such defensive behaviour to deal with adverse feedback, is like using pain killing drugs to deal with pain experienced by the person. Although they reduce the awareness of the pain, but they do not deal with the main cause of it. In the same way, defensive behaviour, due to adverse remarks, may create only an illusion of having dealt with the situation, but it does not change either the situation or the behaviour, as the conflict in the self is not resolved. On the other hand, if confronting behaviour is used as a result of positive feedback as well, the conflict is reduced, and continued use of such behaviour will result in an integrated self, and will process effectiveness.

THE SEPARATE TECHNICAL REPORT

To satisfy the need for a performance rated appraisal against that based on personality trait, the army has devised two separate systems of reporting, atleast for the technical arms and services. The thinking that appears to have gone into this is, that whereas an administrative superior is in a better position to judge the personality trait of an officer, his performance can be more correctly assessed by his technical boss, thus giving an impression that, leadership and administrative qualities are divorced from, and not an adjunct to, his technical performance. Of all the other concepts that has gone into the making of the army appraisal system, this one appears to be the most erroneous.

As an example, let's examine the above in respect to the CR of a sapper Major serving as a Garrison Engineer in a normal MES formation. His IO is his technical boss, viz, the CWE, but his RO is his administrative superior, namely, the Sub Area Comdr. The CWE, being a technical officer himself, is in a position to correctly assess all aspects of the GE's performance, and correlate it to his personality traits. However, the Sub Area Comdr, only sees the

physical part of the engineering structure on the ground, and is only concerned with the probable date of completion (pdc), but without knowing how to get this done in the scheduled time and within the allotted budget. This information requires not just technical knowledge, but a thorough understanding of the administrative processes, such as financial, contractual, resources utilisation, and planning etc, requiring the same leadership qualities listed in the 'personal qualities' part of the CR. For obvious reasons, the Sub Area Comdr, is not at all knowledgeable in these aspects, as such is least qualified to comment as the RO, the correct position for which can only be the next technical appointment in the line, in this case, the zonal CE. The same analogy is applicable to almost all technical arms and service appointments. It is for serious consideration therefore, that for such arms/services, upto the rank of a Colonel (perhaps in the MES, even upto the rank of a zonal CE), the RO and SRO should only be the next technical officer in the line, and the entire report to be processed through the respective corps channels only. Today, in the technical arms/services, this unnecessary dual reporting system, is the biggest source of heart burning; in the Works Services, it is also the major cause of resorting to unauthorised construction, leading to poor workmanship and even corruption, more so now, when the GE is not sure whether his Sub Area Comdr's wife is pleased or annoyed with some non-sanctioned work done in her home, as his CR is no longer shown to him.

CHANGING NATURE OF CR

Lastly, it must be appreciated that, a CR form and its appraisal system cannot remain static, but must conform to, (a) the current strategic thinking of the army, and officer development to meet it, (b) the latest psychological research findings on human relations, and, what is most important, (c) the kind of ethos and value systems that the army expects its officer corps to be imbibed with. In the latter context, the present COAS' letter of 1 Feb 86 addressed to all officers of the army, has a special significance in the formulation of CRs. After Independence, the officer corps has given precious little attention to evolving a code of behaviour, or a statement of ethics, according to which its officers would be expected to perform. Indeed, it is no misstatement to say that, except for the now oft repeated Chetwood's motto of putting the country before self etc; no formal official code exists to give meaning to the above. The present COAS' letter is the first time, that an attempt has been made to develop a code of behaviour which would formally establish the 'price of belonging' for the members of the officer corps. That letter stresses that, cohesion

and ethical codes go hand in and are mutually reinforcing. While the problem of which variable came first remains unanswered, it is now clear that, the failure to develop such a code for the officer corps, is at once a reflection [and a cause of its failure to continue to develop a strong sense of community, around which cohesion could be built, as it was before Independence. The Chief further feels that, today there is a wide spread and often significant difference between the ideal standard of ethical and moral behaviour, and the prevailing standards that are necessary for career advancement. The frequently recurring reasons for the causes of this gap are, the selfish promotion-oriented behaviour and inadequate communication between the junior and his senior. If this gap is to be narrowed, then the ideal standards should be reflected in their CR form. It's a pity that the existing CR does not reflect this; it is a greater pity that, even if the CR did contain these factors, with the present policy of this being not shown to the officers, neither the latter will be aware whether they are measuring upto the COAS' expectation, nor the chief will know whether the contents of his letter being implemented, which according to all accounts, unfortunately appears to have remained only on paper so far.

SUMMARY

In any organisation, and the army is no exception, one of the greatest areas of contrast and potential conflict, occurs in the field of management control, and in particular that aspect of it which attempts to control performance at the individual level, by the use of some system designed to motivate people towards higher performance, which would be in tune with what the organisation needs. Although, initially, the army was the pioneer in the field of performance appraisal, the industry has since developed it into a more scientific method of understanding and controlling human behaviour. As of today, there are two main differences in the way the army appraises its officers, and the method industry adopts to analyze its managers. Firstly, whereas industry has gone over to the system of stressing performance standards in terms of results, the army is still wedded to the now out-dated method of trait-rating, which places greater emphasis on personality characteristics, which are not only difficult to define and measure, but is hard to demonstrate a direct relationship between levels of such personal characteristic and corresponding levels of performance, specially so now, with two streams of reporting for technical/service officers.

Secondly, whereas in industry, the entire appraisal report is shown to the manager reported upon, and holding of performance review made mandatory to the appraisal system, the army believes that, it is not necessary to give a feedback to help a person in increasing his personal and interpersonal effectiveness, and thus has debarred the showing of the CRs to officers reported upon. It appears that in the army, superiors recoil at the thought of having to tell their subordinates how they stand, or what they need to do to improve themselves. They fool themselves into believing that, the subordinates know all this from day to day contacts on the job, and they are too often shocked to learn that the boss 'never told me how I was doing'.

The army further deludes itself into believing that, the shortcoming of basing appraisal on personality traits, can be overcome by such means like having a separate section on 'Demonstrated Performance', and by having two separate channels of reporting for technical/service offices, totally unrelated to one another. This split fails to recognise the fact that, any performance, demonstrated or technical, has to be an outcome of some correlation with personality, and must be seen together.

Regarding the second aspect, of not showing CRs followed by performance reviews, if one were to search management literature, he would not find even one book or article, which argues the case, whether the appraisal report has to be shown and discussed with the appraisees. This is taken for granted, and all books on the subject on appraisal, dwell only on the various techniques and methods for doing so. It's only in the army that the doubt still persists.

CONCLUSION

In the army, both superiors and subordinates, have come to dread the day when evaluation interviews would be held. The subordinate is afraid of being criticized unjustly, and the superior is apprehensive about provoking the subordinate's antagonism. Thus, the easy way out of this, is not to show the CRs at all. Lot of reasons have been advanced in defence of this, such as equalising gradings, and ensuring fairness and objectivity. In this, in my opinion, the main cause has not been spelt out, at least officially, and that is, how to cope with, morally, rather than with quantity, of the large number of appeals that invariably follow the CRs today. It has been observed that, such appeals, apart from refuting the adverse remarks if any, invariably also contained matters washing the 'dirty linen' of the appraiser,

and putting him in an awkward position. Unfortunately, such allegation either stuck, or the superior officer did not have the moral courage to stand by his report. The more unfortunate part was that, he was rarely supported by his own superiors, who also lacked the courage to stand by their juniors, as their own 'linen' were not always found clean. However, the greater tragedy of this is that, it will weaken and discourage the very concepts of officer like qualities, like, 'intellectual honesty', 'Moral courage', 'back bone and guts', 'honour and duty' etc., which the present Chief hopes to achieve as enumerated in his 1 Feb letter. Of all the other disadvantages resulting in not showing the CRs, this would be its biggest failure. It does not require a Hamlet to understand this.

The Past French 'Connection'

LIEUT GENERAL S L MENEZES

A recent account reported that "For all practical purposes, India emerged on the French horizon only after 1947, France's previous concern having been limited to Pondicherry and its environs". Despite this 20th century perception there is, historically, a fairly extensive French 'connection' with India, which is of interest at the time of the recent 'Festival of India' at Paris. It would be best for a brief review of this French 'connection' to deal with the travellers first. The more well-known French travellers in India, among several during the 17th and 18th centuries, were Tavernier, Thevenot and Bernier. Tavernier's 'Travels in India' and Bernier's 'Travels in the Mogul Empire' have been reprinted in this country. In the 19th century, the most prominent traveller was Victor de Jacquemont.

Not currently often remembered in India is Anquetil du Perron, an ancestor of Madame Giscard d'Estaing, the wife of the former French President. A scholar of the Ecole des Langues Orientales in Paris, he chose to come to India as a private soldier in the service of the French East India Company, in order to pursue his interest in languages by travelling in India. While in Surat, he was able to obtain copies of the holy books of the Parsis. According to R C Prasad who mentions him in a footnote in "Early English Travellers in India" (1983), he returned to France in 1764, spent seven years studying the material he had collected, and published in 1771 the first European translation of the Zend Avesta.

Apart from the 'official' Frenchmen like Dupleix and de Bussy, there were the numerous French adventurers. One cannot do better than quote Sir Richard Temple (1898) as to the latter in the India of the late 18th and early 19th centuries, "...in which personalities and nationalities, diversities and contrarities are combined and confused...European adventurers outside the control of any European government, British or other, were among the main factors. These Europeans, more of Continental than of British stock, were as various as their employment. Italians, Savoyards, French, Flemish, Dutch, and occasionally even British; some even of gentle, almost noble birth, some were soldiers from the ranks, some were from the forecastle, some were deserters, some were swashbucklers, some were gentlemen

and administrators, some were honourable though rough soldiers, some were money makers. Many, perhaps most of them, were French..."

It would be convenient to review the more prominent French adventurers commencing from South India to the North, for that is the direction in which the French adventurer scenario developed, but before doing so a few words on Dupleix and de Bussy. Dupleix, after whom a road in New Delhi was named by the British, was appointed Director of the French establishment in Bengal in 1731. By 1739 the French, in emulation of the services rendered to Shah Jahan's daughter in the previous century by the English Surgeon Gabriel Boughton and the sequential 'firmans' obtained by the English East India Company, had appointed a surgeon named Volton at the Court of Emperor Muhammad Shah at Delhi. Through Volton's offices, Dupleix became a Mughal 'mansabdar' in 1741, when he was moved to Pondicherry from Chandernagore (Chandannagar) as Commander of all French forces and establishments in India, and as President of the Superior Council. (Had he continued in Bengal in 1757, possibly events in relation to the English in 1756-57 could have taken a different turn). During the war of the Austrian Succession, the French under Dupleix's orders captured Madras in 1746, a spectacular blow to British prestige. Pondicherry, defended by Dupleix, was now invested by 30 British ships and a land force of 6,000 men. The siege failed, the British losing a third of their force in sickness and in action. Against Dupleix's advice the French government returned Madras to the British in lieu of Louisburg in Nova Scotia. Had Dupleix's advice been heeded by his government, would subsequent events in South India have been different?

By 1753 the French in Hyderabad, under the redoubtable de Bussy, acting on Dupleix's orders, had installed as Nizam, Salabat Jung, the third son of Asaf Jah, the earlier British appointee, Nasir Jung, and an earlier French appointee Muzaffer Jung, having been murdered by hired assassins. The then conflicts between the British and the French in South India continued till 1754, when the British, viewing Dupleix's activities with growing suspicion, prevailed upon a French government anxious for peace to supersede Dupleix, and, if necessary, to arrest him and bring him back to France. These orders were carried out with needless harshness in 1754. Dupleix's work for his country in India was set at naught, even though he had spent his entire private trading fortune with China in the prosecution of French public policy in South India, estimated then at 7 million livres. The then French government did nothing for its greatest colonial governor.

However, in 1759, when de Bussy returned to France, he was loaded with honours, one of the few French officials to be so recognized at the time after an Indian career. After 20 years he returned to Pondicherry in charge of all the French forces and possessions east of the Cape of Good Hope. He died there in 1785 aged 67, his embalmed body having to be moved to an obscure grave, in case it was desecrated by French revolutionary soldiers.

Three years after de Bussy's departure from Hyderabad the British dethroned Salabat Jung in 1763, despite his having ceded several districts to them in 1759. His British appointed successor raised a 'counterpoise' force of 14,000 (against the Marathas threatening Hyderabad) under a French adventurer, General Francois de Raymond, also known as Michel Raymond. This force curiously fought under the French tricolour. He became a legendary figure, despite political influence having passed to the British. After his death in Hyderabad in 1798, aged 43, the British disbanded this force then commanded by Piron—but on each January 5, Raymond's death anniversary, his old soldiers paraded beside his lonely grave, a salute of 21 guns was fired, his old band played the Marseillaise, and token gifts of beer, cheroots and matches were placed by his old soldiers near his tomb. This was continued for over a hundred years by the descendants of his old soldiers, till World War I when it ceased, to be replaced by an informal pilgrimage of local people each year. Such it seems was the influence of Raymond's personality.

Separately, in Mysore the French had first allied themselves with Hyder Ali, who sent embassies to France, and then with Tipu Sultan who sent embassies to Mauritius. Overall, as to French military influence in South India, it can be said that it commenced to wane with Dupleix's departure, and to have been extinguished with Tipu's defeat, his advisers, headed by Monsieur F Ripaud, being French. 'Citizen' Tipu had been in correspondence with 'Citizen' Napoleon Bonaparte in Egypt for the invasion of India.

Well-known in the service of the Nawab of Oudh was Major General Claude Martin, whose testamentary charities, among many, are still evident in the La Martiniere schools at Lucknow, Calcutta and Lyons. He had come to India in the service of the French East India Company then joined the English East India Company, who had later deputed him to the service of the Nawab of Oudh at the latter's request. His monumental tomb is in Lucknow.

Both the husbands of the valiant Begum of Sardhana, who took the field herself, in support of the Emperor of Delhi and of Mahadaji Scindia, were Frenchmen. On the death of the first, General Reinhardt 'Sombre', she had married Colonel Le Vassoult. Apart from Frenchmen like the Bourbons in the service of Bhopal, Alexanders in the service of Jaipur, Dudrenec in the service of Holkar, there were at least 18 traceable French adventurers in the service of Mahadaji Scindia, the most prominent being the Savoyard General Beneit de Boigne, once the lover of Catherine the Great of Russia, militarily a remarkable person who rose to be the right-hand man of Mahadaji Scindia, the most redoubtable Indian military leader of the period, de Boigne left India on account of ill-health, taking his Indian wife Halima and two children with him, advising Scindia not to confront the British. He unforgiveably discarded Halima in England, remarried and settled at Chambéry in France. His son by Halima succeeded to the title of Comte de Chambéry. de Beigne was succeeded by Perron. The former's advice was not heeded after Mahadaji's death, eventually leading to the historic Battle of Delhi in 1803, near Patparganj, when the British-Indian regular forces were led by General Lake, a regular British Army officer, and the Marathas, who fought very bravely, were commanded by circumstance, by Colonel Louis Bernard Bourquin who had only recently assumed command from Perron, the latter having returned to France. Bourquin had arrived in India as a cook in the French East India Company, had deserted, and had thereafter worked his way up as an adventurer. Lake was tactically thus superior.

The names of 16 Frenchmen (including Neapolitans from the former Emperor Joseph-Bonaparte's army) are traceable in the narratives of Maharaja Ranjit Singh's army, out of 52 Europeans (English, Spanish, Greek, Russians, German and Austrian) apart from Armenians. A report from Paris had briefly mentioned the nostalgia sweeping the French as to the 18th and early 19th century India, generated by the French TV serialization, 'The Sun Rises in the East', based on the lives of Ventura and Allard, two former generals in Maharaja Ranjit Singh's army, and Allard's Indian wife, Amrita. The name of Ventura stands first in the roll of Ranjit Singh's white officers. The reason for this is that he was selected by Ranjit Singh in 1822 to command the 'Fauj Khas' or model brigade of four battalions, which were to be models for the rest of the Sikh army. He remained faithful to Ranjit Singh to the end. He was a Neapolitan Jew by birth when Naples was part of the Napoleonic Empire. At the time of the battle of Waterloo, he was a Colonel. His name was actually Rerbon Ben-Tooru. For a residence at Lahore he was allotted Anarkali's

tomb which was previously the residence of Prince Kharak Singh. He took part in all Ranjit Singh's campaigns and contributed largely to Ranjit Singh's victory against the Afghans resulting in the occupation of Peshawar. He was one of the few mercenaries who was too honourable to add to his income by illicit means. He married in 1825 a European lady resident at Ludhiana, a dispensation especially given by Ranjit Singh, as all foreign mercenaries in the Sikh Army were hitherto required to marry Indians. He was the Governor of Lahore and was the third senior in the Durbar. He retired to Paris in 1843.

The second of Ranjit Singh's foreign generals was Jean Francois Allard, born at St Tropez on the Mediterranean coast of France. At Waterloo he was ADC to Marshal Brune. After the murder of Marshal Brune, Ventura prevailed upon him to accompany him to the East (Allard had actually wanted to go to the USA to seek his fortune). After vicissitudes in Persia and Afghanistan, they reached the Punjab where Allard was ultimately given command of the Sikh Cavalry, which he reorganized and trained with considerable success. He took part in all of Ranjit Singh's campaigns and is spoken of highly for his character and disposition. He had married a 'Kashmiri' lady Amrita, arranged for him by Ranjit Singh, but more probably she was from Jammu. He had retired to France with his family, to whom he was devoted, but returned for financial reasons without them to India, dying at Peshawar in 1839 of a heart attack at the age of 54. He was buried at Lahore. Amrita refused to believe he had died and went to the quayside daily to receive him as he had promised to return. It is worth mentioning that Allard together with Ventura, Avitabile and Court received from King Louis Phillipe of France the rank of general in the French Army and Cross of the Legion of Honour. Allard was also appointed political agent of the French Government at the Court of Lahore. Avitabile married in India with profusion, initially being Governor of Wazirabad and latterly Governor of Peshawar. I have not been able to determine whether he took any of his wives with him when he retired to Naples. Court, commander of the Sikh artillery, married in India a second time, on the death of his first wife, and took his surviving wife with him to Marseilles on his retirement. Though many of the French adventurers in Ranjit Singh's army died in service, recently traceable graves are those of Vicount Alexis de Facieu at Ferozepore, Captain Dubuignon at Ludhiana, and Captains Forez and Etienne at Gurdaspur.

A popular bestseller in France 'Le Nabob' by Irene Frain, is based on the career of Rene Madoc, a French mercenary with the Rana of Cohad. He returned to France and settled in Brittany. Currently, French tourist interest in India has picked up, with itineraries like 'in the footsteps of Rene Madoc'.

Khan Bahadur Sher Jang

(Macgregor Medal Recipient—1910)

J A F DALAL



BORN on March 15, 1870, Sher Jang enlisted in Cook's Rifles in 1887. After taking part in the 1st and 2nd Miranzai Expeditions of 1890-91 and accompanying the Kurram column in 1892-93, he joined the Survey of India as a Soldier Surveyor in 1895. From 1895 to 1899 he served on the N.W. Frontier, taking part in the Waziristan Expedition of 1894-95, in the Tochi, Tirah and Mohmand Expeditions of 1897-98, and in Dir and Chitral in 1899 when he was granted the title of Khan Sahib when he was less than 30 years of age. From 1899 to 1901 he served with Captain A.A. Crookshank in Persia, visiting Bandar Abbas, Kerman, Shiraz and Bushire and surveying an area of about 53,000 square miles. In 1901-02 he was attached to the Abyssinian Boundary Commission and was awarded the Title of Khan Bahadur on 1 January 1904, again at a very early age. In 1903-04 he accompanied the Tibet Mission, being mentioned in despatches and in 1905-06 served under the Foreign Department in the Persian Gulf, visiting Bushire, Munammareh, Basrah and the Masqat Frontier. He returned to South Persia in 1907-08 where he surveyed an area of some 25,000 square miles and travelled as far north as the Frontier via Herat. He was then employed on *the Baluchistan-Afghan Frontier* in 1909 and with *the Afghan Mission* in 1910, when he was awarded the *Macgregor Memorial Medal*. He served with the Abor Expedition in 1911-12, when he was again mentioned in despatches. In 1913-14 he was with the Turco-Persian Boundary Commission when he was awarded decorations by the Persian and Turkish Governments.

When the Great War started in 1914, the Khan Bahadur was engaged in survey work with the Commission in the neighbourhood of Urumieh. He brought the survey personnel back through Persia by way of Mianeh, Tehran, Qum, Isfahan and Shiraz, to Bushire.

After a short period of service in India, Sher Jang returned to Persia, and in 1916-17 was with the party surveying the road alignment between Bandar Abbas and Kerman. In 1917-18, he served in Waziristan and on the Maksud Frontier, and towards the end of 1918 proceeded again to Mesopotamia. Owing to his intimate knowledge of conditions in Persian Kurdistan, he was now employed under the political authorities on an important diplomatic mission.

At this time the tribes of Central Kurdistan were in appalling conditions of destitution, as the result of the war, and their chieftans were seeking the protection of the British. In the north, Sayyid Taha, who was in position to control the tribes under British administration, had been invited to meet the political officer; but being influenced by Turkish propaganda, had so far remained aloof. Sher Jang received orders to go to Urumieh, and to negotiate with Sayyid Taha. He left Rowanduz with four Indian khalasis on the 9th March 1919, forced a way over the snow-bound Guru-i-Shaikh Pass on the Persian frontier, traversed the desolate Lahijan country and reached Urumieh after much hardship on the 20th March 1919. Sayyid Taha was six stages away at Chahari, and owing to the attitude of the Persian Governor, Sher Jang was unable to leave Urumieh. He wrote a letter to the Sayyid, persuading the latter to visit him in Urumieh, and they met five days later. All through the night of the 25th March, the two men discussed the situation and at last as dawn was breaking, Sher Jang won his case prevailing upon Sayyid Taha to accompany him back to Baghdad. The success of this mission was largely responsible for maintaining tranquillity in the Rowanduz District during the subsequent rising of Shaikh Mahmud in Southern Kurdistan.

During this rebellion Sher Jang served as political officer in the Sulaimani area. In 1920-21 he was appointed representative of Iraq in the resettlement of the Iraq-Persian frontier, which had been disturbed by war conditions. This work of his was highly appreciated by the Right Honourable Mr. Winston Churchill, Secretary of State for the Colonies, in his despatch dated 21 September 1921. He returned to Persia in 1923 with a detachment of the Survey of India which was then employed on surveying for the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

The Khan Bahadur was promoted to the Upper Subordinate Service on the 1st August 1909. He retired on 15 June 1925 after more than thirty years of most distinguished service. He earned 12 war medals and decorations, with 8 clasps; he was awarded honoraria for his services on several occasions; he also received an assignment of land revenue from the Government of India. In 1902 the Royal

Geographical Society awarded him a Sword of Honour (the Back Memorial) in recognition of his valuable contributions to geography. On 1 January 1916 he was awarded the Kaiser-i-Hind medal (2nd class). During the visit of His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales to India in 1922, Sher Jang was personally presented to the Prince, who showed a very keen interest in this survey officer's achievements.

Sher Jang's unfailing tact and courtesy endured him to all with whom he came into contact; it was largely due to these qualities together with his energy and resource in hazardous situations that he was so successful and his services so valuable, politically and professionally, in the turbulent countries where he spent so much of his life.

Another fine side of his character which was only realised by those who knew him well, was his compassion for the weak. At the end of 1918 he was on sick leave when "the virulent epidemic of influenza" was ravaging various homes in this country. Sher Jang devoted his three months leave to nursing the sick and burying the dead; and he wrote in a letter that he "regarded this duty greater than his active service."

Once in Urumieh in 1919, when he was in an unpleasant and difficult situation, he exercised all his personal influence and tact in urging the protection of the hapless Christian women and children, whose lives were threatened by fanatical Kurds at that time.

Sher Jang was outstanding by any standards having joined the Survey of India in the late nineteenth century and leaving it in the 1920s, when outdoor work requiring both mental and physical fitness was predominant. That he succeeded in whatever task he was given and received fitting rewards, was but right.

After he retired, the department seems to have lost touch with him. As a result of a query to the Surveyor General of Pakistan in 1985, I received a reply, "We have no information about Khan Bahadur Sher Jang."

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

1. Survey of India General Reports.
2. Personal papers.

A Further Analysis of I.O.M. and I.D.S.M. Awards from Secondary Sources

C J PARRETT

ANY quantitative analysis of I.O.M. and I.D.S.M. awards which claims absolute accuracy must be based upon a thorough and comprehensive search of primary sources—specifically Government Orders and the *Gazette of India*—which I have not been able to accomplish. However, until this worthwhile task is undertaken for the entire period 1837 to 1947, I have attempted to extract additional information from a detailed analysis and cross referencing of reliable secondary sources. Out of this has emerged an analysis of I.O.M. awards by date and location of act of bravery, and a degree of fine tuning to previously published data on the numbers of I.O.M.s and I.D.S.M.s issued. My conclusions do not vary in any significant degree from the information published by Abbott and Tamplin in their authoritative work *British Gallantry Awards* and do not claim absolute accuracy, but I hope they will encourage further research and correspondence.

THE INDIAN ORDER OF MERIT—1860 to 1925. Abbott and Tamplin base their analysis of awards between 1860 and 1925 on Hypher's records, which appear to be very thorough and comprehensive. It must be said that his labours have bequeathed a highly valuable consolidation of information on the gallantry of Indian soldiers for historians and medal collectors alike. The only available avenue open to me for verifying Hypher's records up to 1914 has been to check through various regimental histories (twenty-two in all) covering the period in question. Of these only two list I.O.M. awards not recorded by Hypher: *The History of the Guides 1846-1922* (10 for Umbeyla 1863 : 1 for Afghanistan 1879); *The Historical Records of the 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry* (1 for Maiwand 1880). Whilst recognising the frequent inaccuracy of regimental histories, the two specified histories appear to be of relatively authoritative and detailed content and I have therefore included these 12 additional 3rd class awards in my analysis of total issues.

Courtesy the Journal of the Orders and Medals Research Society

For the period 1914 to 1920, I have compared Hypher's records with Hayward's reprint of *The Roll of Honour, Indian Army 1914-1921*. Many awards listed in the *Roll of Honour* were published some time after August 1921, a typical example being the 2nd Class I.O.M. to Sepoy Jai Singh of the Burma Military Police (att'd to 152nd Punjabis) published in G.O. 1234 of 1923 for gallantry at Khan Abu Malul on 19 September 1918 whilst serving with the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. In terms of the date of the relevant act of bravery, the period covered by the *Roll of Honour* ends in July 1920 (an award for Waziristan—G.O. 657 of 1921) and I have found it more relevant throughout my analysis to take the date of act of bravery as the criterion for the year of award rather than the G.O. date.

There are several duplications of awards in Hypher, and there are also three in the *Roll of Honour*:

3445	L-Dfdr Abdul Rahman Khan	32nd Lancers
	Subadar Gul Zaman	40th Pathans
3107	Sowar Chandan Singh	14th Lancers att'd
		29th Lancers

All these duplications have been removed from my analyses.

The cross-checking of all awards in Hypher against those listed in the *Roll of Honour* has revealed only a few variances:

- Hypher lists eleven 2nd-Class awards not recorded in the *Roll of Honour*.
- The *Roll of Honour* lists twenty 2nd-Class awards not recorded by Hypher.

The eleven additional recipients recorded by Hypher are listed in Appendix E. My conclusion on the total number of awards from October 1914 to July 1920 (based on date of act of bravery) is therefore:

	<i>2nd Class</i>	<i>1st Class</i>	<i>Total</i>
Roll of Honour/Hypher	1080	23	1103
Roll of Honour only	20	—	20
Hypher only	11	—	11
Total awards	1111	23	1134

Two of the 1st-Class awards were promotions from the old 3rd class, these being :

Lt Col Durga Singh, 3rd Kashmir Rifles
3rd Class—Chitral 1895
1st Class—E. Africa 1914

Sbdr-Major Arsla Khan, 57th Wilde's Rifles.
3rd Class—N.W. Frontier 1908
1st Class—Waziristan 1920

The 45 awards for the period July 1920 to April 1925 are all additional to those listed in the *Roll of Honour*. The 156 posthumous awards recorded by Hypher between 1860 and 1925 have been identified in my analysis, although this may not be a comprehensive total.

THE INDIAN DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL—1907 to 1947. The analysis by Abbott and Tamplin of I.D.S.M. issues up to 1940 is based upon an article by Brigadier H. Bullock which Spink reproduced in the *Numismatic Circular* of October 1950. It is not clear whether Bullock consulted primary sources or relied upon *Indian Army Lists*, although I tend to believe he chose the latter.

My attempt to verify Bullock's figures relies totally on various issues of the *Indian Army List*, and is therefore limited to the extent that this source is secondary and only records medalists on the active

Type of Obverse	Bullock		A & T		Re-Appraisal	
	Medals	Bars	Medals	Bars	Medals	Bars
Edward VII	133	—	140	—	137	—
George V (1st)	3812	39	3805	37	3815	39
George V (2nd)	59	—	139	2	89	—
George VI (to 1939)	112	2	32	—	82	2
Total to 1939	4116	41	4116	39	4123	41
George VI (1940-7)			1155	10	1155	10
George VI (total)			1187	10	1237	12
Total all issues			5271	49	5278	51

list or pension establishment. It is therefore possible that a few recipients may have died some time between the award of their medals and the publication of the subsequent *I.A. List*. What can be said is that the *I.A. List* will at least record the absolute minimum number of I.D.S. medalists, and on this premise it is clear that Bullock has omitted some recipients from his analysis.

Another aspect of my review of I.D.S.M. issues deals with the actual date of transition from one obverse to another. Bullock and Abbott and Tamplin have both made some very reasonable yet differing assumptions which I believe are open to further debate.

The following notes detail the basis of my appraisal:

- 1 There were 49 awards published in Army Department Notification No. 527 of 26 June 1908 whereas Bullock only records 48 awards. He has probably omitted Jemadar Sarfraz Khan who was awarded the I.D.S.M. for services on the Northwest Frontier. Unlike all 48 other awards published in A.D.N. 527, Sarfraz Khan's award was omitted from the July 1908 *Indian Army List*, but appears regularly thereafter.
- 2 Bullock assumes that recipients of awards published in A.D.N. 522 of 23 June 1910 received medals with the new George V (1st type) obverse, whereas Abbott and Tamplin believe that 'this obverse was first issued from about 1911' and have therefore classified all sixteen 1910 medals as Edward VII issues. Whilst Edward died in May 1910, and it may have taken some months to arrange for medals with the George V obverse to be available, I prefer to assume that the four awards published in A.D.N. No. 933 of 18 November 1910 were the first to carry the new monarch's effigy. The seven medals which fall into this questionable period were issued to :

<i>Rank and Name of Recipient</i>	<i>Regiment</i>	<i>A.D.N. No.</i>	<i>Date</i>
Jemadar Dost Muhammad Khan	18th Lancers	933	18.11.10
1979 Naik Murad Khan	18th Lancers	933	18.11.10
2009 Sowar Muhammad Khan	18th Lancers	933	18.11.10
Jemadar Ghulam Muhammad	123rd Rifles	933	18.11.10
Subadar Malham Khan	N.W. Militia	522	21.6.10
Subadar Zar Khan	N.W. Militia	522	23.6.10
Jemadar Shah Nawaz Khan	Bannu Border M.P.	522	23.6.10

It would be extremely useful if any readers with I.D.S.M.s to these seven recipients would report details of obverses.

- 3 Only eight I.D.S.M.s are listed by Bullock (and therefore Abbott and Tamplin) for 1912 whereas in fact fourteen were awarded. It would appear that Bullock has omitted the six I.D.S.M.s published in A.D.N.s 854 (6 September) and 1077 (15 November) of 1912.
- 4 The July 1914 *Indian Army List* only records 9 I.D.S. medalists for 1913 and 11 for 1914 compared with Bullock's summary of 10 and 12 respectively. As it is not absolutely clear what sources Bullock used for assessing the number of issues for the years 1913 and 1914, I have assumed that he may have consulted primary sources and that the two missing medalists died before publication of the July 1914 *I.A. List*. I have therefore taken Bullock's figures for 1913 and 1914 until someone looks more thoroughly at primary sources.
- 5 Of the 25 second-award bars issued between April 1914 and May 1920, two were to recipients of Edward VII issues and two to recipients of pre-1914 George V issues. Particulars of these four second-award recipients are :

First Award (Edward VII issue)	Subadar Ali Dost 106th Pioneers A.D.N. No. 4 of 1.1.1910
2nd-award bar	Subadar Ali Dost 106th Hazara Pioneers (for Sistan)
First Award (Edward VII issues)	922 Havildar Fauja Singh, 55th Rifles A.D.N. No. 527 of 26.6.1908
2nd-award bar	Subadar Fauja Singh, 2nd Btn. Q.V.O. Corps of Guides (for Egypt)
First Award (George V issue)	1560 L-Naik Dharam Singh, 31st Div. Sig. Co. S & M A.D.N. No. 780 of 9.8.1912
2nd-award bar	Subadar Dharam Singh, Signal Company (for Mesopotamia)
First Award (George V issue)	Jemadar Narbahadur Gurung, 8th Gurkha Rifles A.D.N. No. 780 of 9.8.1912
2nd-award bar	Jemadar Narbahadur Gurung 1st Btn. 5th Gurkha Rifles (for Mesopotamia)

I am not sure why Abbott and Tamplin suggest that Bullock's assessment of 25 bars for the period 1914 to 1920 is a misprint and that the correct number is 23, and I prefer to maintain Bullock's figure. Thus the analysis of medals with secondaward bars (putting aside the date of award of such bars) up to May 1937 is:

Type of Obverse Medals with Bars

Edward VII	2
George V (1st)	37
George V (2nd)	—
Total	39

The 12 bars awarded after May 1937 may have been to recipients of medals with various obverses (i.e. both types of George V or the George VI issue).

- 6 I agree with Abbott and Tamplin's conclusion that the George V (2nd type) obverse was issued with effect from 1933, and I have left their figures for 1932 and 1933 unaltered.
- 7 According to Indian Army Order 241 of March 1938 quoted by Abbott and Tamplin, medals awarded on or after 11.5.1937 were to have the new George VI obverse. Pending further research, I have made a purely arbitrary split in the medals issued in 1937 between George V (2nd type) and George VI obverses.

Sources :

- Abbott and Tamplin: *British Gallantry Awards* (1st Edition 1971).
- Hypher: *Deeds of Valour Performed by Indian Officers and Soldiers 1860-1925* (published 1925).
- Hayward: *Honours and Awards Indian Army August 1914-August 1921* (originally published in 1931 as *Roll of Honour Indian Army 1914-1921*).
- Anderson: *Historical Records of the 33rd (Q.V.O.) Light Cavalry* (updated edition 1913).
- Anon: *History of the Guides 1846-1922* (published 1938).
- Spink: *Numismatic Circular* October 1950—The Indian Distinguished Service Medal by Brigadier H. Bullock (originally published in the *Journal of the United Service Institution of India*).
- Indian Army Lists*
- July 1908
July 1911
Jan 1913
July 1914

INDIAN ORDER OF MERITAWARDS 1860 to 1925APPENDIX A(1)

DATE OF ACT OF BRAVERY	3rd CLASS	2nd CLASS	1st CLASS	ALL CLASSES	REMARKS
1860	6	-	-	6	
1863	* 10	1	-	11	*Not in Hypher
1864	11	1	-	12	
1865	34	3	-	37	
1866	4	-	-	4	
1867	15	-	-	15	
1868	11	-	1	12	
1871	1	1	-	2	
1873	1	-	-	1	
1877	4	-	1	5	
1878	20	-	-	20	
1879	** 90	7	4	101	**Includes 1 award not in Hypher
1880	***79 + 7P	2	1	89	*** Includes 1 award not in Hypher
1881	3	-	-	3	
1882	2	-	-	2	
1883	2	-	-	2	
1884	2	-	-	2	
1885	12	-	-	12	
1886	40	-	-	40	
1887	23	-	-	23	
1888	11	-	BAR	12	
1889	14	-	-	14	
1890	2	1	-	3	
1891	138	2	-	140	
1892	15	-	-	15	
1893	14 + 4P	-	-	18	
1894	18	-	-	18	
1895	81 + 9P	1	-	91	
1896	1	-	-	1	
1897	258 + 22P	7 + 1P	-	288	
1898	24 + 1P	-	-	25	
1899	2	-	-	2	
1900	9	-	-	9	

P = POSTHUMOUS AWARD

APPENDIX A(2)

DATE OF ACT OF BRAVERY	3rd CLASS	2nd CLASS	1st CLASS	ALL CLASSES	REMARKS
1901	18	2P	-	20	
1902	5	3	-	8	
1903	4	-	-	4	
1904	21 + 2P	3	-	26	
1905	9	-	-	9	
1906	1	-	-	1	
1908	24 + 2P	-	-	26	
1909	3	-	-	3	
1911	1	-	-	1	

NEW CLASSES OF ORDER w.e.f. DECEMBER 1911	2nd CLASS	1st CLASS	BOTH CLASSES	REMARKS
1911	1P	-	1	
1912	2	-	2	
1913	3	-	3	
1914 - 1920	1016+95p	21 + 2P	1134	
1920 - 1925	36+8P	1	45	

SUMMARY

	3rd	2nd	1st	BAR	ALL CLASSES
1860 - 1911	1043	32	7	1	1083
POSTHUMOUS	47	3	-	-	50
ALL AWARDS	1090	35	7	1	1133
		2nd	1st		BOTH CLASSES
1911 - 1925		1057	22		1079
POSTHUMOUS		104	2		106
ALL AWARDS		1161	24		1185

TOTAL OF ALL I.O.M. CLASS AWARDS 1860 - 1925

2318

APPENDIX B (1)

INDIAN ORDER OF MERIT
LOCATION OF ACTS OF BRAVERY
1860 - 1913

CAMPAIGN OR LOCATION 1860 to 1913	YEAR	3rd CLASS	2nd CLASS	1st CLASS	ALL CLASSES	REMARKS
NWF (Mahsud Waziris)	1860	6			6	
UMBEYLA	1863	10	1		11	
BHUTAN	1864-5	43	4		47	
OKAMANDEL	1865	1			1	
MUNNIPORE VALLEY	1865-6	2			2	
NWF(SULIMAN KHELS)	1866	1			1	
MANIPUR	1866	2			2	
NWF(various)	1867	10			10	
ANDAMANS	1867	1			1	
KATIWAR	1867	4			4	
NWF(various)	1868	7		1	8	
ABYSSINIA	1868	4			4	
LOOSHAI	1871	1	1		2	
ANDAMANS	1873	1			1	
JOWAKI	1877	4		1	5	
NWF (UTHAN KHELS)	1878	2			2	
AFGHANISTAN WAR	1878	18			18	
AFGHANISTAN WAR	1879	90	7	4	101	
AFGHANISTAN WAR	1880	86	2	1	89	
NWF (MAHSUD WAZIRIS)	1881	3			3	
NORTHEAST FRONTIER	1882-4	6			6	
EGYPT	1885	11			11	
BURMA	1885-7	64			64	
SIKKIM	1888	1			1	
HAZARA	1888	7		BAR	8	Gold Bar to 1st Class I.O.M.
BURMA	1888-9	17			17	
SOMALILAND	1890	1			1	

APPENDIX B (2)

CAMPAIGN OR LOCATION.	YEAR	3rd CLASS	2nd CLASS	1st CLASS	ALL CLASSES	REMARKS
CHIN HILLS	1890-1	2			2	
LOOSHAI	1890-1	2	1		3	
BURMA	1891	3	1		4	
HAZARA	1891	6			6	
SAMANA	1891	2			2	
MANIPUR	1891	86	1		87	
HUNZA-NAGAR	1891	22			22	
BRITISH CENTRAL AFRICA	1891-5	26			26	
UPPER BURMA (SADON)	1892	4			4	
LOOSHAI	1892	4			4	
CHIN HILLS	1892	2			2	
BENARES	1892	1			1	
KATCHIN HILLS	1892-3	18			18	
NWF (CHILAS)	1893	5			5	
ABOR	1894	3			3	
WAZIRISTAN	1894	13			13	
NWF (MALAKAND)	1895	11			11	
NWF (CHITRAL)	1895	69	1		70	
NWF (TOCHI VALLEY)	1895/6	2			2	
MAIZAR	1897	40	2		42	
MALAKAND	1897	76	1		77	
TIRAH	1897	69	2		71	
SAMANA	1897	56			56	
KURRAM VALLEY	1897	6			6	
BAJAUR	1897	25	2		27	
EAST AFRICA	1897-8	32	1		33	
MEKRAH	1898	1			1	
BIR (DACOITS)	1899	2			2	
BURMA	1900	3			3	
SOUTH AFRICA	1900	1			1	
ASHANTI	1900	1			1	
CHINA	1900-1	7			7	

APPENDIX B (3)

CAMPAIGN OR LOCATION	YEAR	3rd CLASS	2nd CLASS	1st CLASS	ALL CLASSES	REMARKS
MEKRAN	1901	3			3	
MAHSUD/WAZIRI BLOCKADE	1901	12	2		14	
PERSIA/BALUCHISTAN	1902		1		1	
GUMATTI	1902	5	2		7	
KOHAT	1903	1			1	
SOMALILAND	1903-4	4			4	
TIBET	1904	22	3		25	
NWF(various)	1905	6			6	
WAZIRISTAN	1905	3			3	
NWF(PESHAWAR)	1906	1			1	
NWF(BAZAR VALLEY)	1908	5			5	
NWF(MOHMAND)	1908	21			21	
NWF(BORDER RAIDERS)	1909	3			3	
ABOR	1911	1			1	
NEW CLASSES OF AWARD FROM DECEMBER 1911		YEAR	2nd	1st	BOTH CLASSES	REMARKS
PERSIA	1911	1			1	
NWF (ZHOB)	1912	2			2	
NWF (GOMAL PASS)	1913	1			1	
NEF (BURMA)	1913	2			2	

INDIAN ORDER OF MERIT

LOCATION OF ACTS OF BRAVERY

OCTOBER 1914 - JULY 1920

APPENDIX C

THEATRE OR LOCATION	2nd CLASS	1st CLASS	BOTH CLASSES	R E M A R K S
FRANCE and FLANDERS	236 + 1P	4	241	
BLACK SEA/SALONIKA TRANSGASPIA	14 + 3P	-	17	
DARDENELLES/GALLIPOLI	40	-	40	
PERSIA	15 + 4P	-	19	
MESOPOTAMIA/KUT UL AMARA	381 + 42P	8 + 2P	433	
EGYPT/PALESTINE	138 + 10P	3	151	
NORTHWEST FRONTIER	36 + 9P	2	47	
WAZIRISTAN	70 + 18P	1	89	
EAST AFRICA	54 + 5P	3	62	
ADEN	16 + 2P	-	18	
BALUCHISTAN	5	-	5	
MUSCAT	1 + 1P	-	2	
BURMA	1	-	1	
SOMALILAND	2	-	2	
NOT IDENTIFIED	7	-	7	
ALL THEATRES/LOCATIONS	1016	21	1037	
POSTHUMOUS	95	2	97	
TOTAL AWARDS	1111	23	1134	

INDIAN ORDER OF MERIT

DATE AND LOCATION OF ACTS OF BRAVERY

APPENDIX D

JULY 1920 - APRIL 1925

CAMPAIGN OR LOCATION	DATE OF ACT OF BRAVERY	2nd CLASS	1st CLASS	BOTH CLASSES	R E M A R K S
MESOPOTAMIA	1920	11 + 1P	1	13	
NORTH PERSIA	1920	1		1	
WAZIRISTAN	1920	2 + 1P		3	
WAZIRISTAN	1921	3 + 2P		5	
MALABAR	1921	3 + 1P		4	
BALUCHISTAN	1921	1P		1	
NWF	1921	3		3	
NWF	1922	2		2	
WAZIRISTAN	1922	1		1	
WAZIRISTAN	1923	5 + 1P		6	
NWF	1923	2		2	
RAZMAK	1923	1 + 1P		2	
NWF	1924	1		1	
BALUCHISTAN	1925	1		1	
ALL LOCATIONS 1920 - 1925		36	1	37	
POSTHUMOUS AWARDS		8	-	8	
T O T A L AWARDS		44	1	45	

APPENDIX E

INDIAN ORDER OF MERIT
 AWARDS NOT RECORDED IN GOVERNMENT OF
 INDIA LIST OF HONOURS 1914-1921
 (Details extracted from Hypher)

RANK/NAME OF RECIPIENT	REGIMENT	THEATRE OR LOCATION	G.O. NO./YEAR	REMARKS
4392 NAIK SHER SINGH	23RD SIKH PIONEERS	SOMALILAND	631/1915	
2343 NAIK KEHAR SINGH	53RD SIKHS	EGYPT	1151/1917	Attd. JIND I.S. Infantry
SUBADAR ANTHIR THAPA	2ND/3RD GURKHA RIFLES	FRANCE	187/1915	Attd. 1st/1st GURKHA RIFLES
267 L-NAIK DHANJIT GURUNG.	4TH/3RD GURKHA	WAZIRISTAN	1635/1920	
JEM.NAR BAHADUR RAI	2ND/10TH GURKHA RIFLES	GALLIPOLI	735/1916	LATER PROMOTED TO 1ST CLASS
8595 BEARER RAM DIN	ARMY BEARER CORPS	GENERAL CITATION.	1151/1917	
8963 BEARER MANGARINGA	ARMY BEARER CORPS	THEATRE/ LOCATION NOT IDENTIFIED.	1151/1917	
262 DAFADAR DARIM	NORTHERN WAZIRISTAN MILITIA	N.W.FRONTIER	301/1915	
JEM.PAT KHAN	NORTHERN WAZIRISTAN MILITIA	N.W.FRONTIER	526/1915	
CAPT.NIAMAT ALI KHAN	JIND INFANTRY I.S.T.	EGYPT	1151/1917	
CAPT.NARAIN SINGH	REGIMENT NOT SPECIFIED. EITHER PATIALA OR BHARATPUR IMPERIAL SERVICE INFANTRY.	GENERAL CITATION. THEATRE/ LOCATION NOT IDENTIFIED.	961/1918	

APPENDIX F

INDIAN DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL

NO. OF AWARDS: JUN 1907 to JUN 1914

SERVING/PENSIONED I.D.S.MEDALISTS					Analysis of IDSM Awards by Bullock	Revised Analysis of Probable Maximum IDSM Awards
RECORDED IN INDIAN ARMY LISTS						
DATE OF AWARD (A. D. NOTIFICATION)	JULY 1908	JUNE 1911	JAN 1913	JULY 1914		
JUN 07	48	45	43	39	48	49
JAN 08	10	10	10	9	10	10
JUN 08	56	55	55	52	56	56
JAN 09		5	5	4	5	5
JUN 09		5	5	1	5	5
JAN 10		9	9	9	9	9
JUN 10		3	3	2	7	3
NOV 10		4	4	4		4
JAN 11		2	2	2	9	2
DEC 11			7	5		7
AUG 12			8	8	8	
SEP 12			3	3	3	
NOV 12			3	3	3	
MAR 13				1	10	10
AUG 13				6		
OCT 13		1				
NOV 13		1				
FEB 14	6					
APR 14		4	12	12		
JUN 14		1				

EDWARD VII ISSUES

133

137

GEORGE Vth (1st type) ISSUES

46

49

TOTAL ISSUES TO JUNE 1914

179

186

APPENDIX G

INDIAN DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL
NUMBER OF AWARDS: 1907 to 1947

PERIOD	No. of Awards	No. of Medals	No. of 1st Bars
1907	49	49	-
1908	66	66	-
1909	10	10	-
JAN-JUN 1910	12	12	-
Edward VII issue	137	137	-

NOV 1910	4	4	-
1911	9	9	-
1912	14	14	-
1913	10	10	-
JAN-JUN 1914	12	12	-
JUL 1914 - MAY 1920	3199	3174	25
JUN-DEC 1920	154	151	3
JAN-AUG 1921	169	165	4
SEP-DEC 1921	74	72	2
1922	78	75	3
1923	58	56	2
1924	23	23	-
1925	8	8	-
1926	3	3	-
1927	3	3	-
1928-1929	-	-	-
1930	26	26	-

PERIOD	No. of Awards	No. of Medals	No. of 1st Bars
1931	8	8	-
1932	2	2	-
George V(1st type) issue	3854	3815	39

1933	21	21	-
1934	5	5	-
1935	19	19	-
1936	14	14	-
JAN-MAY 1937	30	30	-
George V(2nd type) issue	89	89	-

MAY-DEC 1937	52	50	2
1938	24	24	-
1939	8	8	-
1940	31	31	-
1941-1946	1128	1118	10
1947	6	6	-
George VI issue	1249	1237	12

TOTAL ALL TYPES	5329	5278	51
-----------------	------	------	----

Book Reviews

INDIA'S PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE SEVENTIES

BY GENERAL J.N. CHAUDHURI

Published by the United Service Institution of India, Kashmir House, New Delhi-110011, 1973, pages 73; price : Rs. 10/-

IN 1971, the United Service Institution of India celebrated its birth centenary. To commemorate this, it started the series of annual National Security Lectures with a view to encouraging the growing interest in the people in the Study of India's defence problems. This book is the outcome of the first lecture in this series delivered on 13 and 14 January 1971, by Gen. J.N. Chaudhuri, a former Chief of Staff of the Indian Army in the mid 1960's and later India's High Commissioner in Canada.

Gen. Chaudhuri divided his lecture into two distinct parts: the first part covering the sundry strategical aspects and their links with national policy, and the second one dealing with thoughts on defence organisation—of course, both being complementary to each other. Concluding the first part of his lecture he made the following observations:

"On land, protection lies in the maintenance of appropriate forces suitably located. At sea, especially with our strength limitations, protection seems to lie in vigilance and the denial of facilities other than those which are necessary by international law. **The land threat is visible and easy to comprehend. The threat from the sea is less easy to perceive and though it is smaller, it is there. **I would suggest that the first essential for security of any kind is internal stability. The second essential seems to be a clear, constantly updated conception of where any threat lies and what constitutes that threat. The third essential which follows from the second, must be an analysis of how and with what to meet the threat or threats. Under-insurance is dangerous and we cannot afford to over-insure;

therefore a clear analysis is important. I appreciate that through political necessity it may sometimes be necessary to strongly emphasize publicly some particular aspect of threat but where defence planning is concerned, objectivity is necessary. **India, by its very size and position, if by nothing else, cannot escape the responsibility of playing a major role in the destiny of the South Asian Complex. A strong, secure, stable India will play that role in a much more confident and positive manner."

As regards an adequate defence organisation to implement any security concept, Gen. Chaudhuri has given priority to the command and control set-up for defence, both between the political leaders and various executive branches of Government as well as the links within the Armed Forces themselves. He observed: "If there is a clash of personalities between those concerned, particularly in the planning and decision-making area, then the best system is no better than the worst one." As to the Govt. policies he said: "On broad policy principles, it is necessary for the Government itself, as well as some essential personnel who are in the executive arm of Government, to be clear as to that policy and to be sure in their own minds that when an emergency occurs, while policy might be amended in some minor detail, there would be no complete reversal or diametric change of thought. The details of this broad defence policy with its set of choices, would for security reasons have to be kept to a very limited number and, for the same reasons for security, it might even be necessary to have a cover plan."

Gen. Chaudhuri's second important point in organisation for defence is the need for a free interchange of views between the various sections of the decision-making authorities concerned and enough freedom given to work within one's own sphere with minimum interference. He commented: "Perhaps the main drawback of the 1962 operations against the Chinese was the lack of a clear-cut line as to where the spheres of responsibility, in the various segments and strata of defence, began and ended."

His third important point in the organisation for defence "is the definition of who is responsible for tendering to the Defence Minister, and, if necessary, to the Cabinet, formal advice on defence matters." . . . "In my view, the greatest fault of our present system in India today is that despite their titles of Chief of Army Staff, Chief of Naval Staff and Chief of Air Staff, each of the three incumbents

actually combines two important functions in one. They are responsible as Chiefs of Staff for tendering their advice individually and collectively to the Defence Minister. In addition, they function as Commanders-in-Chief of their own arms. While this dual role was just workable when each service was much smaller and less technical, today it puts far too much strain on the individual in times of comparative quiet and an almost unbearable strain on him during a war." He has argued in favour of a modified system of the Chief of Defence Staff. Gen. Chaudhuri felt its need during the Indo-Pak War, 1965. He observed: "Had there been a Chief of Defence Staff at the time, the burden would have been eased somewhat for the CDS would have taken on the advice and re-assurance role, leaving the Army Chief to concentrate wholly on operations, logistics and alternative planning for the future. I am not quite sure though which of the two, the CDS or the COAS, would have taken the rap had events gone very wrong: perhaps it would have been shared."

Next, Gen. Chaudhuri emphasised the need for a well-organised Intelligence System. He said: "However, when one looks at India's defence problem today, where the emphasis is gradually becoming more levelled out between an external threat and internal subversion, a problem which I might add is not peculiar to India alone, a need for the closest co-ordination in the intelligence sector becomes very apparent." The last point the General stressed upon was the question of preparedness. He observed: "Even in the non-nuclear nations, deterrence was perhaps the major factor in the preservation of national security it is necessary to guard against surprise and to be ready with an immediate response. This is all the more so in today's context, where a formal declaration of hostile intent is seldom if ever made and where a strike may occur even while mediatory talks are going on. An immediate and successful reply to hostile attack, requires a balanced consideration of the many facets which go to make up preparedness on the part of any armed forces. What are some of these facets? Perhaps, the more important ones are correct training, correct equipment, correct positioning, fit troops, good communications, the best available intelligence, adequate reserves, clear instructions and high motivation. To this must of course be added good leadership and high morale, both in the military as well as in the political field."

Although Gen. Chaudhuri discussed India's Security problems for the 1970s some of his conclusions are valid for the 1980s and

even for the future decades. Persons interested in national security will find the book interesting and useful.

—DR. B.C. CHAKRAVORTY

INDIA'S DEFENCE POLICY AND ORGANISATION SINCE INDEPENDENCE

BY P.V.R. RAO, I.C.S. (RETD)

United Service Institution of India, New Delhi, 1977; pages 90;
price: Rs. 25; £3.50; \$6.25

THIS book covers the second lecture in the series, delivered by a former Defence Secretary of India on 29th and 30th March 1973. While in the first part of the book Mr. Rao has discussed Defence policy and organisation in India since 1947, in the second part he has dwelt upon the defence needs of the country in the coming years. As he was the Defence Secretary since November 1962 through the Indo-Pak War of 1965, he has been able to give an insider's view of the goings-on in the higher echelons of decision-making for defence. He has commented upon the accusations traded between the military and the IB about intelligence failure, about inadequate handling of the logistics by the Defence forces and the political failure in the 1950s in taking necessary steps for national defence. He had the opportunity to come into contact with Jawaharlal Nehru also during his earlier stint in the Ministry of Defence as Joint Secretary in 1948, when once Nehru observed: "I do not agree with your arguments but I agree that the Indian National Army should not be reinstated. Do you know why? I do not want politics to enter the Services, which will be the result if these men are reinstated. The day politics enters the army, it will be a sad day!" Nehru said in 1956: "The right approach to defence is to avoid having unfriendly relations with other countries—to put it differently, war today is, and ought to be, out of question."

Mr. Rao has remarked: "Unfortunately, the country's efforts at containment by diplomacy have not been successful. The country has been invaded in 1962, in 1965 and in 1971, and has been forced to rely on its armed forces to defend itself. From 1960 onwards rather haltingly, and from the end of 1962 with some determination, the country has been building up its military might, in anticipation that such a contingency may be forced upon it." He has revealed how the Indian Army was surprised when the Pak army attacked

Chhamb on the morning of the 1st September 1965, as it had concluded that the attack would come from further north, how Gen. Chaudhuri was pressurised by the Defence Minister to make a stand at Jaurian, and how his aversion against moving any reinforcements to the Punjab theatre from the east almost led to a disaster in Khemkaran.

Mr. Rao has also given us an inkling of the working of the higher decision-making committees of the Government, such as the Emergency Committee of the Cabinet, the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, the Defence Minister's Committee, the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Chiefs of Staff Committee. He has also made the following interesting remarks: "A few months back, the Vice Chief of the Army Staff, Lieut. General Har Prasad, voiced his misgivings about the shortcomings in maintenance provisioning because of political interference Many of you may recall the outcry at the time that the army commanders were taken by surprise because of the want of data regarding the Ichogil Canal and the defence works thereon. . . . Information to update the maps was with the Director, Military Intelligence, but had not percolated to the field units in a usable manner because of organisational bottlenecks It has been alleged that Intelligence did not anticipate that China would retaliate to our 'forward' policy. The Intelligence Bureau had furnished pretty full details about movements to the front of men and material by China. Whether, inspite of such concentrations, China wanted to bluff or to embark on active operations was a matter for judgement." About the acceptance of cease-fire in Kashmir in 1949, he has given another interesting piece of information, "There have been many criticisms of Government, for accepting the Cease Fire in Kashmir in 1949. I recall some army commanders voicing such criticism even then. But when asked if the fighting could be continued if supplies from abroad were turned off—in those days, immediately after the end of the Second World War, the US and the UK enjoyed a near monopoly in this respect—they had to concede the inevitability of the Government decision." About the popular tendency to blame Nehru about the Indian digrace in 1962, Mr. Rao has said "China was completely ignored. This is curious, since from as early as 1952, Prime Minister Nehru was giving expression, in various private discussions, to his fears about the growing might of China and danger from the North. These misgivings do not seem to have had any influence on our equipment policy. The participation of our military leaders in Korean settlement provided a unique

opportunity to obtain an insight into the capability of Chinese army and its weaponry, but the opportunity does not seem to have been utilised. The army demands put forward as late as the middle of 1962 had little relevance to operations on our Himalayan frontiers."

Mr. Rao has also dwelt upon the defence build-up in India after 1962 with perceptive analysis. About the need for worth-while recruits for the Armed Forces he has made a very thoughtful remark in the second part of his lecture: "The march of technology has made soldiery in any army a skilled job. It requires serious consideration whether, in order to overcome these shortages and at the same time to provide the armed forces with a national identity and an effective motivation, a scheme of selective conscription of the educated is not overdue." He has also discussed how the National Defence Council and the Military Affairs Committee, created in 1962 amidst great enthusiasm, have been made ineffective.

This interesting and thought-provoking book should be read by all who are interested in India's defence.

—DR. B.C. CHAKRAVORTY

SOME PROBLEMS OF DEFENCE

By AIR CHIEF MARSHAL P.C. LAL, DFC (RETD)

United Service Institution of India, New Delhi, 1977; pages: 100; price: Rs. 25; £3.50; \$6.25

THIS book has come out of the third USI National Security Lecture, delivered by Air Chief Marshal P.C. Lal, D.F.C. (Retd), former Chief of Air Staff of India during 1969-1973, at Sapru House, New Delhi, on 21 and 22 March 1975. Commissioned in the Royal Indian Air Force in November 1939, he grew with the Indian Air Force to participate in its expansion, modernisation and military operations till he retired on January 15, 1973 as its Chief. Naturally he has given an interesting and authentic account of the working of the higher decision-making bodies in the Defence, the inter-Service Co-operation and lack of it, and the performance of the Services during the wars they fought.

Mainly, he has dealt with two aspects of Defence: the higher defence organisation and the relationships between the Civilian

authorities and the Services and the Inter-Service Co-operation. During the Pak aggression on Jammu and Kashmir in 1947-48, India had only a dozen Dakotas (raised in 1947) in the transport Squadron and some 20 pilots still fresh to their jobs, besides eight fighter Squadrons and a few Liberator bombers of the Second World War vintage. With this meagre resource, the IAF provided the Army with necessary tactical and transport support during the 1947-48 Operations. Lal has observed: "Lt. Gen. L.P. Sen, the Army commander in the Valley, has written of the deterrent effect that these strikes had on the raiders. I doubt if the Air Force did much physical damage but its very presence along-side the Army must have been demoralizing to men who had come to loot an unarmed population. It also earned a respite for the Army during which its forces could be built up."

He has criticised the non-participation of the IAF in the India-China War of 1962. He said : "Not that the Air Force was unwilling to join in—indeed, the then Chief of Air Staff was most anxious to do so—but apparently the Army did not want it to. It could also be that no thought was given to what the Air Force might do because the higher defence organisation, and in particular the Chiefs of Staff Committee, seems never to have discussed the possibility of a war with China over the border issue. Without any prior planning or preparation the Air Force could have operated only in a limited fashion in NEFA, though it might have done better in Ladakh with which it was more familiar and to which its bases in the Punjab were closer. But that is mere speculation. The bare facts of the matter are that in 1962 the Army and the Air Force did not fight together, and whatever operational plans were made were those of the Army alone. It was as if the Army was still thinking and fighting as it did in 1948. Habits die hard . . . The Kutch dispute, in early 1965, again caught the armed forces unawares. Yet again the Army took the field without any prior planning or preparation. Its reaction was fast but, as on previous occasions, there was not joint Army-Air Force plan, and all that the Air Force could do was to provide logistic support with light aircraft. The possibility of tactical support was considered after the fighting began. It was then realised that our bases were so far from the battle zone that our aircraft would have to operate at extreme range with reduced weapon loads while Pakistani aircraft could dominate the entire combat area from bases close by. Given time, we could also have improvised an airfield or two in or near Kutch, but the fighting ended before that." Lal has criticized Gen. Chaudhuri for not taking the IAF into confidence while preparing

for the 1965 War with Pakistan. He observed: "While there was some hope of the Army holding the Pakistani attack on its own there was no talk of bringing the Air Force into the conflict, but on the 1st September, with the Pakistanis pressing forward from Jaurian, General Chaudhuri, the Army Chief, was compelled to ask for air support. There had been no prior joint planning for such an eventuality. Air Chief Marshal Arjan Singh, the Air Chief, had on his own alerted the air bases in the Punjab. When the call came, a force of fighter bombers from Pathankot mounted a strike on the Pakistanis within minutes of being ordered to do so. It was a touch-and-go affair, because the demand for air support came late in the afternoon and the strike had to be mounted in an area with which our pilots were not familiar. With only a few minutes of daylight left they could have missed the battle-zone or attacked the wrong targets. Fortunately, they did neither and so helped to bring the Pakistani force to a halt." He further said: "Our Navy had no operational tasks but suffered a sea-borne attack at Dwarka in the west. On the whole, the 1965 war proved inconclusive with honours about even on both sides. But its educational value for us was great."

It was only before and during the Indo-Pak War, 1971, that the three Services were involved in joint planning and preparations for the war against Pakistan. He commented: "Fostering a spirit of co-operation between the Army and Air Force proved relatively easy. Many of the officers of the two Services had trained together from the rank of cadet upwards, and readily accepted each other as comrades-in-arms. Such personal relationships are intangible qualities and are not listed amongst the pre-requisites of war, and yet these can motivate decisions and influence actions that have far-reaching results. It was this more than anything else that played a vital part in ensuring the success of the 1971 war." Indeed, the air war was mounted by the IAF in 1971 on the target system, planned in advance before the war had actually started. Lal remarks: "Changes in detail there are bound to be, but it is my estimate that its main features will remain valid for many years yet. I say this without any sense of complacency; my purpose is to bring out the facts of geography that make war a futile affair for Pakistan. Mutual trust and intelligent cooperation between the many people who make up our defence organisation is the formula for success."

About the decision-making apparatus also, Lal has made some interesting points. The basic pattern of India's higher defence set-up

was given shape by Lord Mountbatten in 1947, which was an interface between the political power and its military arm. Within the limits of its accountability to the Parliament the Cabinet formulates defence policy, defines military arms, provides resources for the creation and maintenance of the armed forces and generally oversees their working. This it does through what is now called the Cabinet Committee for Political Affairs. In the early days, these responsibilities were entrusted to the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, set up on the British model, but after the conflict with China in 1962 that was replaced by the somewhat larger Emergency Committee of the Cabinet to which the Political Affairs Committee is now the successor. Of immediate interest is the relationship that exists between the Defence Minister and the Service Chiefs. The relationship is two-fold: the Chiefs are the principal military advisers to the Defence Minister and are, at the same time, responsible to him for the proper management and efficiency of each of their services; they combine advisory and executive functions. These roles are reflected in the working of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, which is meant to study military problems and advise on the action to be taken. Once Government approves of what is to be done the Committee becomes a planning and co-ordinating body.

Lal considers the centralised planning by the General Staff System of the German type as well as the Chief of Defence Staff System as unnecessary for India. He is satisfied with the present system. Although Krishna Menon did a yeoman's service to India's defence by launching a massive road construction programme along the northern borders through the Border Roads Organization and by setting up modern factories for producing arms, armaments and military aircraft, his Churchillian style of functioning in dashing off orders and making decisions without prior consultation or consideration of their consequences, with no Lord Alanbrooke to keep him in check, has been criticised by Lal. He says: "The result was that the Defence Minister charged happily along, doing whatever he thought best, without using the higher defence organisation to test his proposals or back up his decisions." The result was disastrous as evident in 1962. Lal says: "At this stage, the higher defence organisation should have taken note of the military overtones generated by claims and counter-claims, policy directions should have been given to the Chiefs of the Staff and the whole machinery should have set about evaluating the situation and preparing for such contingencies as might arise. In the event, the machine lay inactive; it just did not work.

Apparently, despite mounting tension with China, the subject was never once discussed by the Chiefs of Staff Committee. The matter seems to have been taken out of their hands by the Defence Minister, who bypassed them and the higher defence organisation by himself deciding what military action should be taken and by whom. Later, our reverses in the China war of 1962 were blamed partly on faulty intelligence; that is when the Joint Intelligence Committee was moved out from under the Chiefs of Staff to the Cabinet Secretariat ... The moral of this surely is that the higher defence organisation can function effectively only if it is taken into the fullest confidence of Government, and if its studies, consultations and preparation of plans can proceed in a systematic way, activating each of the Services for the particular part that it may have to play in the event of hostilities." On the Indo-Pak conflict of 1965, he has not minced words in telling the truth and owning up the responsibility of failure: "The 1965 war was successful as a defensive action, for it managed to preserve the status quo in Kashmir, but the operations against Pakistan in the Punjab and Rajasthan were inconclusive. We failed to make a real dent in Pakistan's forces, both on the ground and in the air. The Navy being far removed from Kashmir took no part in the fighting, but suffered some damage when a Pakistani ship shot up its base at Dwarka. An article appeared recently balming the Air Force for allowing this to happen. I tender belated apologies for that Complaints from our forward troops about the limited extent of air cover in the war that followed were well-founded, for in the absence of precise plans the Air Force had simply maintained its normal forces at its bases in the Punjab and in Jammu and Kashmir. To do its job properly, some redeployment of squadrons and of logistic and communication facilities should have been effected before the commencement of hostilities. Had the joint planners been able to do their work in advance I am certain more positive results would have been achieved in 1965."

Air Chief Marshal Lal has also made a passing, but very important, reference to the need of proper financial management in defence. Although an institute of management has been set up for the Defence Services to make Service Officers cost-conscious amongst other things, much "remains to be done to develop techniques and procedures suited to our environment that will ensure maximum defence capability for minimum expenditure. Such an understanding of financial matters within the Services is also essential to realistic equipment and man-power planning and must some day become a subject of

prime concern to the Chiefs of Staff Committee. It can also do much to promote better understanding between the Service Headquarters and the Ministries of Defence and Finance."

There is no doubt that this book will give the reader a good knowledge of the various aspects of India's defence. Some of Lal's observations and conclusions will provide food for thought to military planners and political bosses concerned with Defence.

—DR. B.C. CHAKRAVORTY

DEFENCE AND DEVELOPMENT

By H.C. SARIN, I.C.S. (RETD)

United Service Institution of India, New Delhi, 1979; pages: 72; price: Rs. 25, £3.50; \$6.25.

THIS was the fourth National Security Lecture delivered in Sapru House during 18-19 November, 1976, by Shri H.C. Sarin, Wrangler from Cambridge and I.C.S. (Retd), one of the ablest of Defence Secretaries of India. He held a number of important posts in the Ministry of Defence, spanning more than 20 years since 1946, and thus came to know intimately all aspects of Defence activities. During his tenure as Secretary, Department of Defence Production, 1964-1968, the new Vijayanta tank, India's first Leander Frigate, and Mig-21 rolled out of the production lines. He was also responsible for introducing the 5-year rolling plan for Defence. He held different types of top administrative posts, including the Presidentship of the Indian Mountaineering Foundation and Ambassadorship in Nepal.

Even to-day, common educated people in India hardly know much about Defence activities of their country, although she had to face four foreign aggressions since 1947. There was also a general misconception amongst the general run of the people that defence expenditure impeded economic development of the country. Sarin's book will come as an eye-opener to them. He has lucidly discussed how national economic progress and defence development can go together. He says that during great challenges faced by India "a major reason that the country has been able to meet these situations successfully is our emphasis on industrialisation and development. This has been an important feature of national policy initiated by Jawaharlal Nehru." Prime Minister Indira Gandhi also followed the

policy of rapid industrialisation. She observed in 1972: "In modern warfare, industry is the true base of military strength. ***Economic Swaraj becomes a reality only when self-reliance has been fully achieved."

In this age of conflict, between 1945 and 1975, there were 119 wars (both internal and international) the total duration of them adding up to 350 war years. On a statistical average, at any time, a war or conflict was going on in 12 theatres, and territories of 69 countries, and armed forces of 81 states out of 145 members of the U.N. were involved. \$6,000 billion at 1975 prices, equal to the GNP for the entire world in 1975, had been spent on military activities during that period and millions were killed. Global expenditure in 1975 reached \$ 300 billion a year, and the two Super Powers spent more than 2/3 of that total. What is more, during the thirty-year period since the Second World War, there was not a single day free of conflict. Of these conflicts and wars 97% occurred in the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Although common people are mostly concerned with the stock-piles of strategic weapons in the arsenals of the two Super Powers, the destructive capability of thousands of tactical weapons, many of them 100 times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb, deployed in Europe alone, is generally forgotten.

Prof. Emile Benoit of Columbia University has come to the conclusion, after studying the effect of defence expenditure on 44 developing countries during 1950-65, that defence effort had not any net adverse effect on their economic growth. "The eleven countries with the heaviest defence burdens had a much higher growth rate than the eleven with the lowest defence burdens." During the years 1963 and 1964 when the army was doubled, the defence budget suddenly increased. However, our economy was not seriously affected and could bear the additional burden as the country stood united and was willing and keen to make sacrifices in support of the war effort.

Sarin has also made an important remark: "The educative disciplining and socially integrating influence of the years spent in the armed forces on the life and outlook of a person in our country can hardly be over-estimated."

Nehru called the Second Five-Year Plan "Defence Plan" and defined Defence as "defence forces plus your industrial and technolo-

gical background plus thirdly, the economy of the country and fourthly the spirit of the people." After the 1965 War, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri wanted the Fourth Five-Year Plan to be defence-oriented, in which mining of strategic metals such as copper, zinc, lead, etc. received high priority. The Department of Defence Supplies was created in November 1965 to mobilise facilities in civilian industry to meet defence requirements for components and sub-assemblies in the field of armaments, electronics, vehicles, instrumentation, engineer stores, etc. This was essentially to help fill the gap created by stoppage of such items by foreign suppliers needed for the maintenance of imported equipment. Indigenous defence production began increasing at the rate of 25% each year, and the R & D effort was accelerated to double itself every five or six years. Need was felt for a larger interaction between Defence on the one hand and the National laboratories and institutions of higher learning in the field of R & D. Hence Defence collaboration was started with the five Indian Institutes of Technology, the Indian Institute of Science (Bangalore), the National Physical Laboratory, the Institute of Radio Physics of the Calcutta University, and the University of Roorkee. Sarin has described all this development in brief. Next, he has pointed out the contribution of the armed forces towards India's social and national integration. He says: "The armed forces represent efficiency at its best with their discipline, emphasis on team work, planned execution of tasks, handling of complicated equipment and awareness of sophisticated technologies, and attitudes of self-reliance, modernity, and civic mindedness. In our nation one can trace a positive correlation in regard to successful development of industrial infrastructure and the tradition of service in the armed forces. Punjab, Haryana, West Uttar Pradesh, East Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Maharashtra are relatively more developed and these also are the areas which traditionally contribute the largest personnel to the Armed Forces."

The first Five-Year Defence Plan was formulated for the first time in 1964. However, as the cycle of development-to-production of defence equipment was generally 5 to 7 years (in case of some aircraft it was upto 10 years), five-year plans were considered inadequate. Hence "roll on" Plan for Defence for ten years and even more was introduced. The Planning Commission also started associating the Ministry of Defence in the areas of the construction of roads in border areas, establishment of tele-communication links, development of ports and harbours and laying of railway lines.

"There are three main levels for coordination between defence and development namely, (i) planning, (ii) R & D, and (iii) production. ***The advantages of interaction of defence R & D with the general R & D effort are also obvious. It could facilitate better utilisation of specialised equipment and limited scientific manpower in fields of advanced technologies. It would create larger awareness of defence problems and needs, reduce duplication of effort, and permit having more teams exceeding the critical size working on major problems of national relevance than would be otherwise possible."

Col. P. Lal, Secretary of USI, has aptly said in his Preface to this book, "We hope this publication will be a valuable source of information for those who are keenly interested in our Defence problems and requirements." The book contains, *inter alia*, useful Statistical Tables on (i) Comparative Defence Expenditures, 1972-76, of the important countries of the world, and (ii) Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP in respect of the NATO countries, and also a Bibliography.

— DR. B.C. CHAKRVORTY

THE INDIAN OCEAN AND INDIA'S MARITIME SECURITY,

BY ADMIRAL S.N. KOHLI, PVSM

United Service Institution of India, New Delhi-110011, 1981; pages: 99; price: Rs. 25

THIS book is the result of the fifth National Security Lecture, delivered by Admiral S.N. Kohli at Sapru House, New Delhi, during 13-14 November 1979. In the first part of this lecture, Admiral Kohli has dealt with Sea power—its meaning and function in the context of India and the Indian Ocean, big power rivalry in it and the exploitation of its enormous economic wealth—; in the second part he has discussed the concept of maritime strategy and its evolution, and also suggested some course of action for the 1980s. According to him : "Sea power is composed of many ingredients—geography, climate, population, commerce, industry, technology and a people's aptitude for seafaring."

After giving a brief historical survey of Sea power in the Indian Ocean since times immemorial, he has given some useful statistics about the Indian Ocean, which is about 75 million Sq Km in area,

with 44 littoral states in and around it. "The vast mineral resources and commercial crops add to its strategic importance in relation to the industrially advanced countries of Western Europe, the USA, Japan, China and the Soviet Union. Significantly almost 90 per cent of the trade of the littoral countries is West oriented." "The Indian Ocean is important to India for her foreign trade with practically all countries of the world which runs into Rs. 11400 crores. At any one time there are 90 Indian ships at sea. Our merchant shipping tonnage which is now about 5 million tons is rapidly being built-up. At present India carries only 25 per cent of its total trade in Indian ships, and for the rest relies on foreign vessels." He has also analysed the roles of the major powers and some littorals in the Indian Ocean. Concluding the first part of his lecture he says: "There can be little doubt that the economic importance of the Indian Ocean will increase and that the maritime forces of the littoral states will grow in size and sophistication. Whether the Super Powers will care to accept the peace zone concept or give it serious consideration is still a matter of speculation. The littoral states are endeavouring to secure the support of world opinion for this concept, but they need to plan their strategy beyond this stage. The time is ripe for a more purposeful accord among them."

According to Admiral Mahan, the great American naval theoritian, the object of maritime strategy was to control the seas in order to utilise them to one's own advantage and deny their use to the adversary. To-day, use of sea power implies the control of the Seas in time of war and their use and exploitation in peace time too. The advancement of science and technology has changed the concept of maritime strategy. The advanced use of conventional submarines and the nuclear ones, the extension of air power to Ocean areas through shore-based and carrier-borne aircraft, satellite surveillance and the introduction of Cruise missiles have vastly affected the Sea power. As regards India Admiral Kohli observes: "Today a number of navies are emerging in the littoral states of the Indian Ocean. Five Indian ocean countries have developed a submarine arm and almost all are acquiring missile fitted ships and aircraft. In these days of wars by proxy, if any of these states is persuaded to confront India, our Navy should be capable of meeting the threat. It must equally be able to meet the threat of adventurist policies against India by any regional state." He adds: "Another important factor is the life span of Naval ships and equipment. The life of a steel ship of the frigate type is about 20 years, of a cruiser about 25 years

and of smaller vessels about 12 to 15 years. Electric and electronic equipment of ships becomes obsolete after 10 or 11 years.".. "Even in advanced countries with up-to-date repair and maintenance facilities, the availability factor of ships is of the order of 60%; in other words if a navy has 10 frigates, only 6 of them can be expected to be fully serviceable at any one time." According to him India's naval development should include:

- Ocean-going forces, three dimensional in character, constituting the main strike forces, with provision for various escort commitments and surveillance capability;
- coastal defence forces, required to sanitize an area roughly extending to the limits of our exclusive economic zone;
- harbour defence forces, to protect vital ports and harbours from saboteurs and mines;
- logistic support forces, to replenish the front line forces at sea;
- amphibious forces, for the defence of our outlying island territories and other amphibious tasks; and
- the air elements that should be integrated with the above forces".

Ocean going forces must include sea control vessels with their tactical air component, command and control vessels and ships of the frigate/destroyer type which are the work horses of the Navy."

He thinks that the wisest method to determine naval force levels is by determining India's maritime assets and liabilities. Ports and harbours, offshore islands and off-shore oil installations and the Exclusive Economic Zone, upto 200 miles off the coast confer economic advantages, but they also add to India's responsibility by the way of securing them against encroachments. Also, India will have to guard against the possibility of the enemy's friends' ability to easily press their maritime strength into the service of the enemy during a war. Not only a large number of naval ships is required to guard the 5700-Km long coast-line of India and its extensive coastal waters, but a modern navy with up-to-date arms and equipment is the need of the hour.

Admiral Kohli has also emphasised the need for the economic exploitation of the almost inexhaustible sources of food, mineral, and

energy under the sea. The mineral nodules on the sea-bed consisting of manganese, cobalt, nickel and copper can provide the world with approximately 400 million tons of ores till eternity. There is a vast scope for the expansion of India's maritime fishing operation. The Admiral has rightly concluded: "It is against this backdrop that India has to plan its naval forces for the future and its maritime strategy keeping in mind two vital things. First that naval power, though vital, is only one of the several important ingredients of sea power and therefore the other constituents of sea power, such as the merchant fleet, ports, oceanography and the like should not be neglected. Secondly in developing sea power we should not overlook that there is a long time lag between conception and commissioning as far as naval vessels are concerned. And, thirdly a maritime strategy which acts as a deterrent in peace and carries the fight to the enemy territory in war must take account of the fact that in naval warfare we can also be faced by the fleets of those powers which have not land frontier with us. We must build up our maritime services to guard our vital maritime interests and hence establish a more viable international order in the Indian Ocean.

In the late fifties and early sixties we had to pay a very heavy price for the neglect of the defence of the Himalayas, to neglect the seas in the future would be a blunder of the same Himalayan dimensions."

India being a peninsular country can hardly afford to neglect her maritime security. Anybody, interested in this, will benefit immensely by reading Admiral Kohli's book.

—DR. B.C. CHAKAVORTY

'NUCLEAR BATTLEFIELDS—GLOBAL LINKS IN THE ARMS RACE'

BY WILLIAM M ARKIN AND RICHARD W FIELDHOUSE

Published by Ballinger Publishing Company, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, 1985, Pages: 328, \$ 1495

(A Subsidiary of Harper & Roin, Publishers, Inc) Copy Available in India From :

The Regional Manager, Harper & Roin, Publishers, 105, Harsh Bhawan 64-65, Nehru Place, New Delhi-110019

THIS is one of the most amazingly informative books on the subject of nuclear warfare preparation. It covers all those states and

countries which have, and are ready to use, nuclear weapons. The whole gamut of delivery systems, locations, targetting and provisions for early warning are discussed and shown on maps. In the case of the USA the communication set up in relation to the fighting of a nuclear war are also displayed. In view of the secrecy attached to all military and naval planning it is astounding that so much information could be gathered together. The only other possibility is that the defence establishments themselves have co-operated in revealing all that they thought necessary. In any case with surveillance satellites orbiting both the USA and the USSR it is not possible that much concealment is workable as either side will have certainly a rough, if not an accurate, idea of locations and so on of the other. Thus excessive secrecy is not only impractical but also unnecessary.

The book covers the USA, the USSR, Europe and China. If what is stated about the latter is correct then that country is far more advanced in the nuclear field than it is believed. The authors appear to stress that China is more concerned about the threat from the Soviet Union. On the other hand they locate a missile launching site at what appears to be Lhasa. This could only be sited to cover South Asia and from this point of view represents a threat to the whole region. There is also reference to the means employed to listen into and jam the adversary's line and radio communications. The use of satellites for this purpose in the case of radio communications is not widely known. But ground stations are also needed in close proximity to the stations being watched. This is where Pakistan comes in useful to the USA. It is probable that it also provides seismic information to monitor nuclear testing in the USSR. These points have not been covered. In this way the actual situation of the development of nuclear weapons and their stocks in Third World countries such as India and Pakistan has not been mentioned. There is also a lack of definition of the situation in Israel and South Africa.

The book discusses the possible conduct of nuclear war going from the tactical battlefield to the selection of certain targets on the strategic level to a full scale nuclear exchange. In this it probably reflects the views of the military leadership in the USA. The latter seem to feel a general nuclear war may be avoided; and that the USA must be able to fight on after a full scale exchange has taken place. The idea of a protracted war is also what the Soviets are preaching. The book gives some idea of the reaction time available for a nation's

leadership, in this case the USA, to decide what action has to be taken. This is mentioned as 30 minutes. Obviously the 'hotting up' of the political situation will give some added warning; of days or weeks. The direct lines between the leadership of the USA and the USSR might have been used. The political warning will therefore be sufficient for an alert which according to the authors is constantly at a high level. In the event of a communications black out there are arrangements whereby military commanders have the right to take action under certain circumstances. This could be dangerous in the event of such a leader being too quick off the mark or jumpy; but such plans are indeed necessary. The book also points out the fact that there are really no areas which could now be called 'nuclear free' zones since in most countries or their nearabouts there are staging posts for nuclear carrying aircraft or other arrangements. Thus most of the globe is involved by the superpowers in their struggle between themselves. The nuclear battle field is therefore geographically very comprehensive. No place would thus be safe from harm in a nuclear exchange between the superpowers.

The stress on accuracy in delivery on selected targets seems to have been taken to extremes. If a bomb will destroy everything within a radius of some miles why is it necessary to reach an accuracy of some few millimeters. This may be needed in the case of navigation of ships and aircraft. But progress cannot be denied. There is a similar urge for improving warheads, delivery systems and communications to missile locations. Much research and development in this connection goes on in what appears to be a megalomaniacal way on all sides of the Iron and Bamboo Curtains. If the result of any use of nuclear weapons will lead to a general war and this will create a 'nuclear winter' in which life as we know it is unlikely to survive, the conclusion can only be that nuclear war must be avoided at all costs. Denuclearisation is what the authors recommend. They emphasise that the infrastructure of global nuclear war represents a danger in that some spark might set fire to the whole structure possibly inadvertently. Dismantling of this would reduce such an eventuality. On the other hand it might mean a loss of standing for the superpowers and they might have to fight at a disadvantage against superior numbers. Proliferation of know-how has also widened the area of threat since even some developing countries can make rudimentary warheads. This complicates the situation. Serious and credible arms control reductions are needed. The developed countries have to arrive at a clear enunciation of their aims. They have to defuse the tensions

which exist between themselves. Through example they can begin to make other nations settle problems that they might have with their neighbours. This is probably idealistic. The political masters can however control their military leaders in the never ending search for personal aggrandisement, which is reflected in their demands for more and more weaponry; and greater and greater sophistication in the development of armaments. The authors point out that the instinct of the common man and woman against the use of the nuclear weapon is right. May be all they want is to stress the right to live and not the right of someone else to get them killed. This refers to the many people involved in Peace groups. Survival is after all the basic instinct of all living beings.

Devoid of unnecessary jargon, short and to the point, with references clearly indicated, a large bibliography for further study, this is a stimulating and informative book on the subject of nuclear war.

—GEN SATINDER SINGH (RETD)

NUCLEAR WEAPONS? POLICY OPTIONS FOR INDIA

BY BHABANI SEN GUPTA AND CENTRE FOR POLICY RESEARCH, NEW DELHI

Published by Sage Publications, New Delhi, 1983, Pages: 122, Price: Rs. 60/-

THE Book under review is a comprehensive analysis of papers presented and discussion held at a Seminar in April 1982 organised by the Centre for policy research, New Delhi. The list of participants and speakers in the Seminar indicates that the organisers succeeded in bringing on one platform distinguished scholars and experts from different parts of India to express their views on Nuclear Weapon proliferation programme in South Asia. The analysis of the discussions during the Seminar has been presented in first four chapters by Bhabani Sen Gupta while the fifth and last chapter relates to the Seminar report by G.C. Katoch. Thus the book contains the wisdom of all those who participated in the Seminar.

'Nuclear Weapons' production system is linked with the advancement of the Science and Technology which are themselves interlinked with the over-all development of a State System. And

hence problems related to nuclear weapons cannot be examined in isolation. They must be placed in proper perspective. Professor Sen Gupta has placed the whole problem related to India's option for nuclear weapon in a perspective which makes issues vividly clear. However, the author is quite critical of adhocism in India's defence policy, especially India's nuclear policy. So far India has shown greater sensitivity, and unduely so, to external developments, especially development in Pakistan, rather than inner requirements and capacity. Developments in the neighbouring countries cannot be ignored but they cannot be allowed to overwhelm our thinking process. Whether India should go for nuclear weapon or not should not depend whether Pakistan has one or not. It should respond to our political will to emerge as a global power. And hence any kind and adhocism in this regard will cause undesirable confusion in our policy formulation and plan of action and would hamper India's national interest. The author has rightly pointed out that the ad-hoc style of defence decision-making is becoming unequal to the task of meeting security problems and challenges in the coming years. What India needs is an integrated approach to National Security, based on a carefully thought out policy."

The emerging scenario, strategy and counter-strategies in the sub-continent and requirement of nuclear weapons for India are quite enlightening and would help the policy makers in nuclear policy formulation.

The fundamental question before the Indian policy-makers is: Can a country of India's size, geo-political location, capacity and international status ignore the problem of nuclear weapon and, that too, when nuclear weapon is directly related to power status? No. It certainly cannot afford that. It can be delayed but cannot be avoided for ever. India must master political will to go for nuclear weapon. It must mobilize the resources required not only for nuclear weapon but sustaining the scientific and technological innovation. Lofty idealism without strength behind proves meaningless and ineffective. India as a nuclear power would prove greater asset for the rest of the third world. Moreover, it will compel the power blocs to negotiate the disarmament more seriously and sincerely rather than participate only in cosmetic negotiations, as they have been doing at present. However, Prof. Sen Gupta makes out a strong case against India going nuclear.

Though the book is useful for scholars and policy-makers, it is trying to sail against the current.

—PROF. D.D. KHANNA

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

EDITED BY K. SUBRAHMANYAM

Published by Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi
1985, Pages: 310, Price: Rs. 150/-

THE book under review contains three articles each by K. Subrahmanyam and C. Raja Mohan, and two articles each by Jagjit Singh and P.K.S. Namboodiri. All the contributors are experts in their respective field of studies, holding different posts in the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis. All of them have developed Third World perspective and are quite critical about the Western perspective on the Non-proliferation Treaty and the senselessness of the Western nuclear strategy.

K. Subrahmanyam has forcefully highlighted that the "real conscience-keepers of the concept of non-proliferation are those nations which are fighting the treaty which license unlimited proliferation." He further argues that the vertical nuclear proliferation along with horizontal proliferation through delegated authority and diversion of weapons and devices pose grave threat to humanity. In his opinion acquisition of nuclear weapons by new nations may contribute to increased stability, and that the nonaligned countries must struggle against the nuclear weapon cult of the nuclear powers.

C. Raja Mohan provides deep insight into the advancements made in the field of nuclear technology and the danger those pose to human civilization. But, his analysis of meaningless Non-proliferation Treaty is nothing but an echo of K. Subrahmanyam's analysis of the nature of problem facing the N.P.T. However, he asserts that "nothing short of a dramatic threat to walk out of the treaty by a large number of parties to the N.P.T. can shake the nuclear weapon states into meaningful action against their own policies of nuclear proliferation."

Although the N.P.T. is presented as a major nuclear arms control measure, it does nothing to alleviate the dangers of nuclear

war or stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In fact, it was never intended to do so. According to C. Raja Mohan, the only purpose it has served is to legitimise the nuclear arms race. As long as nuclear weapons are seen as instruments of political power, the major power centres of the world are bound to get them, in one form or the other. Since Non-proliferation Treaty does not address itself to this central problem of legitimacy of nuclear force, the presence or absence of N.P.T. is hardly of any relevance to international security. In his opinion the technology and doctrine of command and control of nuclear weapons have, quietly and surreptitiously brought us face to face with an enduring nightmare of mankind—when machines take over from man.

Jasjit Singh makes his point by stating that as long as nuclear weapons exist, and military capabilities continue to get enhanced with non-nuclear weapon development, the probabilities of actual use of nuclear weapons are increasing. The solution lies not in cosmetic attempts to control them through artificial and fragile arrangements or make them irrelevant through abstract logic, but by total elimination of nuclear weapons if the human race is to aspire to continue its existence.

Namboodiri in his chapter discusses the threshold of climatic effects of multiple nuclear explosions beyond which the surface temperature of the Earth would fall below freezing levels, setting in a prolonged 'nuclear winter', destroying almost all higher life forms, including the human. Regardless of the fact that the northern hemisphere would be main target zone where nuclear explosions take place, the dust and soot column will soon envelop the entire globe, covering the non-combatant nations as well. This threshold is likely to be crossed by the use of even a fraction of the existing nuclear weapon stockpiles. This is an alarming development for all. To get rid of the situation there is need of change of thinking all over the globe. Nuclear devices are not and cannot be a weapon of war or a tool of politics. Nuclear superiority is a delusion. Nuclear arms are not muscles of the modern state; they are a cancerous growth which threatens the very state. Either we will destroy the cancerous growth or it will destroy us.

The book presents a good case for reviewing the Non-proliferation Treaty. It may initiate a serious debate on the subject.

—PROF. D.D. KHANNA

"FUNDAMENTALS OF TACTICAL COMMAND AND CONTROL—A SOVIET VIEW"

BY IVANOV, SAVEL' YEV, AND SHEMANSKIV—

Translated and published under the auspices of the USAF with the approval of the All-Union Copyright Agency of the USSR, Moscow 1977.

THE book is a textbook on command and control at the tactical level, that is at divisional, brigade and battalion HQs. Interspersed throughout are wise aphorisms on the principles of command and leadership.

The techniques mentioned are based on tactical nuclear war which call for some modifications in the methods utilised in the Indian Army. The need is for reducing timings and concentrations of troops so that no worthwhile nuclear target is presented. The tables of timings are useful in dovetailing all commanders and their staffs in this aim while planning and conducting operations. By and large these are mainly related to offensive actions against an enemy. Since there are references to the systems in the US Army it will not be incorrect to assume that the adversary is the USA.

While much is made of the use of mathematical calculations on a computer the writers warn that it is not possible to quantify battle conditions in mathematical terms. Soldiers are not robots. And there are other variables such as incomplete information of both the enemy and that of own troops. But the psychological factors dominate in the conduct of operations at the tactical levels. In the final analysis it is the will of the commander as transmitted through the action of his troops that should so dominate the will of the opposing command that the latter is constrained to change his plans in conformation of those of the former.

Pre-vision and foresight of the commander and the staff, a well established battle drill at HQ and subordinate levels, clear and concise orders, co-ordination and checking of lower formation and unit plans, and lastly monitoring of the latter to see that they are going according to the instructions laid down, all aid in reducing time and increasing the effectiveness of the actions of the force.

It is essential to keep abreast of the situation so that corrective measures and the movement of reserves can be carried out in time.

The need for duplicate control HQ at least at divisional and brigade or regimental levels has been mentioned. This might be done keeping in view that one salvo of nuclear missiles does not destroy both control posts. Such dispersion is possible only at divisional levels. Mention of the use of helicopters in this role has also been made. It might then be possible to evade destruction from nuclear missilery as well as oversee the operation.

Dispersion of troops would no doubt make it difficult to brief and prepare them adequately in the short times available. This is where the use of a number of alternatives and objectives might be given well before the battle. The actual objectives then might be passed through the use of the appropriate code words. The maximum initiative on the part of subordinate commanders in taking action based on the general directives of the higher command would then be necessary. While paying lip service to this aspect it would appear that the writers lay more stress on strict control and less on initiative. The latter would be absolutely essential in a post nuclear situation, where heavy damage can be expected.

The book will be useful as a reference at tactical schools and formations when considering the fundamentals of tactical command and control.

—SATINDER SINGH

AIR POWER IN MODERN WARFARE

BY AIR CMDE JASJIT SINGH, AVSM, VI C, VM,

Published by Lancer International, New Delhi 1985, pages: 303; price: Rs. 150/-

THE book, which has been 'Foreworded' by Air Chief Marshal I.H. Latif, is the product of the author's research at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Starting with an introductory Chapter 'The Indivisible Air Power', Air Cmde Jasjit Singh has followed up with ten chapters, entitled:

Air Warfare

1. Air Superiority: The Struggle for Dominance
2. Fighter Aircraft Trends
3. Imperatives of Air Defence

4. Airborne Early Warning
5. War in the Fourth Dimension

Air Land Warfare

6. Air Interdiction
7. Offensive Air Support of Land Forces

Air Power at Sea

8. Sea Skimming Air Threat
9. Aerial Surveillance for Maritime Security

Trends in Air Power

10. Impact of Emerging Technologies on Air Power

Although the Soviet Leader, Khrushchev, in his time, gave No. 1 position to the missile force, deprecating the importance of the conventional forces, later his successors redressed this miscalculation by building up both nuclear and conventional forces in a balanced way. What Winston Churchill had meant long ago by saying that "air mastery is today the supreme expression of military power", was endorsed by Caspar Weinberger, the US Secretary for Defence, in his Annual Report to the US Congress for FY 1985, when he said, "Air superiority remains a critical linchpin in the air, sea, and ground battles; without it, our forces are subject to attack by enemy aircraft."

There is no doubt that airforce will continue to play a dominant role in this age in any conventional war, but in a nuclear war its role may be undermined by missiles and nuclear submarines equipped with ICBMs. Secondly, whatever be the potential of modern air power its projection will depend upon the technological and economic resources of a particular country. Taking into consideration the rate at which the cost of the present-day sophisticated fighters and bombers is increasing, in near future the acquisition of more advanced aircraft with more sophisticated weapon systems will remain as the dream of most of the countries of the world.

The author, being an air force officer himself, has shown some bias in favour of air power. He has rated air defence through SAM system as inferior to air defence provided by the air force, on the basis of Egyptian and Syrian performance, but in abler hands SAM

could have done much better. No doubt, US Army's new doctrine, called "Air-Land Battle 2000" envisages the importance of air power in land battles, but in the face of efficient use of good missile systems how this doctrine will hold good can hardly be predicted now. His categorical statement "As much as armour must finally dominate hostile armour, as much as naval fleet must dominate the hostile naval power, so must air power do so to its adversary air power if victory is sought," may not always hold good. Everything does not depend upon the air power alone. Much depends on the geographical situation of the combatant countries, their weapon systems and their strategy and tactics. One's air power can be successfully tackled by another's AAA or mobile missiles without using aircraft at all. The use of fast-growing electronics and laser technology in weapon systems may both increase and counter the capability of air power. From that angle of vision, nothing can be said with any amount of certainty about the Air power in future.

Undoubtedly, this publication will provide the reader with good knowledge about the role of airpower in modern warfare plus some food for thought. It contains some useful data tables about airpower, a good bibliography and an index.

—DR. B. C. CHAKRAVORTY

BRITISH AIR STRATEGY BETWEEN THE WARS

By MALCOLM SMITH

Published by Oxford University Press Walton St. Oxford 1984, Pages: 360, Price £ 22.50.

WHILE there are a number of books dealing with the airwarfare during the Second World War, there are only a few books which cover earlier period. This book, in that sense, covers a gap of about two decades which has received scant attention of military historians.

The period between the World Wars was very significant as during this period the nations which fought on different sides utilized the time in improving their weaponry. They expected a war of great scale would break out sooner or later. Hence, it is called a period of armistice. This book vividly describes how after the World War I, there were attempts made to wind up a unified air service and

how it survived. The internal problems and their effects on the re-armament particularly on the production of aircraft is one of the facts which are not commonly known. Smith brings out that soon after the war, the re-armament was more guided by domestic needs than by military thinking. Gradually, the military thinking got priority when the situation began to deteriorate and war appeared to be a reality. In Britain, the theory of strategic interception by Royal Air Force (RAF) developed which implied that the enemy should be forced on the defensive by the sheer weight of the offensive on vital centres. Keeping this doctrine in mind, the RAF was developed till 1937. It was in this year that Inskip Report was prepared which can be called the cornerstone of British policy for fighting during the Second World War. It altered the priorities : it stressed the need for Britain to adopt on initially a defensive posture in a renewed conflict, to withstand the knock out blow, and then to gather the attritional strength which would carry her to victory. This meant turning the prime attention in re-armament from Bomber Command to Fighter Command. In short, the book not only gives details of strategic concepts that developed during the World Wars but also explains the factors that were responsible for them.

The book contains bibliographical notes, tables covering annual expenditure on the armed forces between 1929-40 and comparison of German Air Force and RAF; and a comprehensive bibliography. This book is recommended for military historians and political scientists.

—S.D. PRADHAN

NO FIRE NO THUNDER : THE THREAT OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

BY SEAN MURPHY, ALASTAIR HAY, STELEN ROSE

Published by Monthly Review Press, New York, 1984, Pages: 145
Price: \$7.50

THIS is an important book on war studies not because it brings a new strategic concept but because it points out the growing threat from chemical and biological weapons which are increasing everyday but has been obscured due to the fear of nuclear war. It is produced by three scientists who worked together for three years to put the

threat from the chemical and biological weapons in the right perspective.

The book points out how a systematic development of these weapons is taking place and the new techniques and researches are making them deadlier. The authors rightly do not agree that there is a difference between lethal and non-lethal chemical and biological weapons (CBW). A mere dose of the so called non-lethal CBW can prove fatal. They have also clearly brought out how a new chemical and biological arms race is under way and how inspite of Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972, the race has not been checked.

The First World War saw the first experiment on a large scale in the use of chemical weapons. While Germans used phosgene, the British retaliated by using a mixture of chlorine and phosgene. After the war, chemical weapons were used against the Russian and the Afghans. The devastating effects of these weapons compelled the mankind to check their use. The result was the Geneva Protocol of 1925. While about 40 countries signed in that year, others took as long as 50 years (USA) to ratify it and this made the Protocol weak. However, it was an important step in the right direction. From 1925 onwards, more attempts were made to develop effective chemical weapons. Italians used phosgene and mustard gas against Ethiopians. During the Second World War, all sides used nerve gas and other chemical weapons. Since the end of the war, there are numerous instances of the use of chemical weapons. Its devastating results are seen in Vietnam where for number of years CBW were used extensively. It has led to changes in local rainfall, excessive erosion and irreparable damages to local fauna and flora.

Similarly, the biological weapons are a threat to the mankind. The biological weapons are bacteria, viruses, fungi or rickettsia (a form of bacteria) which are used in wartime to create disease or death in enemy population. It was during the Second World War, that the British began to do research seriously on biological warfare as they expected the use of biological weapons by the Germans. Churchill had agreed with his military advisers that the only deterrent for biological weapons was the ability to retaliate in kind. The researches in biological weapons have continued ever after 1945. What makes these weapons dreadful is that even a small cylinder of bacteria can kill a large number of persons. These weapons can

also be spread by guided missiles and can be dispersed from aircrafts. Alarmed world leaders by the destructive value of these weapons, brought the Biological Weapon Convention of 1972. This represented a significant breakthrough in military thinking about biological weapons. However, the chemical weapons were not included in it.

The authors after describing the fatal effects of the CBW, desire that some effective law should make their possession illegal. In the end, they appeal to readers to join them to work against the use of CBW.

The book has five tables giving details of the CBW and their effects. It also gives a select bibliography and index. It is indeed a commendable work and is recommended to all those who have interest in world peace.

—S.D. PRADHAN

GULF SECURITY INTO THE 1980s: PERCEPTUAL AND STRATEGIC DIMENSION

EDITED BY ROBERT G. DARIUS, JOHN W AMOS AND RALPH H. MAGNUS

Published by Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, Stanford, California, 1984, pages: 134, Price: \$21.95.

THIS book is the result of seminars organised by the Middle East Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania, in cooperation with the National Defense University. The following papers have been chapterized in this publication:

- “CHAPTER 1. The Gulf Cooperation Council and Persian Gulf Security . . . Michael Sterner
- CHAPTER 2. Egypt and the Iran-Iraq War . . . Philip H. Stoddard
- CHAPTER 3. The Iran-Iraq War: Implications for US Policy . . . Harold H. Saunders
- CHAPTER 4. The Effect of the Iran-Iraq War on Soviet Strategy in the Persian Gulf . . . Michael Lenker
- CHAPTER 5. Pakistan and the Gulf . . . Craig Baxter

CHAPTER 6. Iraqi Military Policy: From Assertiveness to Defense . . . John Devlin

CHAPTER 7. The Iran-Iraq War and Iran's Defense Policy . . . Shireen Hunter"

As the two Super Powers have large stakes in the Persian Gulf region, the Gulf politics is vastly complex, and the regional powers have proved themselves as skilful players of international power-politics. Although the conservative Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the UAE) ultimately depend upon American protection against Communist (mainly Soviet) threat, attacks from progressive states of the region and internal threats, their leaders betray deep ambivalences and an inclination to improve relations with the USSR, because like the latter the US has a rather mixed success of influencing its Middle East 'Clients'. As regards the possible results of the Iran-Iraq War, GCC is wary of either's victory. For, if Iran wins, Iran's Islamic 'revolution' may threaten the conservative monarchies, and if Iraq wins, the post-Iraq-Iran War vigour of Iraqi 'socialism' may threaten the conservative Arab regimes. It will be interesting to see if GCC develops itself as a Security organisation in future, and if so how it conducts itself.

As regards the impact of the Iran-Iraq War on Egyptian foreign policy, P.H. Stoddard says that this war has led to the acceleration of Egypt's reintegration with the Arab world and increased economic benefits derived from the sale of arms to Iraq and the rising remittances of Egyptians working in Iraq. However, Egypt's defence priorities continue to be defined by its traditional concerns with Israel, Libya and internal security, and hence it will not be a decisive element in the Gulf equation, either militarily or politically, at least in foreseeable future.

While the latest US policy doctrine for the Gulf region was enunciated by President Carter in January 1981, envisaging US military resistance to any "out side force" trying to "gain control" of the "Gulf Region", President Reagan went one step further saying that should the area be destabilised from regional causes, the U.S. involvement would follow. As regards the implication of the Iran-Iraq War for US policy, H.H. Saunders thinks that the US has little influence with either Iraq or Iran, and she "cannot develop a workable strategy for protecting important interests in the Gulf unless we

give as much energy to dealing with the political problems of the area as we devote to our military preparations." However, with the build-up of RDF in Diego Garcia and the recent US Navy-based military action against Libya go to show the flexing of US muscle and the US will to intervene in the Middle East in defence of her interests.

While USA as a distant power gains by the continuation of the Iraq-Iran War, the Soviet Union "is caught in the bind of having to arm both Iraq and Iran, either directly or indirectly, for a war which only further erodes the Soviet position in the area." The latter, being the immediate neighbour of Iran, whose Islamic 'revolution' possesses the greatest potential to destabilize the Muslim republics of Soviet Central Asia, cannot side openly with Iraq in the War. She is trying to improve her economic and political relations with the Gulf States without criticizing Islam or its revival forms.

In his longish essay on *Pakistan and the Gulf*, C. Baxter has opined that although Pakistan has recently augmented and modernised her armed forces with US aid and stationed around 30,000 of its military forces in the Gulf region, her interests in this area are economic, as Pak employment opportunities in the Gulf and foreign exchange remittances therefrom are even more important than her substantial trade with the Gulf states. He concludes that neither USA can or should rely on Pakistan to play a role in the Gulf conflict, nor can Pakistan depend on direct US involvement in a conflict with the Soviet Union.

Between the two combatant powers in the Gulf, while Iraq's policy has shrunk from victory to defensive effort against recurrent Iranian attacks, Iran, despite receiving military supplies from Syria, Libya, North Korea, China and some East European countries, is suffering from shortage of arms and equipment in her war efforts against Iraq. Due to the decimation of her defence forces as a result of this war and the availability of inadequate resources to provide for heavy military hardware, Iran's position has deteriorated greatly since 1978. Shireen Hunter has observed: "The shape of Iran's future defense strategy and the structure of its military remain unclear, however. They are dependent on the uncertain outcome of the war, and on Iran's future political direction, especially after Khomeini's death."

Undoubtedly, this publication will be found very interesting by diplomats, scholars and students of international politics, dealing

particularly with the Persian Gulf region. The book contains some useful maps, statistical tables, bibliographical notes and an index.

—DR. B.C. CHAKRAVORTY

THE PLO AND PALESTINE

BY ABDALLAH FRANGI

Published by Zed Books Ltd 57 Caledonian Road, London NI 9BU.
English edition published in 1983 (original published in German).

THERE have been a plethora of books written in the English language on the Palestine problem giving the Israeli view point. This is one of the few from the 'other side of the hill', that is it gives the Palestinian side of the conflict.

Basically it demonstrates how an highly organised and directed society has been able to take over control from one that was not so well developed. The fact of the matter is that the Jews not only established their rule but also ejected a more populous Palestine community from the land they desired. Disprivileged in spite of their attainments in finance, science and the arts the Jews had come to the conclusion at the beginning of this Century that they could only gain in stature with the founding of their own state. Such a political entity was unfeasible in Europe or even in the Americas. They therefore selected their 'homeland' from the Bible. It was thus that Palestine, now Israel, became their target.

The 'fertile crescent' comprising of the valleys of the Tigris, Euphrates and the Jordan was directly controlled by the Ottoman Empire in the period preceding the First World War. This comprised of the states of Iraq, Syria, the Lebanon and Palestine. In fact these states came into being as the result of the Allied victory. The Arabs might have preferred one state for all this region but playing on the personal ambitions of the various chiefs a division was carried out. This suited the British who had always believed fervently in the maxim—'divide and rule'. It was important for them to control effectively the land bridge between Asia and Africa to ensure the security of their communications Eastwards from the UK to their possessions bordering the Indian Ocean. They were also interested in exploiting the oil discovered in Iraq for the benefit of the Royal

Navy. At the same time they accepted the idea of a homeland for the Jews in Palestine. Maybe they wanted to balance the Arabs with, in their view, the more amenable Jews. In this they were belied. It was more difficult for them to control the latter than the former. In fact they veered round towards greater sympathy for the Arabs in later years.

The PLO it is seen is a state without a state. It is highly organised politically and militarily. Rising out of the refugee camps to which the ousted inhabitants of the state of Israel established in 1948 this organisation has spread itself in most Arab countries and also into Europe. It is the result of the frustration caused by displacement from their homes and the lack of response by the other Arab states to absorb them. Pan-Arabic sentiments are given lip service by these states with the aim of neutralising internal dissent. The Palestine cause is promoted. All they want is that the more advanced Palestinians stay out of their countries so that they do not disturb the status quo. Initially however, they had united against the new state of Israel but were defeated in 1948. Later Egypt carried the banner of Arab unity but after two exhausting wars it too gave up. For the moment it is only Syria which confronts Israel but it too is cautious. It might have assailed the latter's advance into the Lebanon but it chose not to do so. Thus the path of terrorism is the only one that the Palestinians can use to show that their aim to regain a land of their own continues. Reading between the lines it seems that the initial urge of the Palestinians was to recover all the territory of the original Palestine but this now seems to have been replaced to accept Partition of that state. It is unlikely that the Israelis will be prepared to negotiate on this issue. At the same time they are sensitive of the terrorist pinpricks and their policy has been to push PLO bases away from their borders.

In this they have succeeded. Initially they pushed them out of the Gaza strip. This was later followed by their eviction from Jordan where the ruler co-operated since he was becoming afraid of their influence on the internal political scene. Finally they were ejected from the Lebanon. In their connivance with the Christian Falangists in the destruction and killings in the refugee camps after the PLO had left the Jews earned world wide condemnation. The PLO now operates from North Africa. This circumscribes their operations against Israel.

The book in passing records the divisions in the PLO itself. But according to the author it is Yasser Arafat who is the main leader of the movement. There are of course other contenders who desire a stronger line. Lacking effective Arab support and in their present situation it would appear that the PLO now favours a political solution to their problem. Maybe they fear that with the passage of time passions will die down and the Palestine movement run out of steam.

It is an interesting and well documented book.

—SATINDER SINGH

Letters to the Editor

The Editor
USI of India
Kashmir House
Rajaji Marg
New Delhi-110011

I

CAUSE TO STOP, THINK & ACT

Sir

Looking back at the Indian Army that was and that of today one cannot help but analyse the content of its manpower. I know that we are constantly thinking of the latest in weapons and technology; but it is the men behind the weapons and their supporting social relations that will tilt battles in our favour not the most sophisticated weapons in the World. The last and most lasting sign of this was the battle of Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam where these little men ran rings round French, German and other soldiers armed with the latest equipments and commanded by General Lattre De Tassigny. A perfect set of examples of my assertion are also visible from the Soviet Union and the victories of Mao Tse Tung over both Japan and Marshal Chiang Kai Shek.

While all the most sophisticated weapons of the world were supplied to the "White" Generals the Leninist forces prevailed. After that the interventionist forces of over a dozen countries also suffered the same fate. The USSR was scarcely into its third five year plan after all the devastation wrought inside and along its frontiers when it was overtaken by the Nazi invasion. Most of its Air Forces were caught on the ground and in any case its tanks and aircraft had been shot out of the battle grounds in Spain only two or three years earlier, by the sophisticated and advance designed German machines. Then those very machines entered Western Europe and swept empires before them through France. The most modern and the best forces of those countries were pushed like logs caught in the rapids, and then, broken up.

The Soviet Union in 1941 had no time to reshape its technology or its machines. So they faced up to the Nazi fury with whatever

they had. But by then Soviet manpower, besides its veterans who had undergone basic changes, was that which turned the tide before and at the gates of Moscow and which defied Von Leeb at the outskirts of Leningrad, producing victory where the whole world predicted defeat.

Again the long drawn battles of China, which are a study in Warfare by men, the like of which mankind had never known. Not only the unprecedented long march but the duration of the struggle against a sophisticated Japan and against Chiang's forces which were receiving weapons freely from Europe and the United States has to be studied in detail to be believed. Indeed the very core of Maos Army considered of himself and Chou Teh as leaders and a host of released criminals and beggars from towns as well as landless peasants eeking out a life of hardships and exposure, in central China. Yet these were the very forces which triumphantly entered Shanghai and Peking marching in as the victors of all China.

Again, one has to point not to the arms but to the manpower, its resilience, fortitude and unity of determination that brought such as Mao's forces to ultimate victory. Therefore one may be permitted to look at our own picture of today, for our position is much more critical than it was in 1947 and the decade or so thereafter. The British system of recruitment was based mostly on the tribal and somewhat on the caste system. For instance I was classified by them as a Hindustani Mussalman. The Rajputs of my state were also classified as Hindustani. Then the broader (caste-tribe) picture produced descriptions like Majha or Malwa Sikhs, Tewana's Rajas and so on to indicate a defined and separate group.

Obviously, in a divided and unitary India such groups could not be maintained untouched. Furthermore the pressures of society itself will not be able to maintain them. But we do still hold on to the system as such which was left by the British and we recruit accordingly. At the same time, after freedom, the gates of recruitment were opened to all classes and peoples. The system even turned round to providing for the numbers of intake on the basis of population of a state, modified by the past tradition and willingness to enroll; but this pattern is now rapidly changing and that is what needs our serious attention. The pattern in the officer cadres has already shown a distinct change.

During the pre-war days the young men of India who came into the Army were of two kinds. One with a fighting tradition of father-to-son behind them who were told they were being "true to their salt" and the other, about equal in numbers, who had no military tradition particularly those who joined the officer ranks. They were answering to the general political situation which demanded the replacing of Britishers by Indians and making the Indian Army Indian. Therefore both these types remained balanced in a unity of purpose. Officers and men were drawn from a largely feudal society.

Unfortunately, this picture has inevitably changed in the post freedom era. It should, of course have changed; but in the direction of and with a sense of a high patriotic cause. It has not quite taken that path. Sir Archibald Nye, when Governor of Madras, once said to me "The army is bound to reflect the country's social order." Today this seems true to me to an anxious making extent. There is no reason or cause for which young people in general are joining the army. The main reason for them is the good employment, it offers, and the hope of rising to the higher echelons. India has never learnt those lessons from U.S.S.R. and China as we have shown. No one even points to them as the road to success. Even our democracy is based on the British Monarchical way of life. That way of life, if clung to, will lead us down the same roads that the British made us tread. Even partition was planned and it was forced on us. The British talked our leaders into accepting it.

When one comes to think of it, there was not one good reason for accepting partition, nor for creating Pakistan. The most dishonest section of society in our kind of democracy is undoubtedly the politicians. India was sacrificed by them. They enjoy the fruit of partition today. However they have created thereby a very serious condition of insecurity on this sub-continent. In that situation we still employ mercenary troops from Nepal and the social influx which has taken place across the Indo-Pak borders has been disastrous.

Today the Jat is very much oriented to Haryana. The Sikh to Punjab and the Bihari to Bihar. This makes a nonsense of the National system itself. But even worse the army is now looked upon as a refuge from unemployment. Mr. Jagjiwan Ram wrote a note one day pointing to the army as a good source of employment for Harijans. So there is a rush to enrol where there was no such condi-

tion till recently. This must have its reflection on the battle field, if we should become involved. It is a very dangerous condition which needs examination and repair.

When freedom came the citizen in the street should have been made to feel a responsible individual participant in the progress of his country. Instead, the imperial relationship of ruler and ruled was continued. The relationship in the Armed Forces, as we have noted, was feudal to the core. This, over the years, has grown to one of sycophancy. The bearing of juniors before seniors is dreadful to behold. Furthermore if a junior happens to express his disagreement it is as likely as not to be reflected in his annual report. The annual medical examination also has become a morale breaker. All kinds of abtruse ailments like heart murmur or blood pressure stop one from further promotion. Thus service and advance in it has become something unpleasant. It has led to lack of character and to the domination of that dictum "It is not what you know, but who you know that matters."

It is probably fortunate for us that Pakistan became entangled in military rule, the great antithesis of all soldier like qualities; but that the whole ethos of personal qualities and officer-man relations in India have plummeted is now clearly visible. The officer of today is no longer the pride of his unit, the person to be emulated by his men in all things, mentally, physically and as an example in character. The disciplinary cases in the Indian army are as many and as bad as one saw in the pre-war British army in India. So, without this character this pride and the true patriotic ethos the army like 90% of our civilian officers and employees is just another place to earn a living to fill ones stomach and feed ones own family.

These thoughts came home as a shock to me as I saw the police wading into the servants of the U.P. Government in November. Oblivious of what it meant to the country or the state they have closed their offices and their ranks to demand more money for themselves, without waiting for negotiations or discussions. For them we and our country, for whose freedom one struggled are no where in their thoughts. The employer is the Govt. and the employed is the staff. They would struggle to get pay but to them their contribution to the country was the last thought. This is of course not their fault. It is the fault of the imperialist system and master and servant relations that exist in India.

What contrast this is to August 15, 1947 when I was fortunate enough to see Mr. Nehru hoist the National Flag at Delhi, for the first time. That was the moment to have preserved and the emotion to have cherished. It is probably lost for a long time to come. It can only be revived when we realize the value of our own people, the brotherhood of the humble the week end those who are prepared to give it from above, before they ask for it from below.

The examples of the USSR and China are clearly there to be followed. But it should be noted that while the Tzarist armies ran before those of Hindenburg and Ludendorff in World War One, these same people smashed the far greater Nazi forces in a manner never seen before. The same is the comparison between the armies of the Chinese Generals which were totally wiped out before the Socialist forces of Mao Tse Tung. The reasons and roads are so clear for all to follow. The army will be what we are. It can and must only be Indian in all ways. After the departure of the British, how closely integrated do we and our Armed Forces stand?

Maj Gen E. HABIBULLAH (RETD.)

II

LEADERSHIP AND VALUE SYSTEMS

LATELY, there have been a spate of articles and books published on leadership and value systems. The Army MT Dte has also initiated a study team to draw up a list of Dos and Dont's for governing an officer's conduct. The present COAS even thought it fit to address a letter to all officers on the subject, spelling out the leadership qualities and value systems he wants developed in the officer crops. All these articles, books, reports and letters describe the kind of leadership qualities, code of conduct and value systems that an officer must inculcate, and in which there never has been any dispute or doubt. The question has always been, as to how to bring about these qualities in our officers of today. The specific question is, why have we failed to do so even after 40 years of independence.

In my days we learnt our values, some from our parents, some from our teachers, but the bulk of what shaped our future thinking and conduct, was learnt from examples set by our seniors in Service.

They did not feel the need to set these values on paper, or to institute a study team to draw up a list for governing an officer's conduct. We saw only examples, and followed them, which stood us in good stead in the past. I am afraid such examples are lacking today.

I can do no better than to narrate here the discussion I had recently with a young Gunner officer of 12 years service, on a paper on Leadership written by his then Army Commander. To quote him, "we have read so much, and recently have had such a spate of lectures on leadership and values, that we have even lost count as to what leadership and values are all about. There is today such a wide gap between what the senior officers preach and what they follow, that it has led to a lack of credibility and faith in their sermons and writings. It would go a long way, if instead of sermonising and issuing guidelines on leadership and code of conduct, senior officers can display integrity and moral courage, which can be seen and conceived by all."

To my mind, this young Major has really hit the nail on the head, and this is the crux of the leadership and values problem which we are facing today. What is missing today is the Leader, whose example the subordinate can follow.

20 Nov 1986

BRIG N B GRANT (RETD) AVSM

USI PUBLICATIONS

USI NATIONAL SECURITY PAPERS

Para Military Forces

by Lt Gen ML Chibber, PVSM, AVSM

Price : Rs. 10.00

Defence Budgeting in India

by Shri DS Nakra (Retd)

Price : Rs. 10.00

Possible Counter Measures against Satellite
Reconnaissance

by Air Marshal IW Sabhaney, AVSM

Price : Rs. 10.00

Higher Defence Organisation

by Lt Gen SK Sinha, PVSM (Retd)

Price : Rs. 10.00

Leadership in the Indian Army During
Eighties and Nineties

Lt Gen ML Chibber, PVSM, AVSM

Price : Rs. 10.00

China's Strategic Posture in the 1980's (Revised)

by Lt Gen AM Vohra, PVSM

Price : Rs. 15.00

USI SEMINARS

Report on Armoured Personnel Carriers

Chairman Maj Gen D Som Dutt (Retd)

Price : Rs. 5.00

Report on the Imposition of a Manpower
Ceiling on the Army

Chairman Lt Gen ML Thapan, PVSM (Retd)

Price : Rs. 5.00

Retiring Age in the Armed Forces

Chairman Brig NB Grant, AVSM (Retd)

Price : Rs. 7.50

Report on Recruitment into the Officer Corps
of the Armed Forces

Chairman Maj Gen D Som Dutt (Retd)

Price : Rs. 5.00

Report on a Seminar on Cooperation in Defence

Chairman Lt Gen ML Thapan, PVSM (Retd)

Price : Rs. 5.00

Report on a Seminar on Review of the Organisation
Pattern of the Indian Army

Chairman Lt Gen ML Thapan, PVSM (Retd)

Price : Rs. 10.00

Report on the Military Threat in the Nineteen Eighties

Chairman Lt Gen AM Vohra, PVSM (Retd)

Price : Rs. 15.00

Report on Nuclear Shadow over the Sub-Continent

Chairman Maj Gen DK Palit, VrC

Price : Rs. 10.00

Relationship of Military Law and Discipline with the
Judicial System of the Country

Chairman Lt Gen ML Thapan, PVSM (Retd)

Price : Rs. 15.00

USI NATIONAL SECURITY LECTURES

India's Problems of National Security in the Seventies

by Gen JN Chaudhuri

Price : Rs. 10.00

India's Defence Policy and Organisation Since
Independence

by Shri P.V.R. Rao, ICS (Retd)

Price : Rs. 25.00

Some Problems of India's Defence

by Air Chief Marshal PC Lal, DFC (Retd)

Price : Rs. 25.00

Defence and Development

by Shri HC Sarin, ICS (Retd)

Price : Rs. 25.00

The Indian Ocean & India's Maritime Security

by Adm SN Kohli, PVSM (Retd)

Price : Rs. 25.00

Internal Threats and National Security

by Shri Govind Narain, ICS (Retd)

USI JOURNAL CENTENARY NUMBER

Contains informative and authoritative articles

Price : Rs. 15.00

Ask for your copy from :

Secretary, United Service Institution of India

Kashmir House, Rajaji Marg, New Delhi-110011

U S I

(Estd. 1870)

OUR ACTIVITIES

Library Service

ONE of the oldest and finest military libraries in India, today it has over 25,000 books, and journals on its shelves, including books published in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, on an astonishing variety of subjects. While the principal emphasis is on strategy and defence, there are a large number of works on different facets of Indian life, as well as on other countries. It is a store house of rare books and manuscripts for scholars and research workers devoted to political and military study.

Correspondence Courses

THE introduction of Correspondence Courses for promotion and Defence Service Staff College examinations some years ago found ready response and today the Institution has 1500 members who participate in the Training Courses. Material is despatched to them regularly wherever they may be.

The students have undoubtedly profited by these courses, as evidenced by the success achieved by them in these Examinations. Popularity apart, the courses contribute substantially to the revenue of the U.S.I.

Rules of Membership

1. All officers of the Defence Services and all gazetted officials shall be entitled to become members, without ballot, on payment of the entrance fee and subscription.

Other gentlemen may become members if proposed and seconded by a member of the Institution and approved by the Council. They will be entitled to all privileges of membership except voting.

2. Life Members of the Institution shall be admitted on payment of Rs. 270/- which sum includes entrance fee.

3. Ordinary Members of the Institution shall be admitted on payment of an entrance fee of Rs. 20/- on joining and an annual subscription of Rs. 20/- to be paid in advance.

For further particulars, write to Secretary, USI, Kashmir House, Rajaji Marg, New Delhi-110011.

USI Journal

OLDEST Defence Journal in India, it contains proceedings of lectures and discussions, prize essays, original articles, book reviews, etc.

It is published quarterly in April, July, October and January each year (the first issue being Jan-Mar each year). The Journal is supplied free to members. It provides a forum for the most junior officer to express his opinions relating to his profession.

Gold Medal Essay Competitions

THE gold medal essay competition is held every year. The subject for essay is announced during the month of March each year. On the occasion of the Centenary, an additional Gold Medal Essay Competition has been instituted for Junior Officers of not more than ten years' service.

Lectures and Discussions

A series of lectures by outstanding experts on service, international affairs and topics of general interest to the Services are organised for the benefit of Local Members in Delhi.

MacGregor Medal

THIS medal is awarded every year to officers for any valuable reconnaissance they may have undertaken.